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Abstract 
 
This study has designed a theoretical mapping of complex element relationships within the field 
of physical security. The main purpose of the mapping is to form individual knowledge 
structures for modelling and provide a relative understanding of overall risk based on different 
combinations of physical security arrangements. An understanding of overall risk for modelling 
purposes should lead to improvements in providing support for decision making within this 
field. 
 
The final series of knowledge structures in this study have been represented by value matrices 
for element pair assessments within the topic of physical security. The values that have been 
presented in the knowledge matrices have been gathered from expert opinion and converted to 
numerical data as a demonstration for a holistic approach to modelling physical security 
elements. A profile for each respondent and each category group has been developed to be 
compared for their degree of similarity with other profiles. A correlation technique provides an 
indication of the degree of consensus within the results.  
 
A single profile identified as the most appropriate standard of knowledge representing expert 
opinion, provides the highest relative degree of consensus of expert opinion for the final eight 
knowledge matrices. The hierarchical knowledge structures have each been set out as six by six 
matrices. Universal elements have been ranked in relative order using dimensional scales to 
provide a directional measure representing an overall benefit to security. 
 
The research questionnaire was able to construct a semantic mapping of the universal elements 
of the research by consideration of a hierarchy of relationships measured relative to each other 
using selected units of time. The indicators for time have been presented in the questionnaire as 
fuzzy incremental measures based on seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months and years. 
The time-based logarithmic scale value assessments of this research are able to be transformed 
into values that enable further statistical application. The validity and reliability of the results 
have been demonstrated for this research through the process of determining consensus using 
correlation techniques.  
 
A novel concept for modelling using mathematical tangent functions is presented in this study to 
demonstrate the application of the knowledge matrices. An indication of overall effectiveness 
for various physical security arrangements is able to be graphically interpreted considering the 
concepts of delay probability, detection probability and response probability.  
These concepts have been incorporated into the model structure and parameter values for the 
model have been selected from the knowledge matrices of the research. 
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The results of this research demonstrate that a conceptual mapping can be constructed within the 
topic of physical security. The conceptual mapping reduces complexity within the knowledge 
structure of physical security to assist decision making and has suggested techniques that may 
produce similar success in other disciplines that exhibit high levels of complexity.  
 
 
 
Keywords: 
Conceptual mapping, physical security modelling, decision making, universal elements 
hierarchical knowledge structures, consensus of expert opinion, semantic mapping. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
The introduction to this research places an emphasis on the descriptive nature of the title.  
The title Mapping elements of physical security towards the creation of a holistic physical 
security model suggests that by forming a conceptual mapping, elements of physical security 
terminology may be linked into a structure for holistic modelling. This research will 
demonstrate an investigative approach to determine element hierarchies by mapping element 
relationships to numerical values. The sense of connection from the theoretical to the physical 
world is maintained throughout this study with the research data based on the assessments and 
opinions of practitioners knowledgeable in the field of physical security. 
 
This study delivers its objectives as a series of knowledge structures represented by value 
matrices that when combined together, identify a conceptual mapping of the elements of 
physical security. The values that have been determined within the final knowledge matrices 
have been gathered from expert opinion to provide a holistic approach in modelling the 
complexity of physical security element relationship. Profiles of value (opinion) have been 
created across a range of respondents with each individual profile containing assessment values 
for 288 element pair relationships. Statistical analysis has enabled the approximation of a single 
standard profile representing a combined knowledge structure. For each category group profile 
within the research, similarity comparisons with other category groups using a correlation 
technique have successfully established that a high degree of consensus is evident in the results.  
 
This study has been able to determine its results through the construction of a theoretical 
framework originating from various disciplines and by using an unusual investigative technique 
to identify a suitable approach to the data requirements. The method of inquiry chosen for this 
research was originally suggested in the text of Green et al. (1997) and is unusual in that the 
method does not seek to provide a set of hypotheses for the research to prove, but instead 
recommends an investigative approach to understanding a phenomenon through determining 
element relationships. The method of inquiry identified was phenomenology. 
 
Throughout this research the main terminology appropriate to the umbrella-like collective 
termed physical security will be called “elements”. The specific elements identified in this study 
will be designated as universal elements. For the purpose of this study, italics will be applied to 
the majority of the important hierarchical terms associated with universal elements under the 
umbrella-like collective of physical security. The term “physical security” for the purposes of 
this study shall include all component elements that could be considered for the physical 
environment surrounding an asset that preserves the ongoing integrity and security of the asset. 
Physical security is an important concept within the discipline of security science. 
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The theoretical framework within the research was able to integrate the terminology that is often 
associated with modern security technology within the structure of knowledge and existing 
concepts of physical security such as defence in depth. A research questionnaire was developed 
based on this theoretical framework to collect expert opinion from respondents as value 
assessments representing the relationships of universal element pairs. The knowledge matrices 
that represent the final conceptual mapping were designed to be similar to the decision theory 
matrices of Giere (1991) and were able to arrange value assessments from all sections of the 
questionnaire into a linked knowledge structure representing a conceptual mapping.  
 
In order to determine the reliability and validity of the results, a method for profile comparison 
has provided an indication of the degree of overall consensus using the combined assessments 
of different respondent groups. The results for this research have indicated that the values within 
the final knowledge matrices are able to be independently supported by the different groups of 
the study to a high degree of consensus. The study has also proposed a novel interpretation for 
modelling of the values in the knowledge matrices, using an adaptation of the well known 
trigonometric tangent function to assess effectiveness between dissimilar conceptual entities.  
 
This chapter considers the background of the study, the research aims and objectives, the scope, 
and an overview of the study including a summary of limitations and assumptions. Chapter 2 
considers the literature relevant to the research instrument and the method of inquiry chosen for 
the research. Chapter 3 looks at the theoretical considerations to support the framework of 
hierarchical mapping for the elements. Chapter 4 looks at the methodology of the research 
instrument based on results from the pilot study and considers the research instrument’s 
philosophy, development, validity and reliability. Chapter 5 looks at the collected data and 
provides an analysis of the data in terms of the objectives of the study. Chapter 6 considers a 
novel interpretation for modelling dissimilar conceptual entities and discusses an application of 
results from this study. Chapter 7 concludes the research with a summary of the study objectives 
and provides some recommendations for future work.  
1.1 Background of Study 
The physical security of any facility comprises many components that may work together to 
provide the desired outcome of a secure environment. Components of physical security can 
usually be described as functions of the security concept “defence in depth” in terms of their 
ability to delay, detect, or respond (Garcia, 2001). The process of documenting the minimum 
requirement for physical security combinations in a risk environment is labour intensive.  
Thus any set of deliberations involved in obtaining an optimum solution for physical security 
might typically involve several security risk assessments by experts or consultants in the 
industry and will be by nature subjective. 
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The concept of scientific modelling in physical security has been previously considered in 
literature. A relevant example of this considers the physical security requirements of prisons in 
the United Kingdom through the procurement process (Lindfield & Rodger, 1992), with the 
consideration of a computer-based simulation model developed for this area to quantitatively 
compare different scenarios (Tarr, 1992). Further investigation into this same area has identified 
standard policy-based guidelines for the construction of physical perimeters at selected 
facilities; however variations in the environment and specific conditions at each facility cause 
this approach to be problematic (Tarr, 1994). A hierarchical example of scientific modelling has 
used decision tree-tools for detection systems (Peck & Trachier, 2004) and has attempted to 
produce structured guidance in a process that requires complex parameter considerations.  
 
Ideally modelling of physical security terminology requires that for any given arrangement of 
physical security components, the relative properties of delay, detection and response would 
combine to produce an overall relative risk value for each arrangement. A comparison of 
relative risk values made within a single facility or over a range of facilities could support 
decision making in the procurement process. If this process were available through modelling, 
then the labour intensive approach that currently requires subjective human judgement on a case 
by case basis would be complimented by computer aided decision support and in certain 
situations could be replaced by computer aided decision making. 
 
A consideration of the issues associated with developing a suitable model should first be 
addressed with the nature of the primary problem to the model identified.  This problem can be 
identified as the reality that any human adversary may defeat an arrangement of physical 
security components in a real-life scenario. In a worst-case scenario an adversary defeats the 
physical security to obtain unrestricted access to an asset and presents a major risk to a facility. 
The basis for effectiveness of physical security components in this regard may be typically 
expressed as either probability of success or probability of failure. Further to this concept, an 
assessment of physical security may be regarded as either relatively suitable or unsuitable. 
 
Assessing the human factor in regard to modelling physical security is often expressed in terms 
of motivation. When the range of potential human attack actions is considered, the exhaustive 
availability of tools and technology to defeat physical security must also be considered.  
Such complex permutations suggest a large (if not infinite) number of non-specific relationship 
potentials leading to a vast range of probabilities of success or failure. Any model that attempted 
to determine the effectiveness of an arrangement of physical security components would need to 
consider the entire spectrum of available attack methods (ranging from a simple hammer,  
to a ladder, to explosive devices) to be applicable in the real world. 
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Another area of conceptual uncertainty surrounding physical security terminology is that there is 
often no physical means to measure properties of the components. An example is detection 
sensitivity where a facility with harsher weather conditions may have a relatively poor 
performance in detection, while another facility with the same detection system may perform 
much better. The properties to determine the different types of harsh weather environments are 
complex and may include relative items such as rain, frost, heat and these may interact at 
various times of year. Thus without an adequate standard of measurement for each individual 
component, the properties of physical security arrangements cannot easily be compared. 
 
The primary limitations for computational modelling exist as identifying the boundaries of the 
input data requirements for any quantitative approach to decision making. The list of elemental 
components in any facility may be very large, and as more elements are introduced into a 
model, the degree of variation expands proportionately to the number of element relationships. 
The additional consideration for human interaction introduces major complexities that an input-
based computational modelling system is unable to accommodate. Thus modelling is currently 
best suited to determine a relative risk value from an arrangement of predetermined physical 
security components. Where a set of universal elements can represent the relative effectiveness 
of a given arrangement of physical security, the process of modelling may achieve consistent 
decision analysis across complex arrangements.   
 
The proposal for this research suggests that knowledge of physical security elements may be 
captured through the hierarchical consideration of expert opinion and that this will be able to 
reduce the complexity of physical security assessments. This research suggests a process that is 
able to reduce the complexity of a physical security scenario by determining an order of relative 
risk arrangements of physical security universal elements components. The research 
demonstrates that a reasonable consensus level can be identified in modelling physical security 
by relative ordering. 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
Research Aim: Through an investigative method provide a relationship map that determines 
universal element relationships of physical security terminology and then attempt to construct a 
hierarchical structure of the topic in order to capture holistic considerations for modelling and 
decision making in the presence of large uncertainty.  
 
The requirement for relational data in this study suggested the most appropriate and holistic 
information source would exist within the experience and knowledge of practitioners in the field 
of physical security. The process to relate data elements required a means for measurement 
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along ordered universal element relationship spectra. A suitable outcome of this study would 
identify an overall consensus in values mapped into knowledge matrices. For modelling of 
physical security arrangements to provide support in decision making, a strong connection to a 
consensus viewpoint is important. Thus in considering the need to determine consensus, the 
study outcome needed to ensure validity and reliability in its relational data.  
 
The requirements for the research have been summarised as the following objectives: 
• Determine a set of universal elements for physical security. 
• Create a tool that measures expert opinion as a measure of effectiveness to provide 
knowledge structures of data-sets for the universal element relationships in physical security 
scenarios.  
• Establish data matrices for elemental relationship knowledge structures in ordered format so 
that relative effectiveness of physical security combinations can be determined. 
• Determine that the knowledge structure is representative of common knowledge by 
checking the validity and reliability of results as a degree of consensus among participants. 
• Present a method for modelling dissimilar conceptual entities for an overall risk to physical 
security (using the knowledge matrices) that acknowledges the functions of defence in depth 
with appropriate theoretical considerations. 
• Identify additional applications for this research both in the field of physical security and 
other disciplines. 
1.3 Scope of the research 
The scope of this study was recognised as being strongly linked to the design of the knowledge 
structures that enabled modelling of physical security terminology from expert data-sets. As this 
study has proposed a method of inquiry that considers an investigative process, it is bound in its 
scope by the absolute number of elements that may be chosen to represent physical security and 
by the complexities of these elements. The investigative method was proposed to consider 
universal elements for data purposes that adequately represented knowledge and established a 
consensus viewpoint. Thus the scope of the methodology needed to establish a theoretical 
framework that was able to distil a large amount of terminology into a tactical number of 
universal elements that could represent the broader set of elements. The framework also needed 
to be broadly based to enable techniques to ideally be transferable at a subject level. 
   
The universal elements chosen for the study enable a complete framework for achieving the 
required degree of consensus. The research literature provides an appropriate theoretical 
background with a combination of ideas from various disciplines. The scope of the research 
requires a consensus viewpoint for the data collection and analysis to be bounded by the 
universal element links. The analysis of elemental relationships has therefore been effectively 
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restricted by the hierarchical structure presented in the theoretical framework and by the 
boundary conditions that have been established in the development of the research 
questionnaire.  
 
This study has been influenced by the Delphi technique and to be true to this technique, the 
research would ideally contain a series of iterations to refine its data assessments.  
Where the research questionnaire considers comments from experts, these would ideally feed 
back into the research instruments to be reiteratively examined by experts. Such a process is 
beyond the scope of this thesis; however a single iteration of the technique using the established 
research questionnaire has provided data-sets that can be used to model dissimilar conceptual 
entities. Therefore the scope of this study also seeks to establish a single process that can be 
representative of an iterative process.  
1.4 Overview of the study considering assumptions and 
limitations 
This section gives an overview of the study that particularly considers the assumptions and 
limitations that were identified in the initial proposal for the research and the pilot study.  
It is important to recognise these in order to interpret the validity of the knowledge structure. 
This research has considered an unusual method of inquiry and must consider each assumption 
in order to progress with theoretical correctness. Assumptions are recognised as potential causes 
for weakness in research and in order to provide support for the results of this study, this section 
has considered three significant time-frames of the research with the main limitations and 
assumptions recognised in each.  
• Events prior to the development of the research instrument 
• The main research instrument 
• Post distribution analysis and evaluations 
 
Discussion on these areas provides some mention for improvements to the research. For each of 
the three sections, each limitation represents a potential for weakness in the study and a 
corresponding assumption has enabled the research to progress acknowledging the limitation. 
1.4.1 Events prior to the development of the research instrument 
The pilot study determined that a research questionnaire would be the primary source of data for 
the study and therefore the planning involved in its creation needed to be carefully considered to 
maximise the usefulness of all information collected. The choice of method of inquiry was 
recognised as most important to this research in order to achieve the most holistic approach to 
the topic. The method of inquiry identified as the most appropriate was phenomenology and this 
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method has required that the universal elements of the study be determined and that the 
corresponding elemental relationships be apprehended (Smart, 1976).  
 
The research proposal suggested that the most appropriate method of data collection would be to 
obtain expert opinion either through in-depth interviews or through the use of questionnaires.  
Table 1.1 lists the limitation and assumptions identified prior to the development of the research 
instrument. 
 
Table 1.1 Limitations and assumptions prior to the research instrument 
Limitations Assumptions 
The best method of inquiry to provide the 
platform for holistic modelling appears to be 
one that requires the study to: suspend prior 
conceptions, provide a description of the 
phenomenon, determine the universal 
elements, and apprehend the element 
relationships (Smart, 1976). 
Phenomenology or phenomenological 
sociology is appropriate for the study’s 
method of inquiry. 
The likelihood exists that the set of universal 
elements (quantities) that this study is seeking 
to determine may be an infinite series of 
combinations and permutations of physical 
security terminology. 
A finite set of universal elements exists such 
that consensus of expert opinion can agree 
that such as set is representative of a physical 
security standard. 
The likelihood exists that the set of universal 
elements (qualities) that this study is seeking 
to determine, may be an infinite series of 
semantic interpretations of relationships in 
physical security terminology. 
A finite set of universal elements exists such 
that consensus of expert opinion can agree 
that such as set is representative of a physical 
security standard. 
As the number of universal elements and 
elemental relationships is expanded, the 
complexity in using quantitative methods of 
assessment is increased. The ability for 
computational methods to consider all 
potential influences existing in elemental 
relationships for latent variables in an 
unrestricted environment is greatly reduced.  
Expert opinion can provide indications for 
universal element relationships by 
incorporating human techniques of 
generalisation, heuristic recall, and simulating 
overall benefit in physical security without 
specific details being available for each single 
elemental relationship. 
Expert opinion may only be able to provide a 
limited input for data over a particular area of 
interest for the purpose of this research.  
Questionnaires provide the best research 
instrument for capturing expert opinion over 
a large number of element relationships. 
Expert opinion targeted towards the most 
important concepts will optimise 
respondent’s representation of knowledge. 
The length of the questionnaire and its 
complex nature directly influences the number 
of respondents that will be inclined to 
complete questionnaires. The three groups that 
the study sought to target could provide 
varying levels of expertise in physical security 
knowledge relative to their level of instruction 
and experience. These groups will provide the 
foundation on which all interpretations of the 
research will be made. 
Expert opinion collected from three 
categories: Security Experts, Security 
Students, and Security Users, will provide a 
broad semantic interpretation of the universal 
elements of the research. These categories can 
be considered separately and together to 
provide a wide range of expertise and validate 
consensus. 
…continued 
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The quality of expertise is subjective. Consensus already exists in our language 
structure in the form of common knowledge 
and therefore the research validity can be 
demonstrated as shared common knowledge, 
even with low numbers of respondents 
divided into subjective groups. 
 
1.4.2 The main research instrument  
After the study had identified that a single instrument would provide the primary source of data 
for the research, the main research questionnaire was developed. The content and structure of 
the questionnaire was considered through an investigative selection of the universal elements of 
the study in accordance with recognised sources in the literature. The questionnaire was 
developed as a tool for measuring the relationships of elements of the study. The questionnaire 
also provided a mechanism for self-assessment of its techniques and to identify issues that may 
require comment for the purpose of iterative adjustment.  
 
The set of universal elements that were listed in the questionnaire were used in a manner so that 
they each represented arbitrary reference points over a continuum of measurement along a scale.  
In this way all listed elements could be considered universal elements in that they represented 
other elements that could be located with theoretical proximity on the scales. The universal 
elements were arranged in a proposed relative order (ordered by concept) on the questionnaire in 
a process where defensive-type elements were paired against attacking-type elements to enable 
relationship determinations. Those who responded to the questionnaires were able to make 
value-based time judgements on the element pair relations in a bounded framework. Each value 
suggested an indication for overall benefit to security relative to its scaled position.  
Where different concept scales consider the same universal elements, it is appropriate to 
hierarchically conceptualise each scale in an orthogonal-type relationship. The notion of 
“orthogonal” for interrelating concept continuums is briefly considered for clarification. 
In mathematics, orthogonal is synonymous with perpendicular when used as a simple 
adjective that is not part of any longer phrase with a standard definition. It means at 
right angles  (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
The questionnaire was able to consider universal elements bound by a hierarchical structure of 
these elements within their respective functions of defence in depth. This hierarchical 
framework was determined by considering various concept continuums and relational 
descriptors (action statements) relative to each of the functions of defence in depth.  
The hierarchy that was established provided the scope for the research in a simple structure of 
relationships relative to a theoretical point of reference.  
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Although expert opinion is inevitably subjective in nature, the collection of many opinions 
toward a standard consensus of opinion, suggests that each component expert opinion is valid.  
The questionnaire provides a tool for collecting deviation of opinion, while consensus and 
validity can be aided by the creation of standards based on common understanding of the topic.  
The questionnaire attempts to capture the instinct of each respondent with element relationship 
values each representing a subjective and generalised case from the limited data available for 
each boundary condition presented to the respondents. 
 
The notion of a consensus is important to clarify in this introduction in order to better 
understand when degrees of consensus can be achieved. A clear understanding of the term 
provides direction upon which mathematical representations may demonstrate the measures of 
various degrees of consensus.  
Consensus has two common meanings. One is a general agreement among the 
members of a given group or community. The other is as a theory and practice of 
getting such agreements (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
The questionnaire was distributed to respondents through the mail and the returned information 
was compiled for analysis. Table 1.2 considers the limitations and assumptions that were 
identified during development of the main research instrument.  
 
Table 1.2 Limitations and assumptions of the main research instrument 
Limitations Assumptions 
There were 60 universal elements presented in 
the questionnaire in total. They consisted of 30 
representing the defensive components of 
security (defence in depth) and 30 representing 
various types of attack on physical security. 
A valid set of universal elements has been 
determined for the research and a consensus 
of expert opinion agrees that these elements 
are able to define a region on a scale 
representing a continuum of a security 
concept.  
The universal elements that have been 
presented in the questionnaire may be 
semantically ambiguous in their conception to 
varying degrees although an answer guide has 
provided general definitions for the research 
purposes. For the majority of the universal 
elements specific information for each has not 
been stated e.g. dimensions and defining 
qualities. 
Expert opinion can provide relative value for 
universal element relationships by 
incorporating human techniques of 
generalisation, heuristic recall, and 
simulation for assessing levels of benefit to 
overall physical security without specific 
details being available for each elemental 
relationship. 
The ranked order of universal elements may 
provide relative points on a continuum for a 
security concept, however the order originally 
presented in the questionnaire is open to 
debate. The number of elements defining each 
region for each continuum in the questionnaire 
has been set to 6 to permit the continuum to be 
divided into quintiles.  
Consensus of expert opinion can 
demonstrate that ranked elements are 
representative of a security concept 
continuum and expert opinion able to better 
determine the approximate order of elements 
in relative terms. The continuum runs as a 
scale from a higher level of conceptual 
benefit in one direction through to a lower 
level of benefit in the other direction. 
…continued 
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Limitations Assumptions 
The hierarchical semantic relationships for the 
questionnaire are complex and incomplete.  
A total of only 10 different concept 
continuums exist in the questionnaire and these 
have been orthogonally paired over 8 action 
statements (verbs) describing physical security 
interactions. Each of the 8 action statements 
have been hierarchically positioned directly 
beneath the functions of defence in depth 
which in turn sit under the topic of physical 
security.  
The common understanding mapped out by 
the semantic hierarchical path in this study is 
arbitrary yet valid. It is based on a theoretical 
platform from literature and is based on 
logical semantic associations identified in 
the pilot study. 
Theory suggests that the conceptual mapping 
of physical security elements has n-dimensions 
and yet this research only considers 10 concept 
continuums in the questionnaire.  
The 10 concept continuums of the 
questionnaire provide a representative 
structure of an ideal conceptual mapping of 
physical security. The demonstration for 
consensus fulfils the purpose of the research 
objectives. It is not within the scope of the 
study to evaluate all n-dimensions of the 
conceptual mapping; however future work in 
this area may attempt a broader mapping of 
the topic. 
The 8 action statements chosen for this study 
as boundary conditions restrict the element 
interactions to a single framework. Indications 
from respondents will be strongly dependent 
on the wording of each question in the 
questionnaire and their satisfaction with the 
semantic hierarchy of physical security terms. 
The common understanding mapped out by 
the semantic hierarchical path in this study is 
arbitrary yet valid. It is based on a theoretical 
platform from literature and is based on 
logical semantic associations identified in 
the pilot study. 
The elemental pair relationships can only be 
assessed with respect to a single action 
statement at any point in time without adding 
unnecessary complexity to the assessment. The 
assessment can be considered for value in 
relative directional terms based on a higher 
overall benefit to physical security in one 
direction and a lower overall benefit in the 
other direction. Some ambiguity will exist in 
the concept of overall benefit as opinion cannot 
consider all of the possible factors. 
Respondents must use experience or 
knowledge to provide either a best case 
approximation, worst case approximation, or 
mid case approximation to use in their value 
assessment. 
Expert opinion can provide relative value for 
universal element relationships by 
incorporating human techniques of 
generalisation, heuristic recall, and 
simulation for assessing levels of benefit to 
overall physical security without specific 
details being available for each elemental 
relationship. The “instinct” of the respondent 
will provide the most appropriate answer in 
all cases. 
…continued 
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Limitations Assumptions 
The tool for measurement in all assessments of 
value in elemental interactions is with the use 
of the exponential scaling of time.  
The divisions of the time scale are constant 
across all questions with the use of relative 
semantic time indicators. Each question 
provides a scale where a designated time value 
will provide some relative value of overall 
benefit to physical security. There is an 
inherent ambiguity acknowledged with the 
respondent able to indicate by this method 
both: actual time (as determined by the 
respondent’s best estimation), or alternatively 
a relative indication of preference against 
other listed element interactions. The available 
time choices are non-specific (fuzzy) to cope 
with each respondent’s general case 
approximations. For example, a response with 
the assessment of the term hours does not 
specify whether two hours or twenty three 
hours is more appropriate. The fuzziness 
permits the semantic range of this term to be 
valid.  
The “instinct” of the respondent will provide 
the most appropriate answer in all cases. The 
fuzzy time indications listed in the 
questionnaire provide deliberate ambiguity to 
cope with respondent’s best general case 
approximation and value assessment to each 
question. Each question requiring a value 
measurement assessing time is detailed in the 
questionnaire in the Sections A-H. 
It is expected that all respondents will have 
some degree of expert knowledge and are able 
to simulate an assessment based on general 
knowledge, common sense, or instinct in 
providing their assessment. 
The “instinct” of the respondent will provide 
the most appropriate answer in all cases. 
Respondents are requested to provide any 
additional comments, suggestions, or concerns 
in the questionnaire. This requires that they 
have a reasonable interest to assist in the 
research and provide information freely to 
improve knowledge structures in this topic 
area.  
The “instinct” of the respondent will provide 
the most appropriate answer in all cases. 
Comments and critiques are able to strengthen 
the case for consensus. Comments about the 
method can be incorporated into future 
instruments in an iterative Delphi-type 
process. Respondent’s comments are able to 
critique the method that has been used for the 
research instrument. 
1.4.3 Post distribution analysis and evaluations 
The transformation of each questionnaire’s data into numerical format was complied for the 
purposes of producing knowledge matrices covering the complete list of element pair 
relationships. Standard profiles were created from a list of 288 numerical values representing 
each of the 288 element pair relations of the study. 
 
The value assessments for each element pair relationship are based on the use of time measures 
on a scale indicating an overall benefit to security. The time measures used in this study were 
different from traditional relational and linear scales suggested in literature. Results from the 
pilot study suggested that time measures relative to a set of action statements would be the most 
appropriate mechanism for determining ordered and scaled value from expert opinion.  
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This notion was developed from literature where knowledge structures have been influenced by 
relational descriptors (Smith, 1984). These relational descriptors were interpreted to be action-
based measures which suggest a time based value of a statement.  
 
The measures of time in the research are fuzzy to allow for the process of human generalisation 
to be more effective. In this context generalisation is defined as the ability to consider a 
complex scenario and incorporate generalised or non-specific detail over complicating 
parameters when precise information is not available. In the process of generalisation, human 
opinion can consider complex relationships with only limited data and yet identify areas of high 
importance. In contrast a computer model often requires values for each parameter in its 
algorithm to determine importance. Fuzzy time measures have been included to provide human 
instinct with self-adjustment and a level of uncertainty in value assessments. For the purpose of 
this research the conversion from fuzzy time measures to numerical values uses the base unit of 
seconds for relative considerations of the minimum semantic interpretation of time. 
 
Although the number of respondents used in the research is not large, the three target groups are 
able to provide a strong indication of consensus using the mathematical process of correlation. 
A correlation result is obtained by comparing the list of values of a single respondent profile 
against a series of standard profiles of other category groups. The values for similarity range 
between 0 and 1 where a value of 1 identifies perfect correlation. In this manner the degree of 
consensus can be determined by comparing a series of correlation values over different group 
profiles. Where correlation is high, consensus is likely to be strong.  
 
The correlation method for this research was applied to values for each element pair over a list 
of 288 numerical variables as a single profile. This study has combined each individual’s value 
assessment using the overall statistical mean of the group to represent composite group profiles. 
Each group profile was then considered as a standard profile and was compared against other 
standard profiles. Individual respondent profiles were also independently correlated against the 
various standards to identify the degree of individual variation. The use of the statistical mean as 
function may potentially be replaced by the median, mode or by other graphical means to 
interpret a consensus of opinion. The study has used mean values as indicators for each group’s 
element pair relationship and the results show that while the mean is an arbitrary indicator, it is 
the most effective representation of a group response.  
 
The research has established value matrices to delivers its objectives as a series of knowledge 
structures representing a conceptual mapping of the elements of physical security. The values 
that have been determined within the final knowledge matrices have been created across the 
entire group of respondents considering all of the 288 element pair relationship assessments. 
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Statistical analysis has enabled the determination of a combined standard profile representing a 
single knowledge structure. Similarity comparisons of the combined standard against other 
standards and individuals using the correlation technique have successfully established that a 
high degree of consensus is evident in the results.  
 
A novel interpretation for modelling of the results has been proposed by the study using the well 
known mathematical tangent function to assess effectiveness between dissimilar conceptual 
entities. The model proposed by the study uses empirically based coefficients for adaptations of 
the trigonometric tangent functions combining delay, detection and response. The model is 
designed from a series of conceptual time-probability diagrams, where the curves of the 
diagrams were recognised as similar in shape to mathematical tangent curves. This model has 
demonstrated test cases that are able to produce indications of relative effectiveness over a range 
of physical security element combinations. All test cases successfully use values from the 
matrices obtained from results of the research. All indications suggest that this model may be 
the most appropriate mechanism to assess effectiveness between dissimilar conceptual entities 
in physical security. Table 1.3 provides a list of the limitations and assumptions that were 
recognised during the analysis and interpretation of the results.  
 
Table 1.3 Limitations and assumption that were identified during the analysis and 
interpretation of the results 
Limitations Assumptions 
With only 26 respondents, the argument for 
identifying the degree of consensus is difficult. 
The composite group standard profile will be 
seemingly dependent upon the ratio between 
each group membership number to the entire 
number of respondents. 
Increasing the number (n) of respondents for 
each group should increase values for 
correlation for the group’s profile against the 
composite group profile of towards a value of 
1.0 to provide a better indication for 
consensus. 
The theoretical base for the work has been taken 
from many disciplines and there may be 
criticism of the results due to the use of 
phenomenological approach and method of 
inquiry into the research objectives. 
Phenomenological sociology is appropriate 
for the study’s method of inquiry. 
The transformation from qualitative to 
quantitative data using a semantic scaling 
technique requires that the approximations are 
valid. The fuzziness inherent in the qualitative 
terminology is set to its minimum semantic 
association for each quantitative approximation.  
The fuzzy time indications listed in the 
questionnaire provide deliberate ambiguity to 
cope with respondent’s best estimates. The 
quantitative time approximations remain 
appropriate when set to their minimum 
semantic time approximations. The values 
resulting from the transformation enables the 
data to be analysed statistically to provide an 
indication of relative order, order of 
magnitude, and correlation over group 
profiles to demonstrate consensus. 
The research uses statistical means to base its 
consensus approach. A similar consideration 
can also be made with the median or mode. 
The use of statistical means on which to base 
the analytical approach of the questionnaire 
is the most appropriate. 
…continued 
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Limitations Assumptions 
The research considers the standard deviation of 
the mean as an indicator that points to where a 
higher level of complexity may exist the 
concepts that require greater generalisation in 
their assessment. Concepts with a higher level 
of complexity require additional iterations of the 
process or lower levels of a hierarchical 
consideration in order to reduce complexity.  
The use of standard deviations on which to 
consider the analytical approach of the 
questionnaire is able to suggest where more 
immediate hierarchical consideration is 
required in order to further reduce 
complexity in the semantic mapping. 
The use of correlation in the study has been 
presented to identify the level of consensus over 
the values of respondents. Each correlation used 
in the research is conducted to investigate levels 
of similarity between groups considering the 
statistical means of each element interaction in 
the research (described as standard profiles). 
The similarity between the elemental 
relationship assessments across groups, suggests 
that it is more likely that the correlation of more 
standard profiles of new groups will converge to 
a value of 1.0 with each other. For full 
consensus to be demonstrated, the correlations 
over all groups would eventually converge to a 
value of 1.0 with each other.  
The transformation of expert opinion into 
value demonstrates that a set of universal 
elements representing a physical security 
scenario can be determined as a standard set 
if consensus is reached. Consensus is able to 
be demonstrated with statistical correlation of 
standard profiles of different groups 
converging with each other to a theoretical 
correlation value of 1.0. 
Convergence can only be demonstrated for the 
specific boundary conditions that have been 
proposed in considering it is an arbitrary 
hierarchical structure of the phenomenon of 
physical security. 
The hierarchical path mapped out by 
semantic understanding in this study is 
arbitrary yet valid. It is based on a theoretical 
platform with logical and semantic 
associations identified in the pilot study and 
from literature. 
The phrases: conceptual mapping, semantic 
mapping, knowledge structure, knowledge 
hierarchy and element mapping, all indicate an 
n-dimensional structure that combines elements 
and element relationships towards human 
knowledge and consensus. Each of these 
phrases suggests a theoretical structure however 
the study’s approach to modelling attempts to 
visually demonstrate value relationships in the 
conceptual mapping. 
A knowledge structure is able to be mapped 
by determining its universal elements and 
apprehending its semantic relationships along 
concept continuums and relational 
descriptors. It can be represented as 
knowledge matrices. 
  
The research proposal suggests holistic 
modelling of physical security components is 
desired from the conceptual mapping. A holistic 
approach is difficult to claim as an achievement 
as there will always be the potential for greater 
investigation and depth on a subject.  
Further iterations of this research would require 
continual input from a critical base (such as 
future respondents) to attain true holism. 
Effectively the conceptual hierarchy would 
needs to be expanded both across hierarchical 
levels and down the hierarchical structure. 
A knowledge structure is able to be mapped 
by determining its universal elements and 
apprehending its semantic relationships along 
concept continuums and relational 
descriptors. The consideration of all possible 
real-life likelihoods can determine whether 
any claim can be considered holistic in 
nature. A semantic hierarchy needs to be 
continually expanded both across hierarchical 
levels and down the hierarchical structure to 
lower levels of universal elements. 
…continued 
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Limitations Assumptions 
The inter-related array of numbers that make up 
the mapping may be reduced for each action 
statement by subjecting an entire element list 
(including any non-listed extended elements) to 
an assessment over a 3-dimensional space 
within a facility.  
This 3-dimensional space could be chosen as a 
single cube within a facility i.e. a perimeter 
space or alternatively an inclusive cube that 
encompasses an entire complex.  
Each element could be given an approximate 
percentage of abundance within a 3-D space or 
a fixed length cube. For example each element 
might be assessed between 0% and 100% 
abundance in a given region such that the whole 
cube can be summated for approximate element 
abundance to a number between 0% and 100%.  
 
Facility specific data should allow relative 
interpretations to be made between scenarios 
using the model and the universal elements 
presented in the research.  
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1.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has outlined an overview of this research that has been undertaken as an 
investigative approach to create element hierarchies through conceptually mapping element 
relationships. Practitioners in the field have been designated as having “expert knowledge” and 
were targeted in order to obtain the element relationship data for the research. The universal 
element relationship data represents a holistic view for modelling physical security scenarios for 
the purpose of decision making. 
 
This chapter has considered the research topic, the background, the scope, as well as the 
limitations and assumptions of the study. This research places an emphasis on theory and 
incorporates an unusual investigative technique. The results of the conceptual mapping in this 
study are available in the form of knowledge matrices. A novel interpretation for modelling of 
the results has used an adaptation of the well known trigonometric tangent function to assess 
effectiveness between dissimilar conceptual entities using values from these matrices. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction to the literature review 
This chapter describes several supporting concepts from literature that provide assistance in the 
conceptual mapping of gathered expert opinion. All concepts will be considered for their 
relevance to the subject areas of the research. In consideration of the research method, the 
paradigm of Vallaster and Koll (2002) is worth contemplating, where the three key objectives 
that all research seeks to achieve are realism, generalisability of results and precision of 
measurement. A visual representation is shown in Figure 2.1 where the authors propose that 
such a methodological perspective allows a richer understanding of the phenomena observed 
(Vallaster & Koll, 2002) and they also consider that the exploration of meaning in research 
should attempt to develop a theoretic-analytic framework that holds independent of interacting 
individuals (Vallaster & Koll, 2002). The review by these authors suggests that qualitative 
studies generalise their results with an emphasis in realism, while quantitative studies generalise 
their results with an emphasis on precision of measurement.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 The “magic triangle” of research (Vallaster & Koll, 2002) 
 
This chapter initially considers the appropriate method of inquiry to provide a research path that 
best combines the optimum of the three conflicting desiderata (Vallaster & Koll, 2002) in a 
method that embraces both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Several other concepts in 
literature recommend consideration toward this goal and these will be considered in the sections 
of this chapter. In the attempt to create a holistic model of physical security terminology, the 
study has identified that a common language approach in understanding concepts of knowledge 
may provide the best mechanism to enhance realism in generalised results and at the same time 
provide the required precision in the results.  
 
Realism Precision of 
measurement 
Generalisability of 
Results Quantitative 
Research 
Qualitative Research 
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This remainder of the chapter provides a review of studies that will either have direct relevance 
to the topic of physical security, some relevance to the concept of modelling, or are applicable 
to other areas of interest within the research. The range of these includes decision theory, 
decision support systems, knowledge structures, semantic mapping, measurement techniques, 
hierarchical considerations and heuristic bias.  
2.2 A method of inquiry 
Investigative methods in the behavioural sciences often use the natural sciences for guidance 
with a research-based method of inquiry. A common understanding of language has been 
suggested to provide the most appropriate linkable framework for a problem that deals with 
terminology in physical security. Smart (1976) describes externalisation and objectification in 
our existence as taking place primarily through language, through accounts, descriptions, 
conversations and talk. He captures the beliefs of phenomenology and the phenomenologist 
with a description of the social world as a linguistic and cognitive world, where the task of 
sociology becomes one of describing the processes by which the social world is constructed 
through accounts, readings, understandings and interpretive procedures (Smart, 1976, pp75). 
 
The terms subjective and objective in sociological debate according to Smart (1976, p83), have 
preconceived bias for; objective connoting true, scientific, rigorous and real, apparent to Any 
Man, whereas the term subjective by contrast denotes arbitrary, biased, unscientific and 
personal opinion. Subjective becomes in this sense a term of virtual condemnation, taboo for an 
aspiring science. Green et al. (1988) provide a summary of four of the main types of method of 
inquiry for research. This research considers that the objectivist, subjectivist, and Bayesian 
would all follow similar steps in formulating a problem followed by developing, predicting and 
testing of the hypothesis, and finally testing and analysing results. The phenomenologist is 
opposed to the use of explanatory hypotheses of the phenomenon that represent preconceived 
ideas that may be problematic in selective perception and measurement distortion (Green, Tull 
& Albaum, 1988, pp41). While it is recognised that each method has benefits and limitations, 
this study has chosen phenomenological sociology as the method of approach presenting the 
greatest component of freedom in order to reduce complexity within a phenomenon. 
 
Phenomenological Sociology in its most basic form deals with descriptions of phenomena by 
using universal language. The descriptions of this method of inquiry by Smart (1976) and Green 
et al. (1988) suggest that Phenomenological Sociology provides a most versatile method of 
inquiry to bring together qualitative and quantitative considerations and for each to contribute 
toward a theoretical understanding of physical security modelling. Green et al. (1988, pp41) 
state the following in their text:  
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What is the method of phenomenology? An answer is that, although there is no one 
universally accepted “method” as such, four steps are recognised by enough 
phenomenologists to qualify as representative of the approach generally followed: 
1. Suspension of prior conceptions 
2. Description of the phenomenon 
3. Determination of universal elements 
4. Apprehending of relationships 
In a real sense, this method of inquiry is analogous to what many researchers call a 
“fishing expedition” without knowing anything about the body of water  
(Green, Tull & Albaum, 1988, pp41).  
 
An application of phenomenological sociology to data collection may be found within the 
macro micro focus of a society. Smart (1976, pp87) mentions that within sociology the macro-
micro distinction works to allow the sociologist to shift the focus of his investigation or interest 
from the “hard data” of social structure (macro) to the “soft data” of individual and group 
experience of social reality. The ambition of behavioural scientists it seems is to create 
syntheses of these different “levels” of analysis (Smart 1976, pp75). Some differences are 
evident in describing the focus at the macro-level as the ‘more objective’, scientific and relevant 
approach to the study of society and the micro-analysis regarded as secondary, supplementing 
and small-scale areas of inquiry (Smart, 1976, pp87). 
 
The four steps of Phenomenological Sociology have been chosen to act as section dividers for 
the remainder of this chapter to provide a guiding framework for the literature review of the 
study. The relevance of the literature review to the research instrument is described in each of 
the sections of this chapter. The metaphor of a ‘fishing expedition’ seeks to emphasise the 
exploratory nature that the chosen method of inquiry is able to represent in this research.  
Green et al. (1988) state the following about exploratory studies: 
The major purposes of exploratory studies are the identification of problems, the more 
precise formulation of problems (including the identification of relevant variables), and 
the formulation of new alternative courses of action. An exploratory study is often used 
as an introductory phase of a larger study and results are used in developing specific 
techniques for the larger study. The design of exploratory studies is characterised by a 
great amount of flexibility and ad hoc versatility (Green, Tull, & Albaum, pp497). 
 
In order to better combine all three parts of the magic triangle of research (Vallaster & Koll, 
2002) to this study, the method of inquiry has not required set hypotheses in order to investigate 
universal elements and element relationships within the knowledge structure of the topic. In 
ensuring that the structure for modelling of physical security will be fully considered, the 
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metaphor of a fishing expedition will be used to support a wide range of relevant studies in the 
current body of literature and knowledge and bring them together like a cast net from the 
unknown body of water (Green, Tull & Albaum, 1988, pp41). The literature review will 
rationalise all highlighted concepts to develop relevant techniques and identify influences that 
may exist in considering the four steps of phenomenology.  
 
The strong consideration of this research in reviewing its method of inquiry is that a universal 
set of elements may be recognised through an investigative approach that considers the Delphi 
technique. Green, Tull and Albaum (1988) suggest that this method has achieved increasing 
application in recent years. They expand their description to the idea of using the Delphi 
technique where a group of experts are polled regarding their judgements about when each of 
some set of specified events falling within their area of expertise might happen. They may also 
be asked to state their degree of confidence in each judgement and the implications for present 
policies if the events were to occur (Green, Tull & Albaum, 1988, pp662). The research 
instrument for this study has likewise drawn upon the conceptual input by inquiring from a 
group of experts and also has considered the implications of time in judgements about when 
specified events might happen. 
 
Other authors have made comment on the Delphi technique such as White (1975, pp190) who 
regards the technique as just a short term analogue of the long term collection, examination and 
criticism of any knowledge, which takes place over centuries. Also Ziglio (1996) whose 
investigation into the Delphi suggests recognised variations such as the Policy Delphi, Cross 
Impact Analysis or Nominal Group Techniques may also be of future interest to the research 
instruments.  A theoretical rationale is given as per the following: 
Dalkey argues that between knowledge and speculation is a grey area which is often 
called “wisdom”, “insight” or “informed judgement”. Informed judgement is central to 
the theoretical assumptions of the Delphi Method. The methodological procedure used 
in the Delphi Method aims at structuring and distilling the vast mass of information for 
which there is some evidence (but not yet knowledge) in order to achieve and improve 
informed judgement and decision-making (Ziglio, 1996, pp6). 
  
Risk assessments such as those undertaken by consultants in the field of physical security are 
typically the combination of observation, professionalism and experience of professionals in the 
field of security risk analysis. These judgements made by professionals can thus be translated 
into expert opinion and can be recognised as a precious source of information for the purpose of 
reducing complexity. In recognition of Ziglio (1996), experts in the field of physical security 
were confirmed as the primary data source of the research instrument in this study. 
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Further consideration in the method of inquiry is borrowed from the concepts of structural 
equation modelling (SEM). As many important marketing, psychological or cultural concepts 
are latent constructs with unknown reliability, the use of SEM can relate important latent 
constructs while taking into account the unreliability of the indicators. Reisinger and Turner 
(2000, pp3) describe a commercial application LISREL in the following: 
Lisrel stands for LInear Structural RELationships and is a computer program for 
covariance structure analysis. It is a multivariate technique, which combines 
(confirmatory) factor analysis modelling from psychometric theory and structural 
equations modelling associated with econometrics. It was originally introduced by 
Joreskog and Van Thillo in 1972 (Reisinger & Turner, 2000, pp 2) 
 
The relationship of Lisrel to phenomenological sociology is apparent in the initial stage of its 
method. This is demonstrated by the following steps which adapt the SEM analysis to the 
topical constructs and variables. The eight stages listed below are associated with SEM: 
• Stage 1 Development of a theoretical model (with defined causal relationships). 
• Stage 2 Construction of a path diagram. 
• Stage 3 Formal mathematical specification of the model 
• Stage 4 Variance/covariance or correlation (assessment of the sample size) 
• Stage 5 Model identification (enable parameter estimation) 
• Stage 6 Assessment of the model fit 
• Stage 7 Modifications to the model 
• Stage 8 Cross-validation of the model  
(Reisinger & Turner, 2000, pp 6-18) 
 
These stages of SEM analysis have been considered to direct this study in a synergistic 
combination with the steps of phenomenology and the Delphi technique. In particular the item 
Stage 1 Development of a theoretical model (with defined causal relationships) is of 
significance to this research as it seeks to evaluate causal relationships that would originate from 
universal elements in a similar fashion to phenomenology. Reisinger and Turner (2000, pp2) 
provide a discussion of SEM in seeking to explain patterns of dependence relationships 
simultaneously between a set of (unobserved) latent constructs, each measured by one or more 
manifest (observed) variables such as; distance, cost, weight and height (Reisinger & Turner, 
2000, pp 3). These opinions suggest that manifest variables can be measured through 
respondents, via data collection methods or even be gathered as secondary data from published 
sources.  
 
In summary three methods have been suggested that can assist and direct the method of inquiry 
for this study in Phenomenological Sociology, the Delphi technique and structural equation 
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modelling. A combination of all these approaches has been used as general framework to 
connect the literature review. The remainder of this chapter describes a selection of literature 
that provides lower order guidance for the theoretical framework and considers the requirements 
for modelling as the outcome of this study. 
2.3 Suspension of prior conceptions 
This section of the literature review combines the ideas from studies on topics related to the 
relevant subject areas of this research, ideas from studies that provide direction for the 
theoretical framework, and similar studies that have produced results of interest in relation to 
the objectives of this study. Additionally there will be some comment on studies that suggest 
data collection techniques of interest to this research. 
 
This relevance of this section to the research is demonstrated in its attempt to identify what 
defines a prior conception. As prior conceptions have provided the direction for this research, it 
is suggested that a mix of ideas will provide further holistic considerations to achieve the 
objectives required for physical security modelling. The suspension of prior conceptions seems 
to suggest a “return to fundamentals” approach which seemed reasonable given the complexity 
within the problem. A language-based view to theory gathering was identified as necessary and 
this section of the literature review lists some of the theoretical concepts that have been draw 
upon to establish the fundamentals into investigating a phenomenon to aid decision making. 
Some of the topics that are covered include: decision theory, decision support systems, 
modelling analysis, image theory, knowledge mapping and semantic mapping. In an attempt to 
suspend prior conceptions, this research has identified some of the language concepts in 
literature as part of the theoretical framework to be considered as fundamental.  
  
Some of the concepts of decision theory have been considered as important fundamentals in this 
research. They present a range of techniques to integrate the qualitative-quantitative approach to 
data collection to best connect the subject system and object systems in making decisions which 
is further clarified in the following: before one can undertake any decision analysis, one has to 
consider the questions of ‘who are the decision makers?’ and ‘which is the system about which 
the decisions are being made?’ The former group is referred to as the subject system, and the 
latter is referred to as the object system (White, 1975, pp4). This notion considers the design of 
models for decision making in the presence of large uncertainty compounded by the existence of 
socially constructed variables. White (1975) provides some commentary on the issue of 
unrepresentative modelling, where his viewpoint emphasises that modelling typically uses 
quantitative properties in decision analysis and has the object system in mind, while greater 
difficulties are usually seen if modelling is applied to the subject system. The importance of this 
concept is identified in the original research proposal which determined that a holistic viewpoint 
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was the best way to maximise the benefit to a modelling system although according to White 
(1975) greater difficulties may be expected. 
 
Decision theory has substantial application across many disciplines and a number of sub-topics 
have surfaced as a result. In his overview and summary article, White (1975, pp4) proposes that 
where a model can be created as the result of combining several hypotheses, a theory is often a 
creation of the consequential behaviour of statistics creating a special theory. On the possibility 
of modifying a theory toward establishing modelling, he further states: We may seek properties, 
in a suitable language, which will characterise the actual behaviour, and we may then examine 
these properties as to their reasonableness (White, 1975, pp9). This reference to a suitable 
language as a characterising tool for examining the property of reasonableness echoes the 
sentiment of phenomenological sociology and suggests that language and terminology will 
provide a sound basis for holistic modelling of physical security.  
 
Bunn and Thomas (1975) make a contribution to decision theory with a description of an 
interesting method for comparing an individual’s subjective data to that of an expert group. 
Their proposal indicates that for many applications in life, probability measures can be extracted 
from individuals where response methods can be classified direct if the person responds 
explicitly e.g. placing a number on his subjective belief, and indirect if it is gathered from 
another mode of response (Bunn & Thomas, 1975, pp118). This is strong theoretical support for 
assessing a subjective set of probabilities over a set of propositions or alternatively assessing a 
subjective distribution over a range of conceivable propositions. Moskowitz, (1975, pp328) 
describes the need to begin with a theory as inherent in all modelling and states how a theory 
can be expressed symbolically in terms of a formal axiomatic structure or explicitly stated as a 
set of logical premises. He continues that the components of a model can be found in protocols 
from decision-makers, the researchers’ experience, previous related research, etc. (Moskowitz, 
1975, pp328). Both the suggestions of Bunn and Thomas (1975) and Moskowitz (1975) support 
the proposal to use subjective opinion to provide raw data and from results of such an operation 
form the components of a model. 
 
Ward (1989) discusses basic issues of modelling in contemplating how much detail to 
incorporate into a model in order to provide meaningful insight into reality: 
Models achieve this by presenting problems in a structured, rational manner, with an 
associated reduction in complexity relative to the real-life situation. Models which 
attempt to mirror reality in every detail are not usually appropriate or feasible, but at 
the same time, excessive reduction in complexity must be avoided if the model is not to 
produce misleading inference.  
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With arguments for a constructively simple model, Ward (1989) suggests that one of the most 
important properties of a model is its transparency.  This is also a measure of how users and 
operators react to the complexity of the model.  Ward (1989) also argues that model building is 
a management science intervention that requires approaches that are simple, flexible, easily 
understood, appropriate to the situation, able to cope with low-quality data, and able to help 
managers make decisions (Ward, 1989). 
 
Real management problems require helpful models to allow managers to understand 
unstructured real-world dilemmas and provide meaningful insights into reality. Models achieve 
this by presenting problems in a structured, rational manner, with an associated reduction in 
complexity relative to the real-life situation (Ward, 1989). Therefore models which attempt to 
mirror reality in every detail are not usually appropriate or feasible, but at the same time, 
excessive reduction in complexity may not present enough information for clear decision 
making. Ward (1989) suggests that constructively complex models may provide output that 
imply a degree of precision which is not justified by the quality of the input data and that 
healthy suspicion of the data used and the processed results should be maintained (Ward, 1989). 
 
A method that considers a reduction in complexity is of importance to this research. Ward 
(1989) supports the view that there exists a common tendency to under-emphasise qualitative 
aspects of a decision situation and in the following quantitative-style rationale of the 
requirements he states typical advantages of using numbers: 
• numbers form a common language for more effective and objective communication; 
• decision situations can be precisely defined and ambiguity minimized; 
• the logic of the decision process becomes more explicit; 
• decisions, and subsequent changes in decisions, can be defended in a rational and 
consistent manner. (Ward 1989) 
 
Barron (1975) makes a point about the complexity with regard to secondary problems in 
modelling and by this suggests that the concern about the minutiae of complexity is unwarranted 
without the original conceptualisation of a model addressing the primary problem in the 
following: The reasons for paying so much attention to the secondary problems are that they 
have an influence on the resolution of the primary problem and that the process of identifying 
them has a bearing on the decidability of the primary problem’. (Barron, 1975 pp203) 
 
A brief description of decision support systems (DSS) provides another consideration for the 
research to be more applicable to the wider decision making community. According to 
Bennett’s (1984) explanation a DSS is a coherent system of computer-based technology 
(hardware, software, and supporting documentation) used by managers as an aid to their 
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decision making in semistructured tasks that attempts to focus on improving the effectiveness of 
decision making rather than on merely improving its efficiency (Bennett, 1984).  
 
This research considers the requirements for DSS development as important. In addressing 
holistic modelling, the ability for a model to provide sound policy directions for decisions 
depends on the types of decision that may be considered. In a further description of the ideas of 
Bennett (1984) a DSS considers that the decision rationale is important.  
Not only are decision not gambles, they seldom even involve choices - most frequently 
only one option is considered at a time, and the decision about each is whether to take 
that option (change) or to remain with the status quo. Neither is the status quo treated 
as just another option – it has a special status and is not easily abandoned. (Bennett, 
1984). 
 
According to Beach (1990) the decision support system needs to address not only the 
phenomenon that it is modelling and interpreting but it also needs to model the policy makers 
and social constraints on the decision making body as a whole.  
 
One of the strong foundations of this research is the theoretical framework associated with 
knowledge structures and conceptual mapping. The research into the semantics of astronomy by 
Smith (1984) detailing knowledge structures in particular is most relevant to the development of 
the research instrument. Smith (1984) undertakes data techniques using multidimensional 
scaling with recognition of graphical proximity and considers the conceptual design of 
knowledge structure using a continuum of variation between concepts along a scaled dimension. 
This framework is of special interest to the design of the questionnaire as is the suggested use of 
relational descriptors that form structure within a knowledge mapping. Further detailed 
description of the work of Smith (1984) is considered in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
  
Several other authors have also described the use of expert mapping ranging over various fields 
of application. This includes Miller and Linn (2000) who have conducted work in educational 
assessments obtaining in the case of content, expert judgements about the process models and 
their relationships to the construct are needed (Miller & Linn, 2000).  
The reference to expert judgements is supportive of the directions of this research and its target 
base requiring expert opinion value assessments. 
 
The authors Chang, Sung and Chen (2002) review experimental education methods in text 
comprehension by the use of questionnaires and they suggest that concept mapping is a graphic 
strategy that can be applied to the learning of scientific subjects. While only a limited quantity 
of research is available for the learning of linguistic content, Chang, Sung and Chen (2002) use 
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one-way analysis of covariates and include a post-hoc comparison in test scores using the 
Bonferroni method. Bradley, Paul and Seeman (2006) use instructors and students to consider 
the structure of expert knowledge. The authors have recognised levels of expertise that appear to 
develop with experience. The findings of these authors suggest that an individual’s cognitive 
ability to correctly structure experience is necessary for the attainment of expertise (Bradley, 
Paul & Seeman, 2006). 
 
An outline for a more effective concept mapping measurement system has been produced by 
Aidman and Egan (1998). Some of the more relevant parts of this study consider an example 
that was deliberately simplified to a set of eight concepts (where) faculty members acted as 
domain experts, while the students were treated as learners possessing various degrees of 
expertise (Aidman & Egan, 1998). These ideas are considered instructional in the development 
of the research instrument of this study where the selection of eight concepts as a knowledge 
base is mirrored in the research instrument philosophy of Chapter 4. Aidman and Egan’s (1998) 
method strongly resembles a Delphi-type approach where the comparison between expert 
concept mapping and student mapping demonstrated similarity. Chapter 5 of this research 
considers the different respondent groups to compares the degrees of similarity.  
 
Aidman and Egan (1998) have also used a technique that is of strong resemblance to this 
research where the findings from their results are presented. The authors have developed 
individual matrices of two dimensional projections representing spatial relationships between 
mapped concepts. In their study where different groups included experts, students and novices, 
the resultant proximity-type matrices were analysed for hierarchical clustering and segmented 
into comparable levels of similarity between mapped concepts (Aidman & Egan, 1998). One of 
the findings produced by this study suggests that individual differences in concept mapping 
correlate with academic achievement in the domain subject (Aidman & Egan, 1998). 
 
Chiu and Wolfe (2002) propose a method for analysing sparse data matrices in their goal to 
achieve a reasonable assessment system involving human judgements. Their study investigates 
an option for analysing missing data from the knowledge structure and interpolating in a way 
that preserves the internal and external validity of the data to fully utilise all the information 
collected. They suggest subdividing a sparsely filled data matrix into smaller subsets for 
improved generalisability and their objectives were identified to show that nearly all the 
information collected can be considered without discarding incomplete sets. The authors use 
averaged variance components to achieve their goals in this study. They also state that the 
averaged variance components can serve as the information upon which Decision Studies are 
based (Chiu & Wolfe, 2002). This statement provides support to the averaging of the value 
assessments of respondents in determining consensus in Chapter 5 of this research.  
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Other methods used in knowledge theory and concept mapping include latent class analysis 
(Uebersax, 1999) within the field of medical analysis and research identifying patient latent 
variable classes. This study proposed that latent variable traits were able to be considered for 
levels of both independence and conditional dependence for the research based on measured 
pair-wise dimensions (Uebersax, 1999). The pair-wise dimensions suggested by Uebersax 
(1999) support the orthogonal relationship element pairs used in this research.  
 
Some examples of semantic mapping appear in modern applications for the medical sector with 
consideration of the problems of mapping language to aid diagnostic work. An example by Barb 
and Shyu (2003) considers the content-based image retrieval system for medical images, where 
these authors in particular use the concepts of user-specific profiles as well as considering 
linguistic variables to model perceptual categories (Barb & Shyu, 2003). Other authors Bell and 
Badiru (1993) use concept mapping and knowledge based expert systems for predicting trauma 
disorder. These authors suggest that a model incorporating risk factors could provide 
quantifiable and sound risk levels through the expert system (Bell & Badiru, 1993). 
 
A further consideration of expert and knowledge based assessment is provided by Sikder, Mal-
Sarkar, and Mal  (2006) in their consideration of risk species invasion. These authors introduce 
the integration of expert judgement with empirical information to produce a knowledge-centric 
risk model. They suggest that expert knowledge and judgements are often represented in value-
laden terms or preference-ordered criteria (Sikder, Mal-Sarkar, & Mal, 2006).  
Abernethy et al. (2005) develop performance mapping drawing upon the knowledge of experts. 
They state that causal knowledge is elicited from individuals who through their experience and 
training have encoded relational or causal knowledge about complex systems (Abernethy, 
Norne, Lillis, Malina & Selto, 2005).  These authors consider a method that triangulates three 
separate techniques of deriving a map for causality and they opt for a combination method in the 
absence within the literature of any single method (Abernethy, Norne, Lillis, Malina & Selto, 
2005).  
 
Rowe and Davis (1996) provide some commentary on conceptual graphs that project pattern 
matching operations. They suggest that graphs assist in the comprehension of concepts and 
concept relations for larger quantities of variables and their opinions support the use of 
knowledge based proximity graphs. They state that Causal mapping helps to frame strategic 
problems by speeding up the convergence of ideas (Rowe & Davis, 1996). 
 
A strong insight into the requirements of causal mapping with the following: 
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Causal mapping is useful for communicating problem situations because, typically, 
participants have different mental models. One approach to causal mapping is to use 
comprehensive situation mapping, which extends the mapping construct by assigning 
strengths and direction to links. Links can model the necessary causality requirements 
and help to model quantitative parameters describing complex situations.  
When both data and objects are represented in causal maps, managing software 
systems require the following: 
1. Factor Identifier. This is used to identify critical factors in a situation. 
2. Situation Mapper. This uses causal maps for describing a situation. 
3. Scenario Simulator. This is used to test implications of assumptions that have been 
made. 
4. Assumption surfacer. This explores differences in maps. 
5. Consensus formulator. Consensus on new maps is used to replace existing ones. 
(Rowe & Davis, 1996).  
 
The factors numbered 1-5 in the above extract are very similar in nature to the steps of 
phenomenological sociology. These requirements suggest causal mapping is similar in needs to 
a DSS and this support has been instrumental to the proposed design for creating a knowledge 
structure. The similarity in a combination of approaches toward constructing the research 
instrument is reflected by the suggestion for a consensus formulator by Rowe and Davis (1996) 
with some additional thoughts on the problems of solving consensus measures is additionally 
captured by Lo, Wang and Chao (2005) who deviate from the more traditional method of 
consensus evaluation to consider the variation trend of group consensus using similarity 
measures of consensus index (Lo, Wang & Chao, 2005). 
  
The theoretical needs of knowledge systems and of DSS are converging after having evolved 
separately according to Rowe and Davis (1996), who make the statement that there is now 
increasing impetus to merge the two into knowledge-based, intelligent decision-support systems 
(Rowe & Davis, 1996). This consideration provides support for a more holistic viewpoint as the 
title of this study suggests.  
2.4 Description of the phenomenon 
This section of the chapter will incorporate studies that provide both background and an 
overview to the originating problem of this study. The overview includes past investigations 
into physical security modelling and looking at suggestions for modelling in this area.  
This section will also consider some physical security terminology as concepts that surround the 
phenomenon to be modelled. 
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The documented approach by Tarr and Peaty (1995) uses a physical security model to build a 
virtual facility and recognises performance measures such as; probability of detection, 
probability of intervention, worst intervention, false alarms, capital costs, and equivalent 
annual cost. It can be seen that these attributes of physical security are sometimes difficult to 
quantify and may lead to the case where calculations are made with large uncertainty.  
 
The original work of Tarr (1994) was published as a design to achieve cost effective perimeter 
security, and follows up on his previous publication (Tarr, 1992) where he advocates an 
integration of both subjective and objective approaches for considering limitations to physical 
security modelling. His investigation into the modelling of prison facilities, describes the lack of 
integration of qualitative and quantitative methods inherent in any modelling process that he 
suggests is a dichotomy (Tarr, 1992). His ideas suggest limitations to the success of any model 
using either subjective or objective methods in isolation.  
 
Lindfield and Rodger (1992) advise the importance of defining the respective responsibilities of 
all parties concerned in the procurement system and stress the human aspect of formalising of 
each series of document to provide the best history of installation and protect the commercial 
and contractual interests of all parties. This identifies a critical requirement to model physical 
security in order to establish documentation that could specify; user requirements, performance 
specifications, commissioning procedures, system evaluation and routine audits (Lindfield & 
Rodger, 1992). A statement by them clearly establishes a need for developing a platform of a 
valid model: Clearly, users cannot perform real attacks against their installations in order to 
ensure that a system is working to specification, and a non-destructive test strategy is needed. 
(Lindfield & Rodger, 1992).  
 
To translate the needs of a user into a set of criteria for the system designer, the operational 
requirement and the performance specification should both: 
• be written in user language 
• state problems, not solutions 
• detail all the constraints on the design 
And; 
• Specify performance in terms of measurable attributes 
• Stipulate how those attributes will be measured, and 
• Be legally valid and enforceable 
(Lindfield & Rodger, 1992) 
 
Houchin (1999) considers the difficulties in devising a robust costing model from the 
perspective of a prison governor.  He mentions the two spheres of interest, where complexity in 
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pursuing the options for refurbishment (procurement process) is compared to the complexity in 
options for the individual components of technology. He describes the ultimate conclusion of 
such a model where the goal of the development is to deliver the full set of operating 
requirements at the least cost. Houchin (1999) considers the objectives as likely to be many and 
complex and also the cost themselves having a range of components such as: initial and full-life 
costs, capital and running costs, fixed and variable costs. He describes a trade-off where 
technology and sophisticated equipment will at some stage offset staffing costs. 
 
Limitations for modelling under high complexity will be based on the data input requirements. 
The problem with a quantitative modelling approach is that a list of elements describing the 
physical environment of any facility is potentially very large and after consideration of the 
possibility of all human interaction, the complexity will become difficult if not impossible to 
incorporate as data for a quantitative system.  
 
A reason for high uncertainty in associating a value with a physical security element is that there 
is often no physical means to obtain measurement. Introducing the human factor in a 
quantitative assessment creates a large number of permutations as the potential resources 
available to any attacker of physical security increases with each advance in technology.  
Where there is an unlimited use of either tools or technology to defeat physical security, the 
entire spectrum of available tools ranging from a simple hammer, to a ladder or even explosive 
devices, needs to be considered beyond reasonable behavioural calculations.  
 
In further consideration of actual physical security systems, Garcia (2001) provides a solid 
approach in which her analysis and evaluation map out requirements for a system to provide 
effectiveness in meeting physical security objectives. She compares both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis for this purpose and lists advantages and disadvantages for each in different 
scenarios. Her assessment of the physical protection system (PPS) is comprehensive and is 
described in the following: 
A PPS is a complex configuration of detection, delay, and response elements that can be 
analysed to determine system effectiveness. The analysis will identify system 
deficiencies, help evaluate improvements, and enable cost-versus-effectiveness 
comparisons (Garcia, 2001. pp242) 
 
Garcia (2001) describes effectiveness in a consideration of the design of a facility in meeting 
security objectives. She considers both quantitative and qualitative approaches via adversary 
paths through a facility and suggests that quantitative approaches would be more appropriate for 
assets with an unacceptably high consequence of loss while in contrast qualitative approaches 
would be more acceptable for assets with a lower consequence of loss (Garcia, 2001 pp242). 
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Her description of a path analysis is compatible with this research while some of the concepts 
that Garcia (2001) describes for modelling are also of special interest to this research.  
An example of this is where Garcia (2001) states that the, the probability of nondetection cannot 
be quantified directly, however she does acknowledge that it is important to note that analysis 
models use the probability of nondetection (Garcia, 2001 pp242). In consideration of Garcia 
(2001) this research targets the probability of nondetection to quantify in relative terms.  
 
The decision tree tool of Peck and Trachier (2004) is also of interest in framing the phenomenon 
of the research. Their decision tree tool considers detection likelihood through a system of 
modelling detection technologies and site conditions while considering security objectives such 
as coverage, objectives, usage and intent (Peck & Trachier, 2004). The foundation for similarity 
in the authors’ considerations with this research lies in the provision of ordered concepts of 
increasing difficulty for determination of detection as well as similar interview frameworks 
where they interpret descriptions of interview questions and answers (Peck & Trachier, 2004).  
The decision tree tool does not advise on the selection of barrier technologies, but allows the 
user to model choice based on assumptions of validity and security principles. While this type of 
model is generally capable of assisting with decision making, it is unclear whether the data from 
the different classes of detection capability within the model can actually represent real life data. 
It is stated by the author that the intended user is someone who is unfamiliar with security 
technology and uninformed about the effects of terrain, weather, system performance 
constraints, and detection zone maintenance on the reliability of sensor-based physical security 
(Peck & Trachier, 2004).   
2.5 Determination of universal elements 
This section looks at theory that provides supporting principles to the study, as well as 
considering similar studies in physical security to better understand why the universal elements 
of the research have been selected and looks at some evaluation procedures that may assist in 
verifying the results of the study. 
 
Modern physical security combinations have many components that may be considered as 
elements and technology brings many more potential additions onto the market every year.   
The ability to relate any particular component to each other is reduced by the lack of suitable 
measurement method as many of the potential elements may be latent constructs.  
Furthermore many of these constructs can be manipulated in human attacks that are limited only 
by imagination. The importance of considering physical security elements paired in comparison 
with a corresponding mode of attack is discussed with relevance to the research instrument in 
Chapter 4.  
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For a set of elements to be considered as universal elements two potentials will exist. Either the 
set of all possible elements must be considered universal elements or alternatively some 
elements of low importance or unconfirmed status will need to be considered as non-universal 
elements. For reasons of practicality and feasibility it is necessary for modelling to limit the 
number of parameters to be considered and some elements must be omitted from the universal 
element list. In this scenario all non-listed elements will need to have a potential to become 
universal elements on demand with full properties and attributes of universal elements.  
This effectively means that a system for modelling universal elements needs to be adaptive to be 
able to extend any existing universal element membership. The grouping of elements into 
clusters or hierarchies provides the best means of organising structures for large quantities of 
elements and therefore also provides the best means to recognise the optimum set of universal 
elements. The use of ordered hierarchies can therefore also reduce the number of element 
relationship permeations that can result from large numbers of elements.   
 
The hierarchies for determining which elements of this research are universal elements would 
ideally follow the concepts suggested by Hill (1982). He has stated that hierarchical descriptions 
will apply equally well to both structures and functions (Hill, 1982) in an assessment of General 
Systems Theory where he considers the following: 
The process of simplifying and isolating aspects of reality inevitably lead to 
hierarchical or “stratified” descriptions. D Wilson (1969, p.302) credits Weyl with the 
realization that understanding is a progressive series of descriptions at different levels. 
Each level has its own set of terms, concepts and principles, and different kinds of 
insight are yielded depending upon whether on moves up or down the hierarchy or 
across a level (Hill, 1982). 
 
Hill (1982) considers Guttman’s Radex Theory in detail and suggests that a lack of agreement 
has existed regarding the process for creating taxonomic categories. His consideration finds that 
most writers when discussing hierarchies have in mind part-whole or system-subsystem 
relationships that are able to be represented as tree-diagram structures (Hill, 1982). The process 
hierarchy that he bases his research position mainly relates to ordered considerations of 
complexity or degrees of complexity. This research has attempted to use the concept of ranked 
ordering to structure the defence in depth approach that physical security terminology is nested 
within, where higher degrees of complexity require greater hierarchical considerations.  
 
The type of element that should be considered for a universal set needs to contain certain 
properties that are able to specify value. A number of publications concentrate on physical 
security elements and typically give indications of the overall benefit as well as the 
effectiveness of physical security. The following examples provide both attacking-type and 
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defensive-type considerations with Tarr (1994) suggesting some considerations for a physical 
security model as follows: 
Practitioners should also develop a knowledge of how effective these attack styles will 
be against each barrier, and how well the various alarm systems perform against them, 
at least in some qualitative way. They should also become familiar with the likelihoods 
of each attack style, and the factors that influence it. The major influence is the actual 
perimeter elements installed, but many environmental factors such as; availability of 
tools/equipment, freedom of movement, scope for remaining inconspicuous, desperation 
and alternative routes, also have some effect. (Tarr, 1994) 
 
For barriers the mean delay times for each attack style are important. For alarms, it is 
the detection probabilities for each combination of attack style and weather type, plus 
false alarm rates. The translation of response force speeds into actual times should also 
be developed… It is variations in delay/response times that permit Intervention 
probabilities to be calculated. (Tarr, 1994) 
 
It is argued in this research that the defensive elements of physical security should always be 
referenced by the limit of considered attack on them rather than their standard performance 
ratings. The interpretation of the results in Chapter 6 considers several of the concepts proposed 
by Tarr (1994) and also that of Garcia (2001) that follow on her requirement for “nondetection”.  
 
Other publications of interest provide examples of where more specialised physical security 
elements are unlikely to be found on a list of universal elements, yet the category of the newly 
suggested element is worthy of universal element status. The following example provides a 
scenario considering a modern technological element and some appropriate attack methods 
which are similar to the attack considerations on barriers in this research for a facility specific-
type scenario: 
Fences have traditionally been made of rigid and stable structure. The resulting rigidity 
gives Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS) a stable background energy to 
work against. …There are, however, advantages in making a fence less rigid. A fence 
that in some way reacts to an attack (an active fence) absorbs a proportion of the 
energy from an impact from an imparted blow, making it more difficult to penetrate.  
A swaying fence should also be more difficult to climb…has tested a range of active 
fences in non-rigid or ‘floppy’ form ranging from those made of glass reinforced plastic 
(GRP) tubes to composite fences made of chain link and mesh. These have been tested 
for cutting, climbing and impact attacks. (Wassell, 1997) 
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Other indications for selecting a set of universal elements can be considered from a list of 
concepts that provide insight into the design of physical protection systems. This is evident in 
the following passage: 
Security principles, such as detection before delay, protection-in-depth, balanced 
protection, orientation of sensors, consideration of operating environment and nuisance 
alarm rates, complimentary sensors, camera resolution, light-to-dark ratio, proper 
equipment installation and maintenance, and response force training will still play an 
active role in system effectiveness, whatever the type of analysis done (Garcia, 2001). 
 
The extract from Garcia (2001) considers many important factors of physical security however 
most of the principles listed will be attributes of a system. A hierarchy for conceptual 
knowledge would consider these as universal elements only at a lower order of determination 
from the type of system. A stepwise example is provided for justification.  
1. Operating environment and nuisance alarm rates will be appropriately measured as 
attributes for each type of detection system; therefore they should be placed in the hierarchy 
lower than the type of detection system. 
2. The complete range that describes the possible effects of environmental and nuisance issues 
will be one of many considerations related to the performance of a detection system in the 
event of an attack.  
3. When many possibilities are considered as a larger picture, if a potential exits for an 
attacker to use force or violent destruction against a detection system, then environment and 
nuisance issues would no longer be given consideration 
4. As a result of items 1-3, operating environment and nuisance alarm rates might be placed 
lower in a hierarchy for importance than a specific type of detection system. 
 
This example is one of many possible hierarchical interpretations of the suggested elements in 
this section. The main point of the example is that determining universal elements for this 
research is dependent upon the hierarchical determination of physical security. Garcia’s (2001) 
assessment of the physical protection system (PPS) recognises the high level elements that this 
research has based its approach which include threat definition, target asset identification, 
detection, delay, and response. (Garcia, 2001, pp242) 
 
Peck and Trachier (2004) have used an order scale to imply increased difficulty of detection in 
their security technology decision tree tool. The ordered lists described by Peck and Trachier 
(2004) provide one of the more interesting directions for the research questionnaire in that all 
elements of the study could be positioned along an ordered list of a concept category. This idea 
developed in conjunction with the concept continuums suggested by Smith (1984) represents an 
ideal way to incorporate new elements along the concept scale of an existing universal element 
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list. The universal elements were considered in the questionnaire as indicators of value or 
markers along concept continuums and it was proposed that extended element could be aligned 
at any later stage as a complimentary element resource position in line with its relative value.  
 
A further consideration by Peck (2002) considers weather and terrain effects on detection 
systems in physical security planning. She analyses detection capability of intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) as a function of their dependence on weather and terrain and provides a decision 
aid. Some of the IDS included are infrared and microwave (Peck, 2002). The study from van 
Voorthuijsen et al. (2005) presents CCTV surveillance as an IDS and considers factors 
determining its effectiveness in physical security. The authors describe the optimisation issue as 
a multidimensional problem where reliable image evaluation by a human observer is influenced 
by many variables (van Voorthuijsen, Hoof, Klima, Roubik, Bernas & Pata, 2005). The research 
instrument has considered these IDS examples from the two studies as universal elements for 
the concepts continuum of detection systems. 
 
Some other relevant publications to consider perimeter intrusion systems standards and 
modelling are by Armstrong and Peile (2005) and Armstrong (2005). Both of these studies 
consider concepts of attack as one of the major indicators for physical security effectiveness and 
assessment. The publication by Armstrong and Peile (2005) considers that the concept of 
Vulnerability to Defeat would be more difficult to include in an application-based standard as 
the main vulnerabilities are generally technology specific. While the concepts of detection rate 
and false alarm rate more readily provided in an evaluation rating for detection systems, the 
authors suggest that Vulnerability to Defeat as defined as – a measure of a system’s capacity to 
resist a direct attack on it or detect an intrusion attempt by a knowledgeable attacker intent on 
disabling the system or exploiting the system’s weaknesses to defeat it (Armstrong & Peile, 
2005) would need to be addressed separately. This leaves a potential gap in the standardisation 
of evaluation measures for detection systems. This limitation echoes the suggestions by Garcia 
(2001) that disabling of detection systems should also be strongly considered as a 
complimentary type of attack on a facility to a stealth attack. These two action statements or 
relative descriptors (Smith, 1984) in the evaluation of detection systems have been considered 
along separate concept continuums for this research.  
 
The publication by Armstrong (2005) considers a Physical Barriers Attack Standard he 
describes as outdated and limiting due to an evolving technological capability. Therefore a full 
suite of tools that the highest threat attacker was likely to acquire and use, may be missing from 
any proposed standard (Armstrong, 2005). A disadvantage of any newly proposed physical 
barrier standard as suggested by the author is that its comparative effectiveness will always be 
subjective (Armstrong, 2005).  
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Several literature sources in this section have presented several possible selections for universal 
elements to be used in this research. The main issue that requires consideration in the selection 
process is the necessary structuring of the universal elements into adequate hierarchical 
groupings large enough to be representative of a security facility and small enough to be 
assessed against each other in order that consensus may be achieved.  
2.6 Apprehending of relationships 
This section reviews studies that assist in the apprehension of elemental relationships in the area 
of knowledge structures and semantic mapping. Areas that may impact on this investigation 
include analytical and measurement. Certain aspects of the measurement of element 
relationships are investigated in this section and each is assessed with regard to its potential 
usefulness in developing the research instrument. 
 
In applying techniques such as the Delphi examined by Green et al. (1988) for marketing 
research to the design of the research instrument, references to profiles have been considered by 
this research as a tool for measurement. The concept of profiling groups of elements was 
identified to combine physical security information in general areas of classification and 
performance.. A profile of value assessments for each participant in the research was 
incorporated into a group profile and further extended into a single profile representing 
consensus with the concept of a “standard” introduced. Profiling has been briefly suggested in 
the extract below and will be considered in more detail in Chapter 4 as it appears to have strong 
relevance in conceptual mapping:  
If we have n persons measured on m variables, the profile of each person can be 
portrayed as a point in m dimensions. If we also know the group to which each person 
belongs, and the groups differ in terms of average profiles, often called centroids, we 
might expect to find different groups occupying different regions of the space. The less 
overlap noted among intergroup profiles in that space, the more likely it is that 
discriminant analysis can help us separate the groups (Green, Tull & Albaum, 1988, 
pp107). 
 
This suggests that a dimensional matrix comprising m element dimensions all suitably defined 
by relationship values that could create a reference structure of knowledge as a profile that can 
be used in a decision analysis model. Also the support for discriminant analysis as suggested by 
Green et al. (1988) has been presented by others such as Smith and Robinson (1999, pp32) who 
have demonstrated a two dimensional graphical relationship between pair-wise barrier types for 
both a novice group and an expert group. In similar n dimensional representations matrix data 
could be used as reference comparisons between a user’s knowledge and an expert’s knowledge. 
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The relevance to this study suggests that a questionnaire based n dimensional method can be 
used to rank physical security data by relative value assessments. While expert and novice 
groups are typically compared for differences (Smith & Robinson, 1999), this research proposes 
that these two groups are also considered in union to identify the similarity trends in order to 
obtain a relative consensus of opinion. 
 
Supporting literature in the field of security suggests using multidimensional scaling and 
multidimensional representations such as those proposed by Smith (2002) and perceptional 
representations suggested by Brooks and Smith (2002). These examples indicate that the 
representation of knowledge structures using data from categories such as novice groups and 
expert groups can be collected by relational proximity scaling. The research questionnaire has 
modified the multidimensional scaling technique in this study so that it applies as quasi-
qualitative time based measures instead of linear similarity based measures. The qualitative time 
based measures considered for the research instrument present a logarithmic transformation to 
quantitative elemental relationships when time is used as a fundamental unit.  
 
The concepts of Hill (1982) are presented in this section where mathematical form is 
recommended in the following: 
The ability to translate theory into mathematical form has several advantages. It 
permits precise test of predictions from the basic postulates of the theory. It also allows 
for model adjustments in cases where a prediction is not supported by the data of a 
study (Hill, 1982). 
 
The relationships between elements can be further transformed from matrix format into visual 
representation with development of a conceptual model suggesting defined causal relationships. 
The model that has been presented in this study in Chapter 6 is a graphical conceptualisation of 
the phenomenon of physical security with regard to the functions of delay, detection and 
response.  
2.7 Attitudinal measurement 
As this research attempts to capture expert opinion, this expert opinion can be collected as the 
measurement of human knowledge and experience, however it needs be wholly captured 
through the research instrument. This part of the section investigates some methods used 
previously in measurement of human opinion. An ongoing investigation has been documented 
in the field of attitude measurement. The topic is well summarised by the editor Keeves (1997, 
pp705) in the review Educational Research, Methodology, and Measurement: An International 
Handbook - Second Edition. Some of the more interesting points of comparison are listed in this 
section. 
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Keats considers that attitude measurement is possible as a result of Thurstones’s development of 
scale values for stimuli on dimensions for which there is no corresponding physical measure 
(Keats, 1997, pp759). Keats (1997, pp759) notes that the use of Likert methods for constructing 
objective tests of cognitive abilities could be applied to the construction and use of scales for 
measuring attitudes.  These methods parallel requirements for qualitative data (attitudes) of 
physical security effectiveness. Dunn-Rankin and Zhang (1997) consider unidimensional 
scaling methodologies as recognised tools of measurement with some of the defined terms 
including summated ratings, Likert scales, successive categories, or semantic differential scales 
(Dunn-Rankin & Zhang, 1997, p792). The suggestion of the semantic differential scale has been 
considered further in the research questionnaire.  
 
One of the basic problems with scaling attitudes appears to be a lack of an absolute reference for 
standard comparisons. The task of setting a mastery level or standard reference in terms of a test 
score have been investigated in the field of education and range from the exercising of a value 
judgement by curriculum experts through decision theory approaches which assume knowledge 
of true mastery score to utilizing the ratio of the two costs of misclassification (i.e., false 
positives and false negatives) and alternatively the use of an independent criterion such as 
degree of success in a referral task (Keats, 1997, pp759). Within the field of education, a 
problem identified as representing human cognitive performance in terms of a relatively small 
number of cognitive factors (Keats, 1997, pp760). Factor analysis has also been investigated by 
the author and there are methods specified such as; least squares and maximum likelihood 
methods that are often used (Keats, 1997, pp760). 
 
The parallels of attitude measurement in educational fields and the data required for physical 
security modelling have been briefly summarised with examples from literature.  
Some subjective aspects of physical security can be scaled, measured and interpreted based on 
methods presented in educational research. 
2.8 Heuristics 
The collection of expert opinion in the research contains limitations inherent to the chosen 
method of data collection. A major limitation is due to the fact that opinion is usually a 
reflection of some simple heuristic bias. Some different types of heuristic bias have been 
considered for guidance in this section. 
 
Heath and Tindale (1994) list a range of heuristic considerations which will affect the type of 
recall available to humans. This list is described as follows: 
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Probably the most often studied heuristic from the original three proposed by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) is the “representativeness” heuristic. A person is said to be 
using the representativeness heuristic when he or she judges the probability of an 
uncertain event by the degree to which it (1) is similar in essential properties to its 
parent population, or (2) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is 
generated. (Heath & Tindale,1994).  
 
It is expected that in this research, some participants to the research instruments will be using 
recall mechanisms from personal experience to provide element relationship value assessments, 
while other participants may be using information gained from academic instruction. 
Participants with more experience may draw on the representativeness heuristic to judge 
elemental relationship values. Those with academic instruction may draw upon the availability 
heuristic as considered in the following: 
Research has shown that most people underutilize base rate information. The 
availability heuristic involves people’s tendencies to judge the probability of some event 
by their ability to recall similar events.  … As with representativeness, ease of recall 
and frequency of occurrence are probably correlated in most instances. (Heath & 
Tindale,1994).  
 
A knowledge structure should represent the entire range of conceptualisation of element 
relationships and in doing so a mixture of the heuristic influences will improve the diversity in 
opinions and provide a more general (and holistic) base for relationships. The information that 
the study has identified considers relative differences using heuristics as providing support: 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic is based on the assumption that people often 
start the judgement process by focusing on some initial value (i.e anchor) and then 
based on the other available information, adjust from that value to some final 
judgement. (Heath & Tindale,1994).  
 
As the research instrument considers concept continuums and elements in rank order of benefit 
to security, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic will most likely be applied to estimate value 
assessments for element relationships that are less common or even unknown to the participant. 
This should assist the overall objectives of the research to provide relative indications for the 
elements in a specific rank order of value. Anchoring and adjustment therefore should provide a 
means for participants to provide educated guesses if necessary through the research instrument.  
The simulation heuristic is also possible for consideration: 
The simulation heuristic is related to the ease by which people can construct scenarios 
that fit a particular event. The easier it is to generate scenarios that lead to the event, 
the more probable the event is perceived. However, much of this work has tended to 
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focus more on simulations that lead to other outcomes (counterfactuals), the ease with 
which such counterfactuals can be reproduced, and the types of changes they 
encompass. (Heath & Tindale,1994).  
 
Generally each of the heuristics listed seek to explain how relationships values may be obtained 
from the knowledge assessments of all participants.  
2.9 Concluding remarks 
The literature review has considered the following sections: a method of inquiry, suspension of 
prior conceptions, a description of the phenomena, determination of the universal elements, 
apprehension of relationships, attitudinal measurements and heuristics.  
 
The method of inquiry has sought to improve the distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative research method which provides an unusual approach to the topic. The use of 
phenomenological sociology as a consideration in the layout of the literature review is designed 
to provide guidance for the structure of the research and appears to give the research the 
freedom that allows it to undertake an investigative method of inquiry. 
 
The suspension of prior conceptions is described in order to clearly identify what fundamentals 
are being considered for the purpose of the research and to explicitly connect the relevance of 
this theory to the study. In this way all other concepts are suspended unless they form part of the 
universal element structure. The theory that have been examined in this section are those of 
decision theory, decision support systems, modelling analysis, image theory, knowledge 
mapping, and semantic mapping. Guidance from each of these areas has been selected as 
examples in literature assembled toward developing the research instrument. 
 
The section that describes the phenomenon is more specific to the topic of physical security 
modelling. Several approaches toward modelling are discussed and the difficulties involved in 
this process have been included for comparison and direction in this research.  
 
Determining the universal elements is the third of the four steps of phenomenological sociology.  
The section that considers many of the possible elements to be used in a universal element list 
also considers the properties that the list may require. This section also considered as a universal 
list that can readily includes new members. This section summarises that the universal element 
will be derived from the consideration of a hierarchical construction of the elements in physical 
security terminology.  
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The apprehending of the relationships of the elements is the topic of the next section and 
suggests that profiling elements may be a powerful tool for measurements and to provide 
guidance for consensus of the research findings. The section considers past physical security 
studies that have considered multidimensional scaling techniques for comparisons between 
groups in using similarity measures and provides a direction for this research to propose the 
measurements of expert opinion in time units.  
 
The final two sections of this chapter looks at work on attitudinal measurements in the field of 
educational research to provide further guidance for the research instrument as well as a brief 
look at the heuristic influences that participants in the research may draw upon in expressing 
opinions as measurement.  
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3 Theoretical considerations 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework to validate the formation of the research 
questionnaire. As all data for the research is generated from the questionnaire, it is important to 
identify theoretical links for all of the elements presented in the study in ordered groups within 
the questionnaire. To develop the conceptual mapping identified in the research objectives, the 
element relationships of physical security have been considered from areas of the literature 
review and have been supported by knowledge structure theory, decision theory (decision 
matrices), the hierarchical ordering of physical security terminology and defence in depth.  
 
This chapter investigates the terminology of physical security presented in the main research 
instrument in relation to its hierarchical structure and theoretical framework. It explains why 
this structure is important in order to consider that elements selected along a series of concept 
continuums are able to be universal elements of the study. Theoretical interpretations have been 
necessary to conceptualise orthogonal dimensions as ordered scales in the research instrument.  
This chapter sets the scene for the development of the arbitrary element hierarchies of the 
questionnaire that enable the construction of knowledge matrices from assessment values 
towards holistic modelling.  
3.2 Knowledge structures in physical security 
For the purpose of transferring knowledge to new problem situations, a description of 
knowledge structures deals with concepts and relations at different levels of abstractedness with 
the following explanation useful as an overview. 
The knowledge is organised hierarchically, and is accompanied by explicit guidelines 
specifying the application of this knowledge. The problem-solving model produced, 
when operating on domain-specific knowledge, substantiates human problem-solving 
observations (Smith, 1984). 
  
Smith (1984) recognises two representations of conceptualisation of knowledge in human 
memory as “logical” models of concept representation and “spatial” or “proximal” models of 
concept representation (Smith, 1984). General description of logical models specified have 
listed attributes that include relational descriptors and some semantic systems that identify 
relations through studying the interrelating links of a knowledge structure. Spatial models in 
contrast are defined by the inter-concept strengths and similarities with paired comparisons and 
the presence of a continuum of variation between concepts along a semi-scaled dimension. 
Smith (1984) further states that Nagy (1983) calls for a synthesis of logical and proximal 
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methodologies to better undertake exploration of conceptual relations (Smith, 1984).  
In recognising the importance of this call for synthesis, this research has attempted to combine 
aspects from both logical and proximal theoretical models in order to obtain a cumulative 
benefit of both. The consideration of relational descriptors to describe and assist in constructing 
an ordered hierarchy of physical security elements has been borrowed from the logical model 
while the consideration of scaled concept continuums within the hierarchical structure has been 
borrowed from the proximal model. 
  
The work undertaken to develop the research questionnaire had identified four main areas of 
terminology that have required further theoretical evaluation. These four areas comprise the 
various physical security terminologies that were recognised as high-order levels in any 
hierarchical structure. They are listed here in descending order of hierarchal importance: 
1. Defence in depth and its functions 
2. Relational descriptors (action statements) 
3. Concepts (measured as concept continuums) 
4. Elements 
 
The remainder of this section has been considered from these four levels of hierarchy. 
3.2.1 Defence in depth and its functions 
Several theories of physical security have been considered by Garcia (2001) where a physical 
protection system (PPS) is defined as a complex configuration of detection, delay, and response 
elements that can be analysed to determine system effectiveness (Garcia, 2001). The concepts of 
delay, detection, and response are widely accepted across the field of physical security as the 
functions of defence in depth and these naturally form the highest level of consideration in risk 
assessments in a theoretical structure of physical security. These high level functions are able to 
be conceptualised as forming a hierarchical umbrella of physical security where classifications 
of potentially all elements can be structured. It is also necessary to further understand the 
relationships of each of these three with each other in order to consider their potential for 
modelling purposes. 
 
The fundamentals of defence in depth are evident in most modern physical security 
considerations. Wikipedia (2006) states that the term defence in depth is originally a military 
strategy that seeks to delay an attacker through buying time by yielding space while the term is 
now widely used to describe non-military strategies (Wikipedia, 2006). The following extracts 
are relevant in describing defence in depth where military concepts can been readily extended 
into similar conceptual scenarios for the security industry. 
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Defence in depth strategy requires that a defender deploy his resources, such as 
fortifications, field works … to a succession of prepared positions (to) extract a high 
price from the advancing enemy while themselves avoiding the danger of being overrun 
or outflanked. Delaying the enemy advance mitigates the attacker's advantage of 
surprise and allows time to move defending military units to make a robust defence and 
to prepare a counter-attack…. The defence in depth strategy is particularly effective 
against an attacker who is able to concentrate his forces and attack a small number of 
places on an extended defensive line (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
A well-planned defence in depth strategy will deploy forces in mutually supportive 
positions and in appropriate roles. … Successive layers of defence may use different 
technologies or tactics; for example … Defence in depth may allow a defender to 
maximise the defensive possibilities of natural terrain and other advantages 
(Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
A further consideration by Wikipedia (2006) considers a non-military example of defence in 
depth where fire prevention targets the deployment of fire alarms, extinguishers, evacuation 
plans, mobile rescue and fire fighting equipment (Wikipedia, 2006). This description clearly 
resembles the physical security defence in depth functions of delay, detection and response. 
 
In this chapter the work of Garcia (2001) will be suggested as representative of the modern 
theoretical understanding of the functions of delay, detection and response in designing systems 
with physical security components. As a brief introduction to this, we can consider the position 
that Garcia proposes in an attempt to explain the ordered theoretical relationships of the 
functions of defence in depth: 
The goal of an adversary is to complete a path to an asset with the least likelihood of 
being stopped by the PPS or, conversely, the highest likelihood of successful attack. To 
achieve this goal, the adversary may attempt to minimize the time required to complete 
the path. This strategy involves penetrating barriers as quickly as possible with little 
regard to the probability of being detected. An example of this adversary tactic is a 
force attack. The adversary is successful if the path is completed before guards can 
respond. Alternatively, the adversary may attempt to minimize detection with little 
regard to the time required. This adversary tactic is based on a stealth attack. In this 
case the adversary is successful upon completion of the path without being detected 
(Garcia, 2001). 
 
Garcia (2001) recognises two modes of attack where physical systems may serve to maintain 
security. Effectiveness measures are considered by her firstly as minimum cumulative time delay 
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and secondly as cumulative probability of detecting. Both would able to assess an overall risk of 
an attack on a physical security defence arrangement. In the former effectiveness measure, 
Garcia (2001) notes that delay without detection is not appropriate as the response force must be 
alerted in order to respond and interrupt the adversary. In the latter effectiveness measure, she 
notes that no assessment for delay is considered which she reveals as a disadvantage (Garcia, 
2001). The determination of response time as an effectiveness measure is generally seen to be 
independent of the attack type and is often restricted only by limitations in defensive resources. 
 
Garcia’s (2001) views consider that the adversary factor is the strong dependency factor in 
effectiveness measures and the following extract reinforces the need to consider interconnected 
theoretical structures for risk based option-consequence mapping. Further to this her ideas 
suggest that the best effectiveness measure is one that combines all of the considerations of 
minimum cumulative time delay, cumulative probability of detecting and response time. 
Adversaries may use combinations of force, stealth, and deceit in order to accomplish 
their goals. This is why a well-defined design basis threat is so important to system 
effectiveness. The most successful adversary is assumed to be knowledgeable enough to 
defeat or bypass detection along the path up to the CDP (critical detection point) and 
also knows the response force time (Garcia, 2001). 
 
Garcia (2001) has made assumptions in her description of the theory of defence in depth  
where she doubts that the probability of “non-detection” can be measured. She additionally 
assumes that for a series of physical security measures, delay time is calculated as a sum and 
probability of detection is calculated as a product (Garcia, 2001). This statement is based upon 
an assumption that delay is measured by time and that detection is measured by probability. 
Although these may be logical considerations, they represent limiting assumptions in the 
consideration of non-delay and non-detection. 
 
This study has developed the questionnaire to enable measures of delay and detection to be 
identified through expert opinion with both measures based on relative time associations which 
are effectively likelihood considerations. This proposes that the concepts of delay and detection 
can be calculated as either a sum or a product. In a further consideration for delay and detection 
probabilities, Garcia (2001) assumes that with any assessment of a facility the analyst must 
repeat this process for many adversary paths, find the most vulnerable path, and decide whether 
this is a satisfactory result even though there are many adversary paths into a facility.  
The critical path characterizes the effectiveness of the overall protection system in detecting, 
delaying, and interrupting the adversary (Garcia, 2001). 
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These limiting theoretical considerations suggest that a protection system needs to identify its 
critical path, while in reality the critical path may be elusive and strongly reliant on the 
adversary factor which require that the effectiveness of the system, then, is somewhat dependent 
on adversary tactics (Garcia, 2001). By this argument, without predetermined adversary tactics 
any consideration of risk estimation leads to a circular argument involving the determination of 
PPS path effectiveness.  
 
Effectiveness assessments on elements of physical security (including all typical components) 
such as those reported by Armstrong (2005), Armstrong and Piele (2005), Peck and Trachier 
(2004), and others in this field, do not provide critical time delays or “non-detection” 
probabilities. This is because it is not feasible to consider exhaustive physical testing with a true 
range of adversary tactics. Therefore from a theoretical position, the units of measurement for 
the assessment of delay, detection, and response are different and typically may include either 
consideration of time or probability. This suggests that an assessment of overall effectiveness is 
not feasible as an absolute measure for time or probability as both will be subject to many 
parameters that may be unknown. This research considers that the solution in describing a 
useful hierarchical structure as a framework of element relationships is mostly dependent on the 
attack methods. The research questionnaire has developed a means of assessment that can 
identify a relative understanding of the element-attack relationships available through the 
mechanism of human generalisation. Therefore a hierarchy will be able to determine a relative 
effectiveness when attack-measures are listed as comparable non-detection and non-delay 
arrangements. 
 
A consideration to obtain overall system effectiveness in the theoretical analysis of Garcia’s 
(2001) work is difficult as her performance measures have different units. However she 
considers that regardless of how the increased performance is obtained, any analysis of 
proposed or necessary upgrades to effectiveness will assist the designer or analyst to optimise 
system performance (Garcia, 2001). This notion supports the development of a model that 
incorporates the dissimilar entities of delay, detection and response and is able to equate them 
for assessment in relative terms. Such a model, according to Garcia (2001) should help the 
analyst to optimise system performance.  
 
As a final consideration of overall effectiveness, Chapter 6 of this research proposes a novel 
concept for modelling that combines values for delay, detection and response and is able to 
assess overall effectiveness between dissimilar conceptual entities. The model evaluates the 
functions of defence in depth at the highest level of a hierarchical framework from values of 
element relationships at a lower order and graphically identifies effectiveness in the process of 
relating these functions. 
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3.2.2 Relational descriptors (action statements) 
The relational descriptors that have been identified in this research are action statements that 
come from separate consideration for each of the functions of defence in depth. The freedom 
that the method of inquiry presents to this research enables both theory and interpretations of the 
literature to play an integral role in providing solutions to the research objectives through the 
development of the research instrument. The method of inquiry has identified appropriate 
literature to theoretically construct the research questionnaire.  
 
The term relational descriptors have also been called primitives or “action-on” statements and 
also propositional relations by Smith (1984). They are recognised in the “logical” model of 
concept representation in memory where this type of model strongly considers the relational 
links between concepts in order to gain appreciation for the structure of memory as the 
following states: 
With the interview technique, propositional networks can produce a representation of 
conceptual knowledge, where concepts are portrayed as nodes and propositions, 
indicating the nature of the relations, link the concept points. Individual’s propositional 
diagrams can be compared for similarity, differences, and absent links (Smith, 1984). 
 
The questionnaire has incorporated concept links and relational descriptors to be analogous to 
the boundary conditions that work to provide convergent knowledge structures. The relational 
descriptors as the boundary conditions of the research instrument contain action statements that 
give directional meaning through the knowledge structure enabling universal elements to 
cluster. The relational descriptors are relevant to the individual functions of defence in depth 
where the majority of elements can be clustered for at least one of these action statements.  
A small number of all-inclusive action statements provide a simplified directional time-scale 
that corresponds to the physical action description for each of the functions of defence in depth.  
 
The boundary conditions not only represent the action statement within a framework for 
conceptualisation but also incorporate the scale for time value assessments. This corresponds to 
the directional time-scale and includes an indication of overall benefit to physical security.  
Eight boundary conditions have been included in the research questionnaire. Of these eight 
boundary conditions, five represent the functions of defence in depth with two representing 
delay, two representing detection, and one boundary condition representing response.  
The remaining three boundary conditions in the questionnaire consider the asset, the motivation 
of the attacker, and the type of attack. All boundary conditions consider attacking element 
contributions against defensive element contributions and provide a value assessment for overall 
effectiveness that is dependent on adversary tactics (Garcia, 2001). 
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The theoretical position of Garcia (2001) has considered two potential forms of attack in stealth 
attack and force attack. This study has re-identified these action statements as evading and 
disabling in the research instrument in consideration of Garcia’s (2001) recommendations that a 
measurement of non-detection is the quantity that is most desirable for determining overall 
effectiveness. The term evading is seen as an action of non-detection and is synonymous with 
the concept of a stealth attack. Similarly disabling is an action of non-detection and is 
synonymous with the concept of force. These two boundary conditions for detection provide 
inclusive coverage over a wide range of non-detection potentials and the research instrument 
has suggested to participants that this may potentially cover all situations of non-detection. 
 
In a similar manner, the report by Wassell (1997) lists cutting, climbing and impact attacks and 
is supported in concept by Armstrong (2005) who considers attacks on barriers by force.  
This study has utilised the action statements breaking and climbing for the research instrument. 
By using these two descriptors attacks on a barrier may be identified through a divergent path 
analysis or conceptually as a geometric direction of a path either going around a barrier or going 
through a barrier. These concepts represent properties of “non-delay” in keeping with Garcia’s 
(2001) desired property of non-detection. Any barrier that a can affect delay will be influenced 
by the quality of the tools that are used in an attack. The relational descriptors of the research 
instrument represent the attacking element contributions of the non-delay of barrier elements.  
 
The concept of response is used as its own relational descriptor. A suitable response is able to 
provide timely interaction in the event of an attack. Evaluating the likely success of different 
response methods is outside the scope of this research; however it is a fair assumption to 
conclude that once a response is enacted, the attack cannot continue without some adjustment. 
 
The relational descriptors form mid level structure of the physical security hierarchy as action 
statements that link the boundary conditions to concept continuums and the universal elements.  
The action statements chosen for the research instrument are identified as attacking-type verbs.  
The use of relational descriptors is supported in theory and provides a directional framework in 
the hierarchical structure of knowledge for physical security. 
3.2.3 Concept continuums 
For each of the functions of defence in depth structured as relational descriptors, two concept 
continuums have been presented as orthogonal measurement scales. The relational descriptors 
consider both attack-type continuums and defence-type continuums through inter-comparison in 
order to assess value judgements. The concept continuums are directional scales that indicate 
the magnitude of a relative overall benefit to physical security for set each boundary condition. 
The directional preference for benefit stated within each boundary condition is arbitrary; 
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however a preferred direction is usually apparent for a logical consideration of the relational 
descriptor.  
 
Smith (1984) describes Schaefer (1979) in considering the concept of a “concept” as existing in 
three parts: 
1. the logical core of the concept, which is the invariant structure representative of a 
certain class of objects or events, 
2. a name which is associated with the logical core of the concept, for communication 
and memorisation by the individual, and 
3. an associative framework which surrounds the logical core, and provides a tight 
network of other associations (Smith, 1984). 
 
The notion of a concept continuum has been interpreted from the work of Smith (1984), where 
he considers the characteristics of the “Proximal” model for knowledge representation in 
memory. The concepts are described along as variation along a dimension. 
Proximity data can be represented by dimensional spatial models, or by non-
dimensional clustering models; the distinction between the models depends upon the 
presence of a continuum of variation between concepts along a dimension, or the 
discreteness of attributes in featural representation (Smith, 1984). 
 
In the ordering of elements into a knowledge structure for physical security terminology, the 
reference to a continuum of variation between concepts along a dimension (Smith, 1984) 
provides a means of ranking particular elements of interest in this study. Concept continuums 
have been developed to represent a dimension for an overall benefit to security in one direction 
and an overall lack of benefit to security in the other direction. This is significant as it means 
that elements can be ranked effectively in their overall benefit to security against other elements 
along a measurement continuum. Thus element relations can be better organised into a 
hierarchical structure using the concept continuum as a linking media for relational dimensions.   
 
Further to addressing the concept continuum as a linking media, the consideration of “proximal” 
models compares the similarity measures of concepts. This method uses hierarchical cluster 
analysis in which successively less stringent criteria of proximity are imposed on the concepts 
for lower hierarchies and also clustering within classes and hierarchical relations between 
classes, provide a representation for conceptual interaction (Smith, 1984). The use of concept 
continuums in this research attempts the reduction of elements of physical security into 
universal elements as reference levels along dimensions that can be navigated. 
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This support in literature proposes that a list of elements could also be representative of many 
other elements along a concept continuum which can be extended to suggest that a means of 
reducing complexity can use a representative number of universal elements. The research 
instrument provides several small lists of elements over two orthogonal concept continuums for 
each relational descriptor using time as a measurement indicator. Thus each element chosen as 
a reference level along the continuum may be used to locate other elements (or groups of 
elements) relative to their position.  
 
The concept continuums that have been chosen for the research fit in with the nature of the 
relational descriptors. For the five relational descriptors used across the functions of defence in 
depth, there have been nine independent high level concept continuums used. Over the total set 
of eight boundary conditions, ten independent concept continuums have been used.  
The presented concept continuums provide a broad enough coverage as dimensional scales to 
consider most elements in simple physical security terminology. Examples of orthogonal 
concept continuums that have been used in the research instrument include attack force against 
material strength for the action statement breaking and detection system against stealth attack 
for the action statement evading. 
 
For all elements there is expected to be a range of potential for a maximum position of strength 
with regard to the force continuum, a mean or average position of strength with regard to the 
force continuum or for a minimum position of strength with regard to the force continuum.  
The average value over the range could also be determined to give average conceptual reference 
points along each concept continuum. 
3.2.4 Elements 
Elements described by natural language are recognised by both Phenomenological Sociology 
and SEM as essential parts of modelling a phenomenon. Determination of the universal 
elements for the questionnaire is recognised as an objective of the research. The elements that 
have been selected for the research questionnaire are presented as universal elements of the 
phenomenon in this section.  
 
The determination of universal elements from the many possible element combinations of 
terminology is identified through considering reference levels along a scale of each of the 
concept continuums. Furthermore the most important universal elements in each concept 
continuum are those that represent the outermost reference levels along the continuum for each 
concept. An example supporting this notion considers the concept continuum of force attack and 
the outermost elements of rock and explosive, where rock represents the lowest reference value 
of force, explosive represents the highest reference level of force. All other universal elements 
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positioned along this dimensional scale can be considered as simple arbitrary points for 
reference levels. These may represent a cluster of elements, or alternatively elements may 
represent a sequence of regular divisions along the scale. This is not seen as important for the 
scale in order to be represented adequately; however it is somewhat important that the universal 
elements along the scale are dissimilar enough to be conceptually separated. 
 
For this research the number of elements that has been used over each concept continuum is six. 
This number has been determined in order to divide the dimensional scale into a relative ordered 
sequence of the universal elements. For some concept continuums the universal elements will be 
clustered together while along others the universal elements points will have greater separation. 
The actual separation between the universal elements on a single dimensional scale is 
determined by each orthogonal concept continuum while the relative assessment of each of the 
universal elements in the conceptual mapping is constructed by the range of values in the data 
matrices. 
 
The justification of a universal element becomes a matter of whether or not it is the best choice 
for representation along the scale of the concept continuum. As the two most important 
universal elements are the highest reference point and the lowest reference point along the scale, 
all other universal elements are arbitrarily important and cannot be further justified through any 
benefit to the scale. It is therefore appropriate to determine when an element may not be a 
universal element. Therefore all elements that do not appear on the scale of a concept continuum 
can be considered unlisted elements without universal element status. This status is subject to 
change as universal elements may be readily replaced by different elements with similar 
properties. It is not a requirement that elements become “universal” in order to be analysed in 
this modelling environment. All unlisted elements can be mapped into the concept continuum in 
their most appropriate position based on the properties that they exhibit. For the purpose of this 
research only universal elements have been considered for the value assessments of respondents 
and these have been designated as appropriate as reference levels until better reference levels 
along the scale of the concept continuum can be determined. 
 
If it can be accepted that all the possible elements of physical security can be adequately 
assessed through the boundary conditions of the research, then representative reference levels 
called universal elements on a continuum of the knowledge mapping may act to reduce overall 
complexity in this study. 
3.3 The Decision Matrix 
The theory of Giere (1991), which includes the graphical representation displayed in Figure 3.1, 
has been identified as important to gain an understanding of how data that is collected through 
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the research instrument may be able to be readily transferred into a format that can be modelled.  
Gierre (1991) discusses decision theory by considering knowledge as the determination of 
rational process of comparing options and consequences in the following:  
In the simplest decision theories, the options and consequences are represented in a two 
dimensional matrix ... consisting of one option and one possible consequence.  It is 
these couples, called outcomes that are the bearers of value. (Giere, 1991) 
 
 
Figure 3.1 A general decision matrix 
 
To appreciate the model that Giere (1991) has presented, the value between each option and 
consequence must first be established.  If perfect knowledge were assumed then each outcome 
(Vii) would exist such that the values can be considered a deterministic outcome.   
However this alone cannot find the optimal outcome as the following passage suggests:  
Looking at the ideal case ... knowledge alone cannot determine the course of action in 
any situation.  Lacking a relative evaluation of the outcomes, a decision matrix with 
even perfect knowledge of deterministic relationships is incapable of yielding an 
optimal choice.  A value input is also essential. If perfect knowledge is applied against 
stochastic outcomes, the resulting uncertainty is purely a function of the probability.   
To continue using the case of imperfect knowledge, there can be seen to be no 
difference between imperfect knowledge of a system that might be either deterministic 
or stochastic and perfect knowledge of a stochastic system.  In either case all one knows 
are the probabilities of the various possible consequences conditional on the available 
options (Giere, 1991).  
 
The above statements by Gierre (1991) suggest that for each option-consequence outcome, it is 
not necessary to find a deterministic value. Human expert opinion has been identified as the best 
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source to establish the value content of matrix outcomes relative to each other.  
Once all options, consequences and outcomes have been established to the best of scientific 
knowledge there must be a comparison made. Under large uncertainty the Decision Theory has 
three special cases described in the following: 
• Complete Dominance, where one outcome value is superior to all others and is 
clearly the preferred choice.   
• Sufficiency, where it is not possible to find the best outcome, however one or more 
options have outcome values judged sufficient and can all be judged acceptable.   
• Cautionary, where it is possible to compare the lowest valued outcome for each 
option and maximise from the set of options. This sets a lower value limit on the 
total outcomes of the decision (Giere, 1991). 
 
An investigation into the element relationship values for physical security can utilise the 
decision matrix by considering all defence-type elements as options, and considering all attack-
type elements as consequences. Then determining the value outcome for each option-
consequence pair is possible by collecting expert opinion. Once matrices representing value 
determinations have been created, a model combining these matrices can select values from 
within the matrices based on each case description (Giere, 1991). The model that has been 
proposed for this research combines a approach to using values in the matrices as described in 
this section and is described in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Using matrices to represent value assessments requires that the validity of the relationship 
structure is suitably defined. Consideration of the functions of defence in depth within the main 
research instrument identifies the following relationships: 
 
PV(Detection ∫ evading) = [detection systems] X [stealth attack] 
 
which can be read as the probability value for detection as a function of evading equals the 
combination matrix for detection system and for force attack. Also; 
 
PV(Detection ∫ disabling) = [detection systems] X [force attack] 
 
which can be read as the probability value for detection as a function of disabling equals the 
combination matrix for detection system and for stealth attack. Also; 
 
 PV(Delay ∫ breaking) = [barrier material] X [force attack] 
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which can be read as the probability value for delay as a function of breaking equals the 
combination matrix for barrier material and for force attack. Also; 
 
 PV(Delay ∫ climbing) = [barrier height/topping/surface type] X [climbing attack] 
 
which can be read as the probability value for detection as a function of disabling equals the 
combination matrix for barrier height/topping/surface type and for climbing attack. Also; 
 
 PV(Response) = [response type] X [asset] 
 
which can be read as the probability value for response equals the combination matrix for 
response type and for asset. 
3.4 Summary of theory 
The theory that has been described in this chapter provides an introduction to the philosophical 
considerations of the main research instrument and provides a sound base on which to interpret 
the results of the research for modelling real-life scenarios from the knowledge structures. 
 
Knowledge structures have been identified in theory and two models that have been considered 
for this research are the “logical” model and the “proximal” model. Both have attributes from 
their respective theory bases for a combination effect of these approaches to provide the 
structure for a physical security hierarchy and the research instrument. These have been 
identified in this study as defence in depth, relational descriptors and concept continuums.  
The other term that has been identified and assessed for its theoretical relevance incorporates the 
many physical security elements that have been identified as universal elements. 
 
The important theoretical base of this research has been described in this chapter in reference to 
the development of the hierarchical structure of physical security elements. The study has 
established a theory behind the construction of the hierarchy in order to validate in a holistic 
sense, results obtained from the research questionnaire. It is the questionnaire that determines 
values for the relationship links between the elements and provides a knowledge structure that 
represents human expert opinion in the field of physical security. 
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4 Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the experimental design with a primary focus on 
the data collection instrument of the study. The experimental design is structured on ideas from 
the literature review of the research that has acknowledged phenomenological sociology as the 
most appropriate method of inquiry to achieve the research objectives. The method of inquiry 
has suggested using linguistic accounts of individuals as well as interpretative understandings 
(Smart, 1976). The research instrument described in this chapter consist of a two phase 
approach that incorporates a preliminary series of in-depth interviews in a pilot study followed 
by the main data collection by mail-out questionnaires to three specific groups of respondents.  
 
The two phases developed for the purpose of data collection have been designated quasi-
qualitative, where the in-depth interviews provide a testing mechanism to determine the best 
structure for data collection and the research questionnaire attempts to capture expert opinion. 
The in-depth interviews were largely unstructured and provided insight into the way that 
respondents were most likely to interpret their hierarchies of terminology that in turn reflected 
their knowledge of physical security. The final questionnaire established an element relationship 
measurement tool that enabled opinion based selections over a time based measurement scale 
within a bounded structural hierarchy.  
 
The study’s proposal initially identified three specific category groups of respondent prior to the 
pilot study: Security Experts, Security Students, and Security Users. These category groups 
have been discussed in more detail in this chapter as has the format of the questionnaire that 
evolved after interviews with members of the group Security Students produced the pilot 
study’s results. Comments were continually sought from respondents at all points of the data 
collection process. The collection of comments provided an important means to identify 
concerns in the data collection method as perceived by respondents to enable better 
understanding of limitations and assumptions in developing the knowledge structures. 
4.2 Philosophy of the instrument 
The literature review in Chapter 2 discussed several proposals to incorporate both qualitative 
and quantitative design into data collection. An attempt has been made to establish a moderate 
position between qualitative and quantitative approaches in this research. It has been assumed 
that a qualitative approach gains subjective views that are best captured in an unrestricted 
narrative format over a small group of respondents, while quantitative results require higher 
respondent numbers and can measure slight concept variations within a structured data format. 
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A qualitative assessment of a topic should therefore tend to provide more realism in the data 
generalisation that represents experience and understanding. In contrast quantitative assessments 
generally should provide greater statistical intuition with precision of measurement, although 
assumptions will often be necessary to contend with real world complexities. The dichotomy of 
either choosing a qualitative or quantitative approach (Tarr, 1992) to model physical security 
concepts is the main reason behind the selection of phenomenological sociology as the method 
of inquiry for this research. The resulting process suggests that a valid approach could consider 
the phenomenon in terms of its elements and element relationships without specifying either a 
qualitative or quantitative direction to data requirements. 
 
The research of knowledge structures has investigated human cognitive processes across various 
disciplines. In his investigation of the concept of learning through semantic memory (in the field 
of astronomy), Smith (1984) reviews several contributions in literature including a description 
of the “proximal” model of assessing knowledge structures and proposes several measures of 
concept relatedness such as: methods of direct judgement, word association, and semantic 
differential scales (Smith. 1984). His review is directly relevant to this research and is explained 
further in this section.  
 
The research proposal for this study had suggested that expert opinion would be the most 
appropriate source to be able to capture a mix of both qualitative assessment and quantitative 
assessment. The methodology in this research has attempted to combine a questionnaire format 
to identify listed measures of concept relatedness. The extract below further clarifies the 
foundation for the dimensional scales that have been presented in the research questionnaire to 
assess expert opinion and to ultimately build a knowledge structure with complex element 
relationships. 
Spatial configurations of concepts in semantic memory are portrayed by 
multidimensional scaling techniques, which derive structure with low dimensionality 
from proximity data. A large number of studies have used spatial models to evaluate 
cognitive structure …An important study by Nagy (1983) observed that different 
methods for deriving matrices used on the same subjects, with the same set of concepts, 
tend to produce similar relatedness matrices and hence similar structures. 
 
Dimensional models represent concepts as points fitted in N-dimensional space such 
that interpoint distances in the derived structure provide a best-fit for the interconcept 
proximities in the original matrix  
(Smith, 1984. P52). 
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The major indication from these extracts is that a knowledge structure can be considered as a 
spatial mapping in semantic memory and should be able to display a degree of consensus 
irrespective of the technique used. Smith (1984) has reported that the observations of different 
methods for deriving matrices tended to produce similar relatedness matrices and similar 
knowledge structures. The notion of a concept continuum is also revisited where he suggests 
that spatial models involve a continuum of values for each dimension (Smith, 1984). 
   
A further interpretation has been taken from Smith (1984) where a knowledge structure using 
physical security terminology should be linked via propositional relations or relational 
descriptors to create a common directional reference aspect for concepts. This linking 
mechanism suggests a broader connecting framework for all elements within the hierarchy of 
knowledge. The properties in this case that would define a relational descriptor would be those 
permitting all elements to relate through a common measure in multidimensional space.  
If the semantic measure is an action-on statement (Smith 1984) or has action-based properties 
(i.e. properties of a verb), then each element can be conceptualised using time-based 
multidimensional concept continuums relative to an action sequenced time measure. 
 
The methods previously used to measure opinion have been discussed in Chapter 2 such as the 
popular Likert scales and other attitude measurement scales. This research has instead designed 
a customised logarithmic scale that is able to determine a relative order of magnitude based on a 
semantic understanding of time. The custom scale used in the questionnaire allows the 
respondent to choose time as a measurement option and caters relative fuzziness, where for 
example the semantic use of the term seconds could equally mean two seconds or fifty seconds.  
 
Arguably the most important attribute of time as a measurement indicator is that it allows for a 
relative scale of magnitude to be established. As an example, the quantity that is represented by 
the term seconds is very much smaller than the term days and much closer semantically to the 
term minutes. The common terminology of time allows for an approximate quantification of 
semantics, where each order of magnitude has a numerical approximation relative to other 
terms. For an example the term hour is approximately 1/24 days or 3600 seconds and is also 
equivalent to approximately 60 minutes. In a similar fuzzy way, the term hours can be 
mathematically located somewhere in between 1/24 days to 1 day. Thus a semantic selection of 
time assessing concept pairs can be graphed in nominal units (seconds) or alternatively by using 
a natural logarithmic transformation to produce a linear time relation. Assessments that indicate 
a relative increase in time or decrease in time have been presented in the questionnaire to 
substitute for qualitative value consideration of an adjective pair continuum. These include 
examples such as good-bad, or positive-negative as opposite points along a concept continuum 
indicating the directional overall benefit to physical security.  
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An example is given where a physical barrier might be a wall that requires only seconds to 
climb over which is of less overall benefit to physical security than a barrier such as a fence that 
requires minutes to climb over. The labels of time have been presented in the questionnaire in an 
attempt to standardise action-based assessments with a common unit of measurement over many 
different concepts. The research acknowledges that the term seconds is the lowest semantic unit 
of the time scale with each successive time value existing as a relative multiple of seconds.  
The labels of time in semantic terms (e.g. seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years) 
are also measures that can consider likelihood as well as designating real time in a physical 
sense. Alternative labels of time without a standard unifying measure have not selected for the 
research questionnaire such as: now, soon, in a while, after a long time, and so on.  
The distribution of time labels chosen for the questionnaire enables the relative structure of time 
increments to signify relative importance. The importance is only able to be standardised after 
determining whether the boundary condition considers a positive benefit in a security sense to 
be associated with short time frames or long time frames. The fact that the common unit seconds 
is a multiple in each of the time labels presented enables a logarithmic-linear scale to be 
established for mathematical and statistical analysis where a relative order of magnitude of 
universal elements can signify relative importance in benefiting physical security. 
  
The use of defence in depth functions of delay, detection and response provide simple arbitrary 
starting points for a physical security hierarchical structure and have be considered in detail in 
Chapter 3. The selection of each of the action-based relational descriptors was very important 
in the scheme of the questionnaire as it determined how many questions would be required to 
relate to each of: delay, detection and response as primary functions of defence in depth.  
This determination would provide the total number of independent sections in the questionnaire. 
There were two relational descriptors chosen for the function of delay, two for the function of 
detection and one for the function of response. The research questionnaire also applied three 
additional relational descriptors to compliment the functions of defence in depth with asset, 
attacker motivation and attack type. The additional relational descriptors were included in the 
questionnaire to incorporate a complimentary attack consideration to defence in depth. 
 
The pilot study acknowledged that the chosen action-based statements could be grouped with 
synonyms of relational descriptors that could have equally been used to summarise the actions.  
Thus delay includes the relational descriptors of breaking and climbing which could have been 
equally interchanged for terms like “smashing” and “jumping”. It can be logically and 
semantically argued that both verbs chosen to summarise delay cover a large range of 
alternative actions that an attacker might feasibly use to counteract barriers however all 
possibilities basically consider non-delay aspects that imply action through a facility’s barrier 
system or going around a facility’s barrier system.  
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Garcia (2001) has supported the notion that providing non-detection concepts in preference to 
defending-type actions is more appropriate for modelling analysis. It can be seen that the verb 
pair for detection, presented in the questionnaire as evading and disabling, are semantically 
related with the attack rather than the defence. Typically the measurement of detection 
probability provides a manufacturer’s specification for detection, which is semantically related 
to the function of defence. The measurement of detection in this manner assumes that the device 
is able to work efficiently and effectively, and does not anticipate specific attack-type properties 
for evading or disabling. In real life situations an attacking adversary is adaptive and therefore 
semantically the evading or disabling of a working detection system is the most adaptive 
response. These however are typically excluded in the measure of detection probability.  
 
The verb elements in the questionnaire were specifically chosen to represent attacking-type 
actions rather than defensive-type actions. This important distinction is supported by the fact 
that attack is more irregular and naturally proactive in its effort to adapt to defence capabilities.  
In contrast defence is more reactive and regular in its systems. The use of attacking-type verbs 
may be in contrast to the way that standard device specifications are given in terms of 
functionality. An attack on a facility could easily translate into an attack on a security device 
and in this case the functionality of the device would be irrelevant if it has already been 
compromised. 
 
The verb elements used for response do not require an attacking-type action to be considered as 
the concept of response is always a reactive type situation. The terms asset, attack type and 
attacker motivation have not been assessed using action-based measures but instead consider 
typical relational descriptors considering motivation, capability and opportunity. 
4.3 Developing the instrument through the research design 
The research proposal had suggested the original methodology of the study. This section 
describes the step by step planning process of how the data would be collected. Figure 4.1 is a 
flow-chart that has been identified from the research proposal and is an important for the 
structure of this study in describing the approach used to collect data. 
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Figure 4.1 Methodology identifying stages and testing methods of the research 
 
Identify in-depth-interview 
technique for collecting data 
Investigate universal elements and semantic 
hierarchies of physical security terminology 
using in-depth-interviews 
Identify elements and semantic 
hierarchies from security science 
students in a pilot study 
Create a database of elements and 
potential hierarchies 
Identify universal elements to establish the 
required semantic relationships for a physical 
security knowledge mapping 
Create questionnaires to determine 
elemental order of importance and 
relative order of magnitude 
Refine questionnaires to enable 
elemental relationship 
(hierarchical) measurement 
Collect data from respondents 
Create standard profiles in 
database for respondent 
groups 
Test data and methodology for 
correctness from respondent 
feedback 
Define method of integration of qualitative and 
quantitative data 
 
Test methodology and 
integration methods 
Identify consensus of data to 
enable holistic physical security 
decision modelling 
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The inclusion of testing at all stages of the methodology shown in Figure 4.1 is used in an 
attempt to document instrument based assumptions from comments by respondents. The testing 
of the methodology is meant to be a transparent process allowing respondents to input 
comments together with data so that future replication of the study may include improvement in 
the research instrument.  
 
The methodology was effectively split into two phases. Phase 1 included the pilot study which 
sought to identify and define the representative sets of elements of physical security through  
in-depth interviews. The in-depth interviews were conducted with students enrolled in formal 
tuition of a security science bachelor’s degree course. The pilot study was primarily a tool 
designed to recognise and modify a potential universal element list for the questionnaire.  
It presented an unstructured opportunity to determine how respondents organised elements 
within a hierarchical framework to best represent their knowledge of physical security.  
In order to determine the universal elements for the study, initial sets of elements were supplied 
to the respondents as discussion lists. Common terminologies in physical security were 
discussed and recorded in interviews with the participants. 
 
Phase 2 of the research identified data collection through questionnaire to investigate the 
relationships of elements based on relational descriptors and a series of concept continuums. 
The methodology of Phase 2 included fixed boundary conditions and hierarchical structure of 
universal elements. The relative order and the order of magnitude between these elements along 
the continuum were assessed by respondents as opinion based values specifying physical 
security benefit as interactions in time. The data collected from the questionnaires enabled a 
series of profiles to be developed. The format of the questionnaire was able to collect data from 
respondents to identify relative value assessments as a conceptual understanding of each 
boundary condition through a measured format suitable for transformation into numeric data.  
4.4 Population 
Obtaining the data required for a conceptual mapping in physical security was a matter of 
collecting large amounts of opinion-based assessments over the sets of elements listed in each 
concept continuum. In considering the population that would have the best exposure to the 
broadest uses of terminology in physical security, sources such as academic based knowledge 
and industry based experience were targeted as were users of physical security technology.  
 
Three subsets of the target population had been identified in the research proposal with each 
capable of providing varying degrees of expert opinion to the relationship assessments of 
physical security. The three groups were identified as Security Experts, Security Students and 
Security Users. Each group’s individual expertise in physical security terminology is important 
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in order for a wide contribution of knowledge to determine an overall consensus within 
boundary conditions of the research questionnaire.  
 
Security expert respondents were targeted from within the university environment.  
Security Students undertaking a bachelor’s degree course were recruited through seminar 
presentations and Security Users were randomly recruited through interpersonal contact.  
The defining method separating the group Security Experts from the group Security Students 
considered a minimum requirement for completion of academic security science instruction. 
Although any separation method is arbitrary, the composition of each of the groups is not as 
vital as the ability of the different group profiles to be representative in overall comparisons 
with each other through correlation techniques and ultimately support the notion of consensus. 
The consensus of expert opinion involving combined category groups can translate into 
knowledge structures and create “standard” profiles of knowledge.  
 
For ethical issues in the collection and storage of data, the questionnaire was designed to be 
anonymous for the most appropriate privacy requirements. The Statement of Disclosure that 
accompanied the research questionnaires stated that the questionnaire was anonymous and made 
a request for respondents not to enter their name or any other comments that would make them 
identifiable. The Statement of Disclosure and the questionnaire are included in Appendix A. 
  
The required collection of a large amount of opinion-based data toward obtaining a knowledge 
structure meant that questionnaires would need to be long and complex. The inevitability that 
busy people would decline involvement in the research suggested that a higher number of 
participants should be targeted so that the number of completions would be adequate.  
An arbitrary decision was made to limit the questionnaire length to approximately fifty minutes 
to coincide with the hourly block requirements of a university environment. The complexity of 
the data assessment and the terminology would also need to allow for an optimum number of 
participants to comprehend the questionnaire’s requirements.  
 
On the issue of sample sizes Green et al. (1988) suggest that sample size is related to the 
precision of collected data. Some suggestions for determining sample size include; arbitrarily 
determined, a minimum cell size, budget based, or by applying an error formula (Green, Tull & 
Albaum, 1988, pp41). Given that the sample error in some statistical arrangements is related to 
the square root of the sample number, for example, 5(2.2), 10(3.2), 15(3.9), it can be seen that 
by using 25 respondents an argument for sample error estimate would be in the order of 5 or 
20%. However as the research questionnaire is defined quasi-qualitative and because each 
respondent’s viewpoint is deemed to be precise within the bounds of interpretation, an error of 
20% is meaningless. In this case the number of respondents seems to be less important than the 
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ability to determine correlation and consensus between a number of individuals and between 
groups. Thus the concept of sample error has not been a driving factor in deciding the 
population and therefore more attention to detail has been considered in the questionnaire. 
Further to the suggestion of Green et al. (1988) and together with the grouping of the 
respondents into categories, the sample size has been chosen as an arbitrary number of 25 
respondents. 
 
In this research the group consisting of Security Students was the easiest to target in location as 
they are generally located at a university campus. With practicality in mind, it was decided that 
the majority of respondents would be targeted from this group. The final decision was that 60% 
of respondents would be Security Students while the other two groups should contain similar 
numbers to each other. Since Security Users have been more readily targeted from the 
community, they were identified as the group least likely to provide a knowledge base that 
would be convergent towards consensus for physical security element relationships.  
The targeted population was the same as Security Experts at 20% of the composite group target. 
The ability to locate and obtain input from Security Experts is limited in the community as their 
population numbers are low and their expertise is highly desired. 
 
The difference between the number of respondents identified for possibility and the number 
projected for participation is given in Table 3.1. Of the groups chosen the non-return in the 
Security Students group was considered to be the highest risk as this group were already 
undertaking studies of their own and the questionnaire was most likely to become a low priority. 
The expected return rate for the Security Students group was estimated at 33% while the 
Security Experts and the Security Users return rate was expected to be closer to 50%.  
Therefore the numbers of Security Students identified for interest was significantly higher than 
the number projected for participation. 
 
Table 4.1 Number of respondents targeted and the number required 
Number of respondents  
identified for possibility 
Number of respondents  
projected for participation 
Phase 1 – pilot study 
4 students targeted for possibility 4 students for participation 
Phase 2 - research questionnaire 
10 Security Experts targeted for possibility 5 Security Experts targeted for participation 
45 Security Students targeted for possibility 15 Security Students required for participation 
10 Security Users targeted for possibility 5 Security Users required for participation 
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4.4.1 Group 1: Security Experts 
Persons fitting the title Security Experts may be found in the public sector, in the academic 
sector and the private sector. In general the Security Expert group will have professional skills 
in the assessment of risk and the management of risk and have a background of knowledge in 
physical security terminology. It is expected that that could establish a relative order of 
importance of terms and assess element relationships confidently and methodically.   
4.4.2 Group 2: Security Students 
Students from a bachelor’s degree course in Security Science were identified for Group 2.  
The expert opinions of Security Students were expected to provide strong academic 
understanding and knowledge of physical security terminology in a similar way to that of a 
Security Expert. The level of difference in knowledge between a Security Student and a 
Security Expert may be marginal however this was expected to exist within the extent of the 
formal instruction received and the type of experience gained from terminology used in physical 
security. Data collected from Security Students was expected to vary slightly from Security 
Experts in terms of consistency and precision. 
4.4.3 Group 3 Security Users 
Security Users represented a group that dealt with the terminology of physical security from the 
point of view of a purchaser or distributor of products of physical security. The group Security 
Users was expected to represent the broadest range of opinion and demonstrate a lower level of 
consensus in the range of their areas of expertise.  
4.5 The Pilot study 
The initial research proposal had identified that the universal elements of physical security be 
determined and that an investigation of these elements would determine the best type of 
framework for a knowledge structure to be constructed within the topic. A pilot study was 
conducted in the form of in-depth interviews with four students undertaking tertiary study in the 
field of security science.  
 
The pilot study conducted investigations into the hierarchical nature of terminology associated 
with physical security by direct interviews with respondents. It posed questions to participants 
and recorded their replies as text using a purpose-built computer program (database) for 
identifying hierarchical links. The recorded text was entered during the spoken interview and 
arranged into the computer program as visually demonstrated hierarchies that best represented 
each participant’s perception of the their structural knowledge of terminology. The final 
hierarchical determination was checked visually by each participant at the termination of the in-
depth interview to reaffirm satisfaction with the computerised arrangement.  
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The method included simple spoken prompts during the interview that sought to identify nouns, 
verbs and adjectives of physical security. Each prompt requested that participants identify 
elements in their own perceived hierarchies of physical security terminology while considering 
a scenario of a particular facility of their choice. Examples were suggested to them such as a 
shop, a bank or a prison. Database separation of the responses into nouns, verbs and adjectives 
was undertaken to allow the all terms to be considered for their linguistic and semantic qualities.  
 
The research proposal had suggested that data collection methods for the research would require 
an evolution of change through the entire process. In the pilot study, practicality allowed for 45 
minutes of interview time with each participant. The participants were asked to provide 
quantifiable or measurable parameters in a hierarchy for concepts of physical security.  
 
The interview had to contend with subjective issues including each interviewee’s perceived 
freedom in responding to the questions. This also included the interviewer’s prompts to provide 
direction and guidance for each concept posed to the respondents. The first respondent’s data 
showed very few repetitions or patterns that offered little likelihood of convergence toward 
mapped knowledge. A formal list of boundary conditions was established after the first 
respondent’s interview in an attempt to develop greater convergence in data sets. In order to 
encourage hierarchical convergence toward a defined set of universal elements, the remaining 
three participants of the pilot study were subsequently provided the formal list as conceptual 
boundary conditions to consider. 
  
The boundary conditions were established from the basic functions of defence in depth and were 
as follows:  
1. physically trying to stop an attacker from getting to an asset (delay), 
2. determining if and when an attack is taking place with respect to physical security and an 
asset (detection), 
3. responding to an attack (response), 
4. the asset,  
5. the quality and quantity of resources available to the attacker. 
 
The pilot study identified a wide range of physical security elements (n=241), and at the same 
time identified that without convergence, the hierarchical structures of physical security would 
provide adequately reduce complexity. A summary of the elements numbers determined from 
the pilot study for each interview is available in Appendix B. 
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The pilot study collected 165 physical security noun-elements that would potentially expand to 
infinitely larger numbers with additional interviews. The noun-elements collected from the pilot 
study exhibited inconsistent grouping patterns which suggested endless possibilities for the 
hierarchical structure of these elements. The indications from this finding was that although an 
extensive list of nouns may be captured to describe a facility, a set of separate relational 
descriptors would be needed in order for noun-elements to be adequately grouped or clustered 
in hierarchical knowledge structures. The relational descriptors would need to be drawn from 
either adjective-elements or verb-elements identified in the pilot study or from literature. 
 
An analysis of the verbs that were determined by the pilot study recognised 8 specific action-
based measures covering the majority of concepts of attack. The pilot study recognised that 
these verbs would present an ideal approach for relational descriptors in the questionnaire in 
order to consider directional aspects for a physical security hierarchical structure of knowledge. 
The verb-elements would therefore include the following: to break, to climb, to evade, to 
disable, to respond, to be motivated, to be capable, and to have opportunity.  
  
The adjective-element list that was identified from the pilot study was somewhat larger than the 
corresponding range of verbs. A pattern emerged that identified pairs of adjectives as a potential 
for optimising measurement in the questionnaire and also a means to provide quantifiable values 
for terminology considerations. Approximately 49 adjective pairs were identified in the pilot 
study. The pilot study highlighted that in order to be able to measure a value for the benefit of 
physical security noun-element relationships, an adjective-element needed to be recognised as 
either supporting attack on physical security or support defence of physical security.  
The following list of 10 element adjectives was identified from the pilot study as the most likely 
attack and defence measures for physical security assessments:  
• good-poor,  
• likely-unlikely,  
• expensive-inexpensive,  
• effective-ineffective,  
• suitable-unsuitable,  
• fast-slow,  
• sensitive-insensitive,  
• strong-weak,  
• overt-covert,  
• reliable-unreliable.  
 
In summary the pilot study results suggested that noun-elements of physical security could be 
related by action-based direction and then ordered and measured by adjective-elements within 
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appropriate physical security boundary conditions. Any nouns that were not included in the 
study have the potential to be associated with at least one included noun with similar properties 
on the continuum scale. An example that describes this is the comparison of a reinforced 
concrete wall to a plain concrete wall. Both are similar enough to share similar properties for an 
adjective pair continuum that could be represented as strong-weak. A different example could 
be used for aluminium which would be more similar to wood in strength than steel on a 
strength-related continuum; however both steel and aluminium are semantically closer as metals 
in a material-related measurement continuum. Each noun-element could be associated to a 
continuum whether listed in the questionnaire as a universal element or not and therefore 
ordered in a hierarchical structure over an action-based assessment. 
4.6 Interpretation of results of the pilot study 
The implications of the pilot study suggested that each element of physical security was 
appreciated by each respondent in their subjective multi-hierarchical knowledge structure.  
The pilot study also suggested that a list of elements might be determined to be a set of 
universal elements for a knowledge structure when used in conjunction with relational 
descriptors. The pilot study indicated that if the hierarchical structure of elements could be held 
constant with a boundary condition using relational descriptors as action-based measures, then 
a small set of elements could be assessed for each boundary condition from expert opinion. 
Common knowledge could be measured over each boundary condition when a set of relational 
descriptors would effectively orientate a knowledge hierarchy direction (action) (Smith, 1984). 
All action-based indicators would be verb-elements of physical security to determine noun-
element relationship links through a boundary condition in order to obtain convergence toward a 
knowledge structure of elements and element relationships. 
 
The most interesting finding of the pilot study was that a relatively low number of verbs could 
be used for a large number of nouns and adjectives as concepts within physical security.  
Of all verbs identified for this topic through the interviews of the pilot study; it was evident that 
eight action-based measures were of special significance across the relationships of elements 
within the topic of physical security. This set of action-based measures suggested a large 
overlap in the number of element relationships within the topic of physical security. 
Interpretations from the pilot study proposed that the relationship values could be determined 
from eight questions representing eight action-based measures using an assessment of time (over 
the duration of the action) to determine the desired value.  
 
The design of the questionnaire has acknowledged several important considerations in the 
research. The design sought to address several recognised problems apparent in the pilot study 
and provide data in a form suitable to achieve the study goals. The following conclusions were 
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made on a theoretical level after the pilot study to extrapolate concepts from the pilot study to 
the main research instrument and provide the best recognised format on which to investigate the 
knowledge structures of physical security: 
1. The eight verbs selected in the pilot study should be comprehensive in relating the extensive 
list of noun-elements to each other within the concepts of defence in depth and each action 
can be used to translate into values. 
2. That an extensive number of elements, either listed in the questionnaire or from other 
sources, should each be able to be included along a spectrum using a value measurement of 
an adjective-element quality e.g. strong-weak. 
3. That each respondent in a questionnaire could agree or disagree with the represented order 
of elements in a spectrum of value measurement of a specific quality and provide reasons 
for this decision. 
4. That consensus of opinion can be determined for specific element pair relationships using 
physical security verb-elements as the foundation of boundary conditions. 
5. That the value of element relationship links would be determined on a time measurement 
scales that could indicate on the scale either benefit to support attack on physical security, 
or to support defence of physical security. 
6. That feedback on the data collection methods is a necessary part of the knowledge structure 
and a system for self adoption of suggested improvements will increase the method’s 
validity. 
 
The results of the pilot study are presented as Phase 1 of the data collection and have 
determined the nature of the questionnaire. The format of the questionnaire has been limited by 
the complexity required in extracting suitable data from respondents together with the 
consideration of likelihood in the return rate of questionnaires from the targeted groups.  
4.7 Modification to the instrument 
For the main research instrument a questionnaire was designed with reference to the theoretical 
framework of Chapter 3. This questionnaire was the primary instrument of data collection for 
this research and as the primary source of data for the study it is also the primary source of error 
within the study. All of the methods used to collect information from respondents have been 
based on the framework presented. This discussion presents the techniques chosen to enable 
measurement and to provide results that can be supported in general by the literature.  
The questionnaire posed fifty questions in total to each respondent, eight of which were 
complex. The fifty questions can be best divided into five categories based on the question type. 
Each of these five categories has been considered separately in order to categorise relevance to 
the research purpose. Full copies of the Research Questionnaire, the Answer Guide and the 
Statement of Disclosure have been presented in Appendix A. 
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The use of eight concept based relational descriptors suggested by the pilot study has a 
supporting parallel in a previous study with Aidman and Egan’s (1998) consideration of pre-
selected set of eight concepts derived from a domain of human perception (Aidman & Egan, 
1998). These authors have explored expert knowledge as a computerized concept mapping and 
recognised a set of eight concepts in cognitive psychology with a rationale for complexity that 
stated if such a limited-size mapping can yield an acceptable level of discrimination between 
learners, then the method is worth serious consideration for mapping more complex conceptual 
structures (Aidman & Egan, 1998).  
 
The questionnaire was divided into eight sections labelled Section A - H. Each of the eight 
sections was based on a repetitive style template containing six questions. A final two questions 
completed a total of fifty questions. The specific number of questions was chosen so that the 
questionnaire could be completed in fifty minutes at a suggested rate of one question per 
minute. The limiting factor determination the number of questions was considered to be the total 
time requirement to complete the questionnaire which affected the likelihood of having 
questionnaires completed and returned. 
 
As stated previously and for the purpose of this section the description of all of the fifty 
questions of the questionnaires have been discussed under five different category types of the 
question which are: 
1. The complex value assessment questions,  
2. The questions evaluating the element scales used,  
3. The questions evaluating the list of elements used, 
4. The questions requiring comments on the element scales, 
5. The questions evaluating the questionnaire method and research objectives. 
4.7.1 The first question of each section considering complex value 
assessments 
The most complex question for each section of the questionnaire (Sections A-H) was the first 
question of each section. This question requested that the respondent tick boxes in the 
appropriate columns where they identified a value assessment of a qualitative time measure. 
These qualitative time measures were listed and abbreviated as the following labels;  
seconds (sec), minutes (min), hours (hrs), days (Da), weeks (We), months (Mo), years (Ye).  
 
Each of the complex questions contained a preliminary description before the main question. 
This description set up the framework for the relational descriptor to be applied to the question 
and provided a common understanding for each value assessment required from the respondent. 
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This preliminary description forms the first part of the three part boundary condition that is 
offered as an interpretive base for each section of the research questionnaire. For an example the 
description preceding Question 1 of Section A has been included and reads as follows: 
Two lists of elements are presented below. Both comprise a series of terms, which for 
our purposes are called Sets 1-6. Sets 1-6 are based on the terminology of the concept 
Attack and the verb Breaking. In particular they concentrate on the verb Breaking 
within the concept of Delay. For further explanation of the terminology in Sets 1-6 
please refer to the Definitions in the Answer Guide.  
 
The two lists of elements referred to in the preliminary description contain universal elements of 
this study and these are separated into columns of elements where Element 1 typically refers to 
an attacking-type element and Element 2 typically refers to a defensive-type element.  
The designations for Element 1 and Element 2 are continued in a similar manner throughout the 
questionnaire. The terminology in the columns of Element 1 and Element 2 change throughout 
the questionnaire with each new section and boundary condition, however there is also a small 
degree of repetition between sections.  
 
After the preliminary description the actual question forms the second part of the three part 
boundary condition and requests input of time based value assessments with respect to an 
action-based relational descriptor involving the Element 1 to Element 2 relationship.  
For an example Question 1 of Section A has been included and reads as follows: 
How long do you think it would take an attack of [Element 1] to break through an 
[Element 2] barrier? Please complete for Sets 1-6 in the table below, checking your 
answer in the appropriate column under “Estimated Time”. 
 
The questionnaire next provides some supplementary notes for the respondent in order to 
complete the third part of the boundary condition and avoid confusion in the selection of value 
assessments to be made in the appropriate units for the measurement of time.  The example of 
Q1 is as follows: 
Note the following: 
− In this instance increased “time” represents better defence. 
− It is appreciated that a wide range of time values could be used as answers, in 
these cases please choose a value that would represent your initial thoughts of a 
typical scenario for each. 
− Please try to choose one of the listed “time” values (for further information please 
see the Answer Guide). 
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The supplementary notes suggest that a typical scenario should be considered by each 
respondent in order to best estimate in time units their value assessment for the question.  
Aside from the given boundary condition and the listed element sets, no other information is 
available for each question throughout the questionnaire. Although the Answer Guide provides 
additional information for clarity; it does provide further clarification for making value 
assessments or indicate a correct way for respondents interpret the terminology in the Element 1 
and Element 2 lists. The Answer Guide provides a brief overview of the research objectives, 
states the risks and benefits of the research, outlines the scale of measurement that has been 
presented including the time value labels, and most importantly it states that there are no wrong 
concepts and that all opinions are valid and valuable. 
 
The terminology of both Element 1 and Element 2 lists have been provided in an arbitrarily 
ordered scale, ranked along a concept continuum with six elements in each scale. The concept 
continuum for Question 1 of Section A presents an Element 1 list in increasing order of 
attacking force, where this means that the term explosive has a greater breaking ability than oxy 
cutting, which has a greater breaking ability than an electric drill, than an axe, than a hammer 
and finally than a rock. The opposing concept continuum (conceptually orthogonal) for 
Question 1 in Section A presents the Element 2 list in increasing order of strength, where this 
means that the term steel has a greater strength than concrete, which has a greater strength than 
brick, than wood, than glass and finally than earth. The effective number of terminology pairs 
for each complex question presented a six by six matrix requiring 36 values in total to be 
assessed. Respondents were requested to make a selection for all of the 36 element 
combinations by ticking a box in the appropriate column representing one of the qualitative time 
indicators for each.  
 
In the example of supplementary notes for Question 1 of Section A, the time scale presents a 
directional measure for defence of physical security where increased time represents better 
defence. As previously stated in this section, the time scale allows for relative value assessments 
representing the expert opinion of the respondent. 
 
Each question requiring complex value assessments in the questionnaire have presented 
arbitrarily ordered lists of universal elements representing proxy reference levels along a 
continuum of the concept. Within each complex question the final ranked order of the various 
terms is suggested to be common understanding; however this ranking of the concept continuum 
through the knowledge structure creates an individual knowledge profile for each respondent. 
The remaining five questions within each of the Sections A-H ask the respondent to comment 
on their level of agreement with the originally presented order of the scales of element lists. 
These questions seek to determine an opinion of the proposal to hierarchically order terms. 
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4.7.2 The hierarchical structure of the universal elements 
As described in Chapter 2, the phenomenological approach seeks to make a determination of the 
universal elements of the phenomenon. A list of universal elements was identified for this 
research; combining both sources from literature and considerations from the pilot study.  
For the purpose of this research 60 elements have been chosen with 30 elements representing 
the defensive-type terminology of physical security and 30 elements representing the attacking-
type terminology of a security threat. It is proposed by this research that the 60 elements 
presented are universal elements of the phenomenon and can represent the phenomenon with 
their elemental relationships. 
 
Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 are provided to assist in the conceptualisation of the 
structure of the elements in a theoretical hierarchy used for the research instrument.  
The individual levels in the hierarchy have been designated by numbers within circles.  
The numbers within the circles correspond to the structural level that represents a horizontal link 
across the hierarchy. In these figures some of the boxes containing elements have been heavily 
bolded at their border. This bold bordering highlights the defensive-type elements as simple 
reference points that may be selected to represent a facility. The elements boxes without bold 
borders represent attacking-type elements that influence the choice of defensive-type elements. 
 
Delay Response
Risk Factors of physical security
Detection
Relational descriptor - evading
detection systems (continuum)
stealth attack (continuum)
Relational descriptor - disabling
detection systems (continuum)
force attack (continuum)
Stealth attack
Luck
Create false alarms
Smoke
Colour camouflage
System knowledge
Knowledge & 
diversion
Relational descriptor - motivation
asset (continuum)
attacker motivation (continuum)
Detection systems
Multiple systems
Microwave
Infrared
CCTV
Mobile human 
guard
Chance detection
Force attack
Accidental
Physical 
intimidation
Electrical 
interference
Cut power
Violent destruction
Explosive
Relational descriptor - motivation
asset (continuum)
attacker motivation (continuum)
1
2
3
3
4
2
3
 
 
Figure 4.2 Detection terminology showing element level hierarchy 
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Relational descriptor - motivation
asset (continuum)
attacker motivation (continuum)
Relational descriptor - motivation
asset (continuum)
attacker motivation (continuum)
Relational descriptor - breaking
material strength (continuum)
force attack (continuum)
Relational descriptor - climbing
barrier dimensions (continuum)
climbing attack (continuum)
Delay Detection Response
Barrier dimensions & type
5 human high smooth brick wall + razor wire
5 human high smooth brick wall
5 human high steel small mesh fence
3 human high smooth brick wall
3 human high steel small mesh fence
3 human high steel large mesh fence
1
2
3
2
3
3
4
Risk Factors of physical security
Climbing attack
No aid
rope
ladder
climbing aids
projectiles & wire
flight assisted
Material strength
glass
wood
earth
brick
concrete
steel
Force attack
rock
hammer
axe
electric drill
oxy cutting
explosive
 
Figure 4.3 Delay terminology showing element level hierarchy 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Response terminology showing element level hierarchy 
Asset 
low value goods 
small cash 
personal valuables 
corporate data 
large cash 
human life 
Response type 
high tech 
armed 
police 
insurance 
security patrol 
general public 
Relational descriptor  - responding 
asset (continuum) 
response type (continuum) 
2 
3 
3 
4 
Delay Detection Response 1 
Risk Factors of physical security 
Response D lay 
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4.7.3 The second through to the sixth question in each section 
The second and third questions throughout Sections A-H identify the ranking of the presented 
elements and comprise two parts that are designated parts a) and b). The fourth and fifth 
questions in each section ask for modification to the ranked order of the listed elements.  
The sixth question of each section asks for specific comments about the method used. The final 
two questions of the questionnaire request comments about the objectives of the research.  
 
Part a) for both the second and the third question of each section request a clear Yes or No 
response to identify general agreement amongst respondents with their perception of the 
presented ranking of elements in the scale.  
 
The following part b) to each question asks the respondent to state a reason to justify the answer 
in part a). This combination gives the respondent an opportunity to object to the scales presented 
as well as the overall concept of ranking elements over a concept. This request for feedback 
attempts to capture qualitative opinion that may assist in identifying limitations in the method 
and further investigates the items of importance in conceptualising physical security scenarios. 
 
The fourth and fifth questions in Sections A-H consider the ranked elements again and ask 
respondents to modify, delete or add to the elements listed in the order that signifies their 
preferred listing. It is proposed by this research that the elements listed as proxy values can also 
be used as group headings to enable other similar but unlisted elements to be used for value 
based comparisons in a physical security scenario.  
 
As the universal elements of the research are used to develop simple reference levels over the 
scale for each concept continuum, it was deemed to be important to also consider other possible 
elements outside the presented element lists. The questionnaire attempts to broaden the 
applicability of its presented list of elements by providing a means for respondents to suggest 
new elements that approximate a similar scale location in the order of their preference.  
The purpose of this part of the questionnaire is to give respondents the ability to modify the list 
so that they can determine an alternate representative list of universal elements.  
 
The sixth question of each Section A-H requests that the respondent provide comments on 
specific aspects of the method used in the questionnaire. This series of questions initially allows 
respondents to validate the information that the questionnaire has requested and to secondly 
supply additional information that they feel should be stated to further qualify their responses 
including perceived difficulties or frustrations that were identified within the research method. 
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The main purpose of the sixth question in each of the Sections A-H, was to obtain feedback 
criteria for the method. This was recognised as beneficial regardless of whether the comments 
received were positively biased or negatively biased overall. The critical commentary that this 
section of the questionnaire requested from respondents forms a basis for justification and 
consensus in the study. 
 
The final two questions of the questionnaire request that the respondent provide comments on 
whether they believed the objectives of the research were achievable and if they believed these 
objectives could be practical in relation to real-life facilities. These questions provided 
respondents with the opportunity to compliment their value assessments for each section with 
other comments or overall opinion about the information that they have supplied. The opinion 
on whether the respondents believe this research to be relevant to real-life issues provides an 
insight into areas of concerns for a subjective system that includes decision makers. 
4.8 Reliability and Validity 
The reliability and validity of this study is important to establish with all data originating from 
the main research instrument. A discussion on these concepts and how they are related to the 
notion of consensus will provide a better indication of how the study is able to demonstrate both 
precision and realism in its results.  
 
Each respondent chosen for the study is a source for some degree of bias and error.  
An overall consideration of the combined results will assume that the range of bias over the 
entire group can be represented over the time scale using value assessments. This distribution of 
opinion may exhibit normalised shaped curves or other statistical shape of value assessment 
depending on how common knowledge is appreciated over each boundary condition by different 
groups of respondents. The shape of the distribution was not considered as important as 
identifying the range of viewpoints and acknowledging the most commonly held viewpoint.  
For the purpose of this research a normalised shape is assumed, where evenly distributed 
selections of value about the mean should be evident with increased target numbers.  
 
This research contends that irrespective of the shape, the statistical combination of the results of 
all respondents can provide a statistical mean and standard deviation that suggest a degree of 
consensus. The statistical mean has been chosen to represent the moderate viewpoint towards 
consensus with the standard deviation representing the strength of the degree of consensus. 
While these selections are arbitrary, the data in Chapter 5 considers the validity of their 
selection and describes the justification process where both provide strong indications for 
consensus. 
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While other statistical considerations can also represent viewpoints of consensus, such as the 
statistical median and the mode, the difference between the median and the mean is an absence 
of the weighting of deviation to either side of the moderate viewpoint. The statistical mean 
provides a moderate viewpoint allowing for the weight of opinion to skew its value toward the 
majority. In reality all of these measures should be suitable to compare relative differences in 
value assessments between element pair combinations.  
 
The method that has been proposed to check large lists of numbers against a standard list is 
computerised correlation. The function enabling this correlation is able to assess the variance 
between correlating value items on two separate lists. The resulting correlation is able to assess 
the total degree of similarity in two large comparative lists. The correlation used in this research 
has been identified from the following statistical comparison. 
 
Equation 4.1: 
ρx,y =   Coυ(X,Y)   /  σx . σy 
 
Where -1 ≤ ρxy ≤ 1 
And Coυ (X,Y) = 1/n Σ (xi – µx)(yi – µy) 
 
(For this research all correlations are made using the MicroSoft Excel function CORREL in 
version Office 2000.) 
 
As long as the statistical measures chosen for determining consensus are consistent, relative 
differences from one list to another should remain evident and provide an indication of 
similarity. The standard profile of a group of respondents will be the combined statistical mean 
for each value assessment over each of the Sections A-H. The correlation method is to be used 
to assess each “standard profile” against the remaining groups using their own combined value 
assessments to determine the degree of consensus for each “standard profile”. This correlation 
method is also able to check individual respondents against their specific group profile and 
against the other group profiles. 
 
By correlating the various group profiles against each other and correlating individual’s profiles 
against the group profiles, the degree of consensus can best determine the final knowledge 
structure of physical security over the boundary conditions. This knowledge structure then 
effectively represents a preferential ordering of element relationship values along continuums to 
indicate the overall relative benefit to security. 
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The consideration within the research instrument to demonstrate reliability and validity is 
important to gain confidence in the development of the knowledge structure and therefore the 
overall results. Some guidance in this area has been taken from Armstrong and Peile (2005) who 
consider standards that adhere to the following high level principles.  
• impartiality,  
• objectivity,  
• repeatability,  
• reproducibility,  
• validity, and  
• accuracy. 
(Armstrong & Peile, 2005) 
 
In their work Armstrong and Peile (2005) suggest impartiality is achieved when results are free 
from bias. In the research questionnaire individual bias is collected purposefully as each 
completed dataset represents the individual opinion of a respondent. It is unavoidable that 
individual opinion is subjective and bias is inherent. The combination of datasets across groups 
is able to demonstrate a complete range of bias and can indicate that impartiality can be 
considered as the point where moderate opinion is the greatest for consensus purposes.  
 
Objectivity requires that the evaluation of results be free from subjective judgement or opinion 
(Armstrong & Peile, 2005). For this study the research has considered all input to be quasi-
qualitative judgement, therefore all data is subjective judgement and opinion. An analysis of this 
range of opinion provides the resulting standard profiles with a statistical mean value 
representing consensus opinion. An acknowledgement of the range of opinion within the 
consensus allows the interpretation of the results to consider both extreme and moderate 
viewpoints as the best possible way to realise objectivity in development of the knowledge 
structure. 
 
Repeatability requires that similar overall results should be seen from the same respondent 
during any repeat evaluations of the same questionnaire (Armstrong & Peile, 2005).  
This study acknowledges that time considerations for individual element pair combinations may 
change slightly for a given respondent completing the questionnaire on a different day.  
It is expected that the order and order of magnitude of values along a continuum should remain 
relatively stable as characteristic pattern as long as a person’s knowledge is not altered. 
Therefore with the relative order of consideration unlikely to change, the statistical results for 
element pair relations should always remain relatively constant. Repeatability for this study is 
demonstrated by the consistency of ordering of universal elements along a concept continuum. 
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Questions seeking an individual’s critical assessments along the concept continuum have been 
as a cross-referenced by the second and third question of each Section A-H parts a) and b). 
 
Reproducibility considers that a similar result should be obtained from a different respondent 
considering the same questionnaire (Armstrong & Peile, 2005). The order and order of 
magnitude of values for element considerations along a continuum will reflect a person’s 
knowledge and understanding of the element pair relationships. Statistical means used for the 
element pair relations correlation between group profiles become important. Reproducibility for 
this study is the ability for individual results to be compared to the consensus of the relative 
ordering of universal elements along a concept continuum. 
 
Validity requires that evaluations of the questionnaire produce the most likely forms of value in 
a realistic set of conditions (Armstrong & Peile, 2005). The answer guide to the questionnaire 
has stated that for all responses that there are no wrong concepts and that all opinions are valid 
and valuable. This statement underlines one of the main assumptions of the study.  
This assumption is that all expert opinion is valid and that instinct provides the best assessment 
in all cases. The reason for this assumption is that consensus should include both extreme and 
moderate viewpoints. This approach therefore contains the most realistic and holistic 
consideration of the phenomenon.  
 
Accuracy requires precision and rigour to minimise unintentional interpretations. Accuracy is 
considered at the point of the boundary condition that states: It is appreciated that a wide range 
of time values could be used as answers, in these cases please choose a value that would 
represent your initial thoughts of a typical scenario for each (Armstrong & Peile, 2005). 
Accuracy in this case is left to a determination of the respondent however with some basic 
guidance from the questionnaire. 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided a description of the experimental design and the data collection 
method of the study. The phenomenological approach seeks a combined emphasis between 
qualitative and quantitative understanding of a topic and has determined that expert opinion is 
the best source of data for the research. The quasi-qualitative assessment of the topic of physical 
security will investigate terminology toward the process of obtaining a knowledge structure 
through a combination of methods. The linking mechanisms required for a semantic mapping of 
physical security elements in the knowledge structure will be achieved through opinion-based 
value assessments over sets of elements represented along concept continuums.  
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The respondents for the research questionnaire have been chosen from three target population 
groups: Security Experts, Security Students, and Security Users. A pilot study was undertaken 
with in-depth interviews to refine the main research instrument of the study and has suggested 
that hierarchical grouping of elements could be related by action-based statements.  
Concept continuums were introduced into the questionnaire to provide a mechanism by which 
universal elements could be identified and related over a dimension. A method for value 
assessment for each element pair relationship has been recognised within appropriate physical 
security boundary conditions. In order to provide directional indications and overall benefit to 
physical security on the continuum, the chosen scale uses time relative to each action statement. 
 
The questionnaire was constructed into eight sections labelled Section A-H. Each section was 
based on a repetitive template style of questioning with each containing six questions and a final 
two questions numbering fifty in total. The questionnaires have been described in five main 
category types based on the question requirements in each section which include: the complex 
value assessment questions, the questions evaluating the element scales used, the questions 
evaluating the list of elements used, the questions requiring comments on the element scales; 
and the questions evaluating the questionnaire method and research objectives. 
 
The reliability and validity of the research instrument has also been discussed. A computerised 
correlating function can be applied to the value lists determined for each respondent as their 
individual profile. These profiles contain values that can also be combined into group profiles 
which become standard profiles. The correlation method can be applied over the different 
groups to determine the overall degree of consensus. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the results of the research and main emphasis of the study. The results 
have been presented in two sections including the processing of the raw data and the analysis of 
the processed data. These two sections are arranged so that the results originating from the 
research instrument can demonstrate an achievement of the objectives of the study.  
The questionnaire developed for the study is the primary data source and it is necessary to 
demonstrate reliability and validity which extends from the expert opinion at the collection 
point to the analysis and the presented interpretations. 
 
The initial considerations for this chapter require processing of the raw data. The physical path 
of the data can be identified from the respondent via the questionnaire into the custom built 
database used for storage and formatting. The processing and transformation of data starting 
from quasi-qualitative into numerical for analysis has been completed using a semantic- 
equivalence transformation rule. The processing of data also considers the comments of 
respondents which compliment the study’s reliability and checking mechanisms. The processing 
of data summarises comments of the questionnaire for their relevance to the method in terms of 
recognising concerns arising out of the relative ordering inconsistencies of the universal 
elements and considers extended element lists for each concept continuum. 
  
The analysis of the processed data considers two separate stages in order to demonstrate the 
objectives of the study. The first stage identifies simplified knowledge structures by 
constructing data sets as semantically mapped matrices. These are structured for each section of 
the questionnaire as two grouped lists of universal elements presented over orthogonal concept 
continuums. The knowledge matrices contain values that consider element pairs and represent 
universal element relationships. This study presents a list of raw value assessments for each 
individual to establish a profile for that individual. Additionally by using statistical averaging a 
group of individual profiles is able to construct a group profile. In order to develop a group 
profile, the statistical mean over each element pair relationship within a group of respondents 
has been used to combine value assessments. In this research the statistical mean represents a 
centralised point of opinion that displays good properties for demonstrating a degree of 
consensus.  
 
The second stage of the analysis of the data considers the ability to demonstrate consensus.  
The technique of correlation is used to demonstrate how both individual and group profiles that 
have been directly compared with each other, are able to support the notion of consensus.  
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The relative degree of consensus is able to be demonstrated through correlation as profiles are 
compared against a standard profile in order to establish the degree of variation among both 
groups and individuals. A single “standard profile” has been considered by combining the three 
group profiles into a composite profile. The correlations recorded over the different group 
profiles suggest that there is a relatively high consensus in the data collected by the research. 
This method demonstrates that the information within the knowledge matrices is valid to a high 
degree and exhibits reliability with completely independent groups able to correlate strongly 
with each other. The degree of consensus is also able to establish that the values within the 
knowledge matrices are representative of common knowledge in the field of physical security. 
 
The study has determined that the composite group profile representing the all groups of 
respondents provides the highest degree of consensus as the “standard profile”. This composite 
group profile has been used to provide the content for the values in each of the final knowledge 
matrices for each section of the questionnaire. This outcome is identified as one of the required 
objectives of the study. 
5.2 Processing the raw data 
In this study all information was collected from respondents through the send-out questionnaire 
package containing the questionnaire, an introductory letter, a statement of disclosure, a page of 
definitions and a stamped self addressed envelope. The questionnaires were sent out to potential 
respondents in target numbers based on pre-defined group categories. Table 5.1 provides an 
indication for the total number of returned questionnaires (n) including total returns from the 
group of Security Students (SS), total returns from the group of Security Experts (SE) and total 
returns from the group of Security Users (SU).  
 
Table 5.1 The Returned questionnaires summarised by group 
 Group SE Group SS Group SU Total (n) 
Target numbers 5 15 5 25 
Questionnaires sent 10 46 10 66 
Actual Questionnaires returned 5 14 7 26 
Rate of return 50% 30% 70% 39% 
 
Although the rate of return from the group Security Students was lower than the other two 
groups, this was not unexpected as a more impersonal recruitment style was conducted.  
The other two groups were recruited with a more personal contact style and a better return rate 
was evident. The numbers of questionnaires returned was close to predicted target numbers. 
 
Questionnaires were coded prior to being sent out to respondents with each group code 
indicating whether the participant belonged to the Security Expert group, the Security Student 
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group, or the Security User group. Upon receiving completed questionnaires through the post, a 
formal logging system recorded details of all Sections A-H. The information was retrieved from 
the questionnaires and transcribed from its physical format into a computer database through a 
custom built interface that visually replicated the presentation of the questionnaire.  
5.2.1 Processing of complex questions 
In Chapter 4 it was noted that the first question in each of the eight sections of the questionnaire 
was of a complex nature. For sections A-H of the questionnaire, each of these complex 
questions directly compared a six element list (Element 1) with a corresponding six element list 
(Element 2). Each respondent was asked to consider a one to one relationship for each element 
pair to provide a total of thirty six value assessments per section. For each of these value 
assessments, respondents were required to provide an indication by marking the appropriate 
columns identifying each element pair to represent their initial thoughts using a selection of time 
indicators. Boundary conditions were outlined for each section to provide a reference direction 
for indicating value to imply an overall benefit to physical security. In summary Questions 1, 7, 
13, 19, 25, 31, 37 and 43 were transcribed into eight corresponding database matrices each with 
thirty six value assessments representing element pair relationships. As a result of this process 
288 element relationship values were available to be assigned for each respondent profile.  
 
All parts of the research questionnaire contained terminology based on common language and 
common understanding. The study assumed that each respondent was able to comprehend the 
lists presented to them in the context supplied by the boundary conditions to make their 
appropriate value assessments. Each respondent’s knowledge structure profile in the field of 
physical security was expected to differ slightly based on occupational exposure, academic 
instruction and general experience; however this wide range of accumulated difference was 
expected to provide an overall umbrella of knowledge for a conceptual mapping of the topic. 
The assumption that all respondents would be able to understand the terminology and agree to 
the tasks of the questionnaire did not hold for the entire range of assessments with a small 
number of respondents omitting values in sections of the questionnaire. Overall the rate of full 
completion of the questionnaires was very good. Often additional information was included by 
respondents to provide explanatory notes to rationalise their value assessment choices. 
 
For each respondent the 288 potential value indications collected from Questions 1, 7, 13, 19, 
25, 31, 37 and 43 in the questionnaire have been designated as quasi-qualitative data.  
For the purpose of this research, respondents were required to make comparative judgements in 
quantitative assessments, though not in the manner of more common multiple choice 
questionnaires, but rather to consider conceptual relationship based values of universal 
elements. For this reason a series of qualitative representations of time were chosen as the scale 
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representing the labels and increments for value assessments of each relationship and these 
include seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, and years. These may all be interpreted 
as fuzzy time increments. In considering an element-element relationship and a boundary 
condition, the respondent’s qualitative appreciation of the boundary condition is sought in order 
to select a time based value. As the respondents were requested to provide time indications that 
would best indicate their initial thoughts, they are interpreting the boundary conditions.  
 
For the complex questions of the questionnaire the direction of time always implied some 
overall benefit to security. For Questions 1, 7, 19, 31, 37 and 43, increased time implied better 
defence of security and for Questions 13 and 25 decreased time implied better defence of 
security. The questionnaire did not require respondents to differentiate reasons for choosing the 
time values. For the purpose of this study, time has either represented an indication of relative 
likelihood in overall benefit to security for each element combination or an actual “time” 
approximated action event sequence. This research considers that both representations provide a 
relative indication of elemental relationships between universal elements and are therefore both 
equally valid. For each of the respondents, the 288 value assessments indicate a relative profile 
as an overall benefit to security. 
  
A quasi-qualitative to quantitative transformation was applied to each of the 288 value 
assessments within the database for each of the 26 respondent profiles. An equivalent numerical 
value was created for each fuzzy time indications in the questionnaire by applying the quasi-
qualitative to quantitative transformation methods presented in Transformation rule 5.1, 
Transformation rule 5.2 and Transformation rule 5.3 with the results displayed in Table 5.2. 
 
It should be noted from Table 5.2 that the quantitative time indications are exponential in nature. 
In order to develop linear relationships to assist this research, Table 5.2 has applied the natural 
logarithms for time estimations (mathematically represented as ln T). It should also be noted for 
the purposes of conceptual mapping that arbitrarily setting time at its minimum semantic value 
is able to demonstrate a relative ranked order between the values of element relationships.  
For all relationships in Table 5.2, the minimum semantic quantitative equivalence designated as 
secondsmin has been used. 
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Transformation rule 5.1 
All qualitative semantic (fuzzy) time indications are defined by their minimum quantitative time 
approximation (T). 
 
Transformation rule 5.2 
The minimum quantitative time approximation (T) is defined by the use of the lowest unit of 
commonality among semantic time indications (where the quantity secondsmin is set to unity).  
 
Transformation rule 5.3 
For convenience the final quasi-qualitative to quantitative transformation is the conversion to a 
logarithmic value by considering the natural logarithm expression e(linear time approximation) to provide 
a final linear quantitative time approximation (ln T). 
 
Table 5.2 Equivalence approximation values for qualitative time transformations 
Qualitative 
semantic time 
indication 
Minimum quantitative  
time approximation (T) 
Time (T) in units of 
secondsmin 
ln T 
seconds 1 secondsmin 1.07 (see note) 0.07 
minutes 60 secondsmin 60 4.10 
hours 60 x 60 secondsmin 3,600 8.20 
days 24 x 60 x 60 secondsmin 86,400 11.40 
weeks 7 x 24 x 60 x 60 secondsmin 604,800 13.30 
months 4 x 7 x 24 x 60 x 60 secondsmin 2,419,200 14.70 
years 365.25 x 24 x 60 x 60 secondsmin 31,557,600 17.30 
note - a value of 1.07 has been used as opposed to a value of 1 to avoid a ln T value of zero 
 
An important relationship duality exists in the quasi-qualitative to quantitative transformations 
of Table 5.2. This relationship provides the opportunity for respondent values to be ranked as 
elemental pair considerations on an ordered time scale indicating preferential benefit to security 
and additionally it allows an indication for a relative order of magnitude of that benefit (which is 
synonymous to a relative importance), exhibited along the logarithmic nature of the scale.  
As the semantic comprehension of the concept of time is not subjective, an exponential time 
scale represents a versatile standard of measurement that is consistent across all human 
consideration, regardless of the subjective nature of human reasoning or the interpretation of a 
particular boundary condition. 
 
From Table 5.2, it is evident that linear time indications along an ordered scale of benefit to 
security can be constructed, by assigning a qualitative time indication as a number between the 
end values of the scale given as 0.07 (seconds) and 17.30 (years). These values represent the 
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useful boundaries of the time scale over the concept continuum for typical real-life physical 
security considerations. In setting minimum semantic representative levels for arbitrary time 
indications, a relative conceptual understanding between values should remain valid as the order 
of magnitude between all time values will remain relative to the interpretation of secondsmin.  
For example; the term weeks is set to its minimum representative value of 604,800 secondsmin 
and is valid up to 2,419,200 secondsmin before the next semantic term months becomes more 
appropriate in common understanding.  
 
A combined table of the transformed data from Questions 1, 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 37 and 43 was 
completed for all value assessments over each respondent. Sections A-H of the questionnaire 
can therefore be represented by 288 rows from the database across a list of 26 respondent 
columns. The final table produced includes three labelled columns specifying Element 1, 
Element 2, and the relational descriptor from the boundary condition for each relationship 
assessment in Sections A-H.  
5.2.2 Processing of non-complex questions 
The remaining non-complex questions of the questionnaire were directed at the respondent’s 
level of agreement with the element lists presented in the questionnaire as well as the level of 
agreement with the techniques used to collect information. Transferring this information from 
the questionnaire into the custom-built database required several format types including 
comments, agreement/disagreement indicators and adjustable lists for any new elements for the 
extended universal elements lists. Within each of the Sections A-H of the questionnaire the non-
complex questions (second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth question) have been used to establish 
respondent perception of the research validity. 
 
The study attempted to collect a number of additional non-listed elements to construct a 
complimentary membership to the universal elements listed in the questionnaire. The structure 
of using universal elements as simple reference points over a concept continuum in which to 
consider an overall benefit to security through ranking requires the dimension to be assessed by 
each respondent, in order to critique the relationship measurements of the research.  
The questionnaire presented universal elements in ordered scales based on the dimensions of 
each concept continuum and boundary condition. Feedback from respondents has regarded the 
sets of universal elements of the research, and has validated and extended the presented lists. 
Respondents were free to provide any comments that they perceived to be important in the 
consideration of these scales. For demonstration purposes Sections A will be briefly considered 
in the body of this text with summaries considering the universal elements. Table 5.3 identifies 
a summary for the remainder of Sections A-H located within the Appendices. 
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Table 5.3: A summary of the second to fifth questions of each of Sections A-H located within 
the Appendices 
Section of Questionnaire Appendix containing summary of the comments and 
indications 
Section A, Questions 2-5  Appendix C1 
Section B, Questions 8-11  Appendix C2 
Section C, Questions 14-17  Appendix C3 
Section D, Questions 20-23  Appendix C4 
Section E, Questions 26-29  Appendix C5 
Section F, Questions 32-35  Appendix C6 
Section G, Questions 38-41  Appendix C7 
Section H, Questions 44-47  Appendix C8 
 
Table 5.4: A summary of the sixth question of each of Sections A-H located within the 
Appendices 
Section of Questionnaire Appendix containing summary of the comments 
Section A, Question 6  Appendix D1. 
Section B, Question 12 Appendix D2 
Section C, Question 18 Appendix D3 
Section D, Question 24 Appendix D4 
Section E, Question 30 Appendix D5 
Section F, Question 36 Appendix D6 
Section G, Question 42  Appendix D7 
Section H, Question 48  Appendix D8 
Question 49  Appendix D9 
Question 50  Appendix D10 
 
The comments concerning Section A from respondents provide some insight into the value 
assessments that have been recorded in Question 1 of the questionnaire in considering element 
pair combinations and relationships. The conceptual ordering of the selected elements into lists 
presents a semantic challenge as a simple agreed order of terminology does not exist in 
collective knowledge. Exceptions to the rule will inevitably present some contentious variation 
in the absolute ranking of the order of latent variables. Despite the potential for exceptions  
Table 5.5 and Table 5.7 both show high levels of acceptance among respondents to the ordered 
lists presented with 71% agreement and 82% agreement respectively. Table 5.5 considered 
elements along the concept continuum used in a force attack for the action statement breaking 
and Table 5.7 considered elements over the concept continuum used for material strength for 
the same action statement. 
 
Comments received from respondents mainly indicated general agreement toward the ranked 
order of elements listed however as can be seen in Table 5.5 and Table 5.7, some respondents 
have indicated that the questionnaire did not supply enough specific information to suit their 
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preference when making these assessments. The overall implications of comments made by 
respondents identified concern with the lack of specific information supplied with the boundary 
conditions. This problem forms part of the original issues with modelling, where it would be 
unfeasible and equally impractical to supply sufficient specific information for each 
respondent’s requirements over each value assessment in a basic questionnaire. This leads to the 
necessity of the research presenting a “general” case and requiring respondents to consider a 
“general” solution when providing their element pair assessments. This “general” case suggests 
that the many unspecified details for proper consideration in a particular judgement, needed to 
be substituted through expertise and experience. Therefore the “general” case becomes heavily 
moderated through respondent intuition and instinct. This research has assumed that experience 
and other similar methods can provide valid distillation of real-world complexity.  
 
It is this proposed “general” case that the research has considered as a means for reducing 
complexity. It should be understood that each indication considering the “general” case will be 
quite subjective and valid only within the confines of a single human knowledge structure. 
However the combined consideration over an entire range of subjective and relative indications, 
finds the resulting “general” cases providing value assessments that create a commonly 
understood conceptual map of relationships in physical security terminology.  
 
Further to considerations for the general case scenario, the identification of a definitive order 
ranking the elements is not as important to this research as the understanding of the dimensional 
magnitude of the element relationships. The order of the ranked elements provides a simple 
overview of a scale while dimensional values indicate where the fuzzy edges of uncertainty may 
exist for most scenarios. The elements listed in this research can be considered as true universal 
elements when they are based on simple reference levels as an overview of a concept 
continuum. The issue of whether these elements are slightly out of order or are mostly correct in 
their rankings can be determined through the consideration of questionnaire value assessments 
over paired element rankings along each corresponding and “orthogonal” dimension of a 
boundary condition.  
 
Table 5.5 demonstrates that for several respondents some uncertainty exists about the potential 
order between an electric drill compared to a hammer and an axe. As there are complicating 
factors that may be manifest in ranking these items, it is likely that individual “general” cases 
may identify different comparisons. Respondents have identified that electric drills require 
mains power or an alternative mobile power source, while axe and hammer are human powered. 
Similarly hammer and axe work best against material structures of lower strength while electric 
drills can work better against stronger based material structures but usually in a more localised 
area. Many other complicating factors exist and it is beyond the scope of this research to discuss 
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them however it is the summary of comments from all respondents that form a library 
presenting examples of these complicating factors for future consideration. 
 
An example of an element that was particularly seen as a poor fit into a ranked order for several 
respondent’s “general” case scenarios, was the element of oxy cutting. This element shows more 
affinity to metallic type substances than ceramic type substances for the action statement 
breaking. This indication by a reasonable number of respondents points to a need to continue 
with additional iterations of a modified questionnaire to better understand this element.  
Ideally additional iterations would be able to construct additional levels of hierarchy for many 
of the universal elements where fuzziness exists in their ranking.  
 
While it is beyond the scope of this research to provide additional iterations of the questionnaire 
in order to improve the presented hierarchical structure of elements, if additional levels of 
hierarchy were introduced through additional iterations of the questionnaire, this study’s method 
should provide a framework for improvement to the results obtained. One of the objectives of 
this research is to highlight suggestions from the comments of respondents, where this process 
may provide a better degree of consensus and reduce complexity.  
 
The results from Table 5.7 suggest that the strength and available quantity of any barrier is 
likely to be directly proportional to the cost of materials. The respondents in the study have 
generally agreed to the questionnaire’s suggestion that barrier strength is proportional to the cost 
of material. This provides a suggestion to identify whether the requirement for modelling is 
performance dependent or dependent on budget limitations. The consideration of cost for a 
physical security scenario will in most cases be a simple calculation involving the quantities of 
each of the physical security elements multiplied over a defined region as a cost per unit area.  
Other cost factors that may affect this calculation include running and maintenance costs to the 
physical security elements. 
 
As indicated in Table 5.7 many respondents have also indicated from their comments that the 
density and thickness need to be better established for more accurate value assessments.  
This suggests the inclusion of additional iterations of the questionnaire and additional levels of 
hierarchy to consider the effect of various densities and thicknesses on material strengths.  
 
The extended list of elements has been compiled from the various respondents’ suggestions and 
has been presented to indicate the potential for new elements to be added to the universal 
elements listed and thus provide more reference points over the concept continuum.  
The extended lists are presented in Table 5.6 and Table 5.8 where it is evident that the list of 
extended elements provides a rich set of alternatives to the listed universal elements.  
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In both Table 5.6 and Table 5.8 the extended list suggests elements in more than one position of 
ranked order. This would most likely indicate that the elements operate at a range of 
effectiveness and this further suggests that a fuzzy ranking for each of these elements is 
appropriate. In cases such as these, more specific information seems necessary and a 
consideration of a lower order of hierarchy may be useful to better understand the fuzzy range 
and its dependencies. The best examples of this from Table 5.6 are a jackhammer and diamond 
tipped electric cutter, while for Table 5.8 examples of this include concrete and brick walls. 
 
This study acknowledges that the lists of universal elements are not comprehensive lists of data 
representing the dimensions of the concept continuum, however as simple reference levels along 
each dimension they have been relatively successful in generating agreement among 
respondents.  
 
Table 5.5 Section A, Sets 1-6 Element 1: Considering question 2a and 2b of the questionnaire 
Question 2a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
71% agreement for the presented ranked order from the least force to the greatest force downwards. 
 
Question 2b: Summary of comments on the presented rank order by 
frequency of comment 
 
Comment made Number of 
Respondents (n) 
General agreement in their comments. 10 
The application of oxy cutting was specific to metal and would not be applicable 
on the other type materials e.g. brick, earth. 
6 
All tools worked differently for different materials which made assessment 
difficult. 
3 
Concern that an electric drill my not have the force of a hammer or an axe. 3 
The lack of specific information made this assessment difficult e.g. unknown 
thickness of materials, weight of attack item, force of blow, speed of drill, etc. 
1 
The chemical structure needed to be assessed during the interaction when the 
tools were used. 
1 
 
Table 5.6 Section A, Sets 1-6 Element 1: Considering question 4 of the questionnaire 
Elements in 
rank order 
Question 4: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
rock knife, shovel, hand, fist, screwdriver, rock size, rock shape, hammer 
 crow bar, bar/rod, hand, metal pole, air pressure 
hammer chisel, bat, chisel, what type of hammer, size & weight will make a difference 
 power, sledge hammer, sledgehammer 
axe mallet, saw, bolt cutter, what size & type of axe, jackhammer 
 hydraulic, hack saw 
electric drill tin snips, ((electric drill)) chain saw, angle grinder, handgun, what type of drill e.g. size & 
speed & type of drill bit, oxy cutting 
 diamond tipped electric cutter, O2 gas, electric saw 
oxy cutting jack hammer, ((oxy cutting)) sledge hammer, ((oxy cutting)) jackhammer, laser, what 
type of oxy gas & tips used, car ram raid 
 diamond tipped electric cutter, motor car 
explosive bomb, what type of explosive 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
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Table 5.7 Section A, Sets 1-6 Element 2: Considering question 3a and 3b of the questionnaire 
Question 3a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
82% agreement for the presented ranked order from the least material strength to the greatest material 
strength downwards. 
 
Question 3b: Summary of comments on the presented rank order by 
frequency of comment 
 
Comment made Number of 
Respondents (n) 
General agreement in their comments. 5 
The thickness/density needed to be stated for different materials to make a better 
assessment of strength. 
3 
All tools worked differently for different materials which made assessment 
difficult. 
3 
Unsure about the inclusion of earth in the list. 3 
The lack of specific information made this assessment difficult e.g. type of glass, 
type of wood, solid jarrah or ply, etc. 
3 
The order between concrete and steel may be swapped. 2 
The order would be close between wood and brick. 1 
 
Table 5.8 Section A, Sets 1-6 Element 2: Considering question 5 of the questionnaire 
Listed 
Elements in 
rank order 
Question 5: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
earth no barrier, no barrier, paper, dirt, clay, glass sliding door, impaction of earth, no barrier 
 wood 
glass window, window, glass, glass (normal), Perspex, plastic, window, strength, window 
 safety glass, wire mesh, limestone 
wood door, plasterboard, door, ice, brick wall, tiles, tin roof, what type solid jarrah or plywood, 
door 
 bullet proof glass, colourbond fence, security mesh 
brick gyprock wall, wire fence, wood, concrete wall, brick and concrete are kind of similar, 
wall, what type solid brick or verticore, brick wall 
 composites 
concrete wall, brick wall, brick, steel, walls are generally more expensive than fences, plain 
concrete or reinforced, concrete wall 
 reinforced concretes 
steel wire mesh fence, ((steel)) reinforced concrete, concrete, reinforced concrete, thickness, 
steel plated wall 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 
Table 5.9 considers the final question in Section A. The questionnaire attempts to gauge 
agreement from respondents in accepting an alternative list of elements as potential substitutes 
for the presented universal elements. This alternative list provides the basis for extending the 
universal element lists and also provides the basis for conceptualising the universal elements as 
simple reference levels on a dimensional scale representing the concept continuums.  
Table 5.9 displays general agreement from respondents to the suggestion of replacing the list. 
Several respondents indicated the alternate list was more appropriate to real-world examples. 
There was only a minor lack of agreement to Question 6. A comparison suggesting the 
consideration of the Australian Standard provides an alternate list that may substitute for the 
chosen universal elements. 
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Table 5.9 Section A: Considering question 6 of the questionnaire 
Respondent commentary on extending the lists for both Element 1 and Element 
2 by associating new/additional terms while continuing the same visual ranking 
method. Summary of comments by frequency of topic 
 
Comment made Number of 
Respondents (n) 
General agreement in their comments. 8 
The alternative list suggested was more appropriate to real-world examples. 3 
Limited agreement with the alternate list. 1 
Uncertainty 1 
Disagreement with the alternate terms as no actual specifics for those terms was 
provided. 
1 
The question did not consider groupings of the Australian Standard AS3555: with 4 
classes of tools – Hand, Power, Hydraulic, O2/gas. 
1 
 
A summary from Question 48 of the questionnaire is listed in Table 5.10. This question includes 
respondents’ commentary on the overall method used in the questionnaire and has been 
included in the text for information purposes. The main indication recognised from respondent 
feedback is that some confusion is evident about whether time represents an actual measure of 
time or alternatively a likelihood of an event happening.  
 
Table 5.10 Question 48 of the questionnaire 
Respondent summary of the overall method used in the research by frequency of topic 
5 respondents indicated general satisfaction with the method used. 
3 respondents indicated that they had no comments on this question. 
 
The following comments have been included for information purposes: 
 “I don’t really get the time thing e.g. Q43 does a week mean it’s more likely to happen or is it the time it 
takes to do it?” 
 “Section H confused me a little bit (increased time means more likely attack OR increased time means 
how much defence consideration should be given?), although both similar still confused me – but rest was 
good.” 
 “Asking for suggestions for the element list became tedious”. 
 “I believe the method being used in this questionnaire is good and laid out good and allows for the 
wanted information to be retrieved.” 
 “Most parts were good although I found Questions 37 a bit confusing.” 
 “Time scale – easy for most questions.” 
 “Maybe be able to put an actual numerical value on some of the sets.” 
 “There were so many variables involved that a lot of assumptions need to be made – respondents may 
have vastly different interpretations of these questions.” 
 “Not completely confident that it is an effective way of allocating a monetary security budget to a 
facility.” 
 
A summary from Question 49 of the questionnaire is listed in Table 5.11. This question includes 
comments from respondents on their thoughts about whether a small set of elements can 
adequately describe a real-life facility. There is general agreement to this proposition although 
concern has been raised about the ability for the universal elements to be a large enough set to 
be representative. The main area of concern raised by several respondents was that specific 
information was not available for the questionnaire. This study acknowledges that facility 
specific information was not available for each of the relative assessments that were made 
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however an assumption of the study considers that a “general” case is appropriate within the 
research boundary conditions. 
 
Table 5.11 Question 49 of the questionnaire 
Respondent commentary on the proposition of whether a small set of elements (such as those in the 
questionnaire) can adequately describe a real-life facility. Summary of comments received by 
frequency of topic 
9 respondents indicated general agreement with the proposition. 
4 respondents indicated that they did not agree with the proposition. 
3 respondents indicated reduced agreement with the proposition and suggested that the lists as provided 
would not be large enough. 
 
The following comments have been included for information purposes: 
“No not really, always depends on the situation, and different variables and everyone has to be thinking at 
the same level.” 
“Yes, though it may need to be tailored to individual facilities to ensure that the terms are accurate and 
that everything necessary is covered.” 
“No – some would fall outside the scope of the categories.” 
“How small is small. I feel that the list provided would not be large enough, but expand to say 10, and 
then OK.” 
 
A summary from Question 50 is listed in Table 5.12. This question includes comments from 
respondents on their thoughts about whether a small set of elements, such as those in the 
questionnaire, can adequately describe the physical security of a real-life facility.  
There is general agreement to this proposition although concern has been raised about the ability 
for the universal elements to be a large enough set to be representative. A similar set of concerns 
were received for this question as those for Question 49. 
 
Table 5.12 Question 50 of the questionnaire 
Respondent commentary on the proposition of whether a small set of elements (such as those in the 
questionnaire) can adequately describe the physical security of a real-life facility. Summary of 
comments received by frequency of topic 
8 respondents indicated general agreement with the proposition. 
3 respondents indicated that they did not agree with the proposition. 
3 respondents indicated reduced agreement with the proposition and suggested that the lists as provided 
would not be large enough. 
1 respondent indicated that they were uncertain. 
 
The following comments have been included for information purposes: 
“No, because every situation will have different variables.” 
“Yes and no. Used as guide yes but maybe not for an in-depth analysis.” 
“Not quite, needs to be more in depth, will provide a good general idea of what risks there are and where 
physical security may be required, but hard to be specific.” 
“Yes, but once again they should be customised for each building or facility.” 
 
A general indication from the comments received for Question 49 and Question 50, suggests 
that the model would not be able to be specific enough in situation based scenarios.  
Although these comments raise an important consideration for the model, it is worth pointing 
out that the universal elements are representing reference points along each concept continuum 
mapped by the framework that has supported this research. This study proposes that the list of 
universal elements is able to be representative for all situation based scenarios as a relative scale 
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when they are used as simple reference points. This can subsequently be used to determine 
value for extended lists of elements that arise in specific environments. 
 
Several questions within the questionnaire have required respondent feedback and have 
provided a validation of the elemental lists and the method used to obtain the data. Respondents 
have provided a series of comments that have been considered as a summary within the text to 
give indication of the strengths and weaknesses of the research.  
5.3 Analysis of the data 
The analysis of the data collected in the complex questions of the research questionnaire will be 
considered to represent knowledge structures for this research. The analysis will consider two 
separate stages in order to best conceptualise a mapping of the universal elements of physical 
security. The first stage will identify the matrices that will be used to represent knowledge 
structures. These knowledge matrices in this first stage will indicate a directional benefit to 
physical security based on ranked ordering of universal elements over orthogonal concept 
continuums for a specific boundary condition. These matrices are based on value assessments 
from expert opinion and are presented in order to meet the objectives of the study.  
The second stage will aim to demonstrate validity for the knowledge matrices to suggest that 
they are representative of a consensus of expert opinion. This second stage will attempt to 
demonstrate the degree of consensus by conducting correlation measures on universal element 
relationship value assessment profiles. The correlations assess the similarity comparisons 
between different profiles and have been applied for individuals, for each category group and 
against the composite group of respondents.  
 
The raw data also provides a profile for each respondent consisting of a list of 288 values.  
The 288 values that make up each profile consist of eight sections of 36 element pair 
relationship assessments. A series of the profiles for each of the 26 individual respondents can 
be viewed in full in Appendix E.  
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5.3.1 Stage 1: Creation of knowledge matrices 
To investigate the potential for consensus various combinations and statistical interpretations of 
respondent’s profiles can be considered. Table 5.13 provides an example for the results from 
Section A of the questionnaire in this text, where the orthogonal concept continuums are 
designated as Element 1 (force attack) and Element 2 (material strength). The boundary 
condition for Section A considers the action statement breaking and indicates that increased 
time represents better physical security defence. Table 5.13 demonstrates that different 
statistical indicators can be applied over the combined data from all respondents where n=26.  
 
The full set of tables representing each Section A-H of the study can be viewed in Appendix F. 
 
Table 5.13 Statistical indicators of combined values for Section A considering time based 
relationship assessments between Element 1 and Element 2 for n=26 respondents 
Section A, Question 1 – considering the action 
statement “breaking” MEAN MEDIAN MODE 
ST 
DEV 
Element 1 Element 2     
explosive glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
explosive wood 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
explosive brick 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.79 
explosive earth 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.79 
explosive concrete 0.38 0.07 0.07 1.10 
explosive steel 1.00 0.07 0.07 1.73 
electric drill earth 0.53 0.07 0.07 1.31 
electric drill glass 0.69 0.07 0.07 1.48 
electric drill wood 1.47 0.07 0.07 2.55 
electric drill brick 4.04 4.10 4.10 3.56 
electric drill concrete 5.34 4.10 4.10 3.72 
electric drill steel 6.69 6.15 4.10 4.02 
oxy cutting glass 1.62 0.07 0.07 2.00 
oxy cutting wood 3.18 4.10 0.07 3.10 
oxy cutting steel 3.57 4.10 4.10 3.01 
oxy cutting earth 3.99 0.07 0.07 5.49 
oxy cutting brick 8.50 8.20 8.20 4.94 
oxy cutting concrete 9.03 8.20 8.20 5.07 
axe glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
axe earth 1.04 0.07 0.07 2.82 
axe brick 5.05 4.10 4.10 2.66 
axe wood 5.45 4.10 4.10 5.24 
axe concrete 8.07 8.20 8.20 3.35 
axe steel 12.27 13.30 14.70 3.51 
hammer glass 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.82 
hammer earth 0.91 0.07 0.07 2.06 
hammer wood 4.62 4.10 4.10 2.19 
hammer brick 5.09 4.10 4.10 2.66 
hammer concrete 8.58 8.20 8.20 3.06 
hammer steel 13.47 14.70 17.30 3.55 
rock glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
rock earth 0.73 0.07 0.07 2.68 
rock wood 7.73 8.20 8.20 1.34 
rock brick 10.87 11.40 11.40 1.63 
rock concrete 14.52 14.70 14.70 0.69 
rock steel 17.30 17.30 17.30 0.00 
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The statistical indicators that have been listed in Table 5.13 include the mean, median, mode 
and standard deviation for each element pair. Other indicators could also be considered here 
such as the absolute maximum and minimum values. This research will argue that the use of 
statistical indicators to achieve an indication for the degree of consensus in the data is also a 
proper method to judge the validity and reliability of the data. The indicators used to gauge 
consensus have been presented in Table 5.13 and in particular the values for the statistical mean 
(indicated in bold font) are considered by this research to be the best indicator for consensus.  
 
In working toward the common meaning of consensus as identified in Chapter 1, this study’s 
objective implies obtaining a collective opinion or developing a standard of agreement.  
Where a collective opinion can be identified over the subject area, this will inevitably include 
both moderate and extreme points of view along the many relevant conceptual dimensions.  
A common point of view for each relationship structure can be developed into a series of 
standard reference points for agreement purposes, where the more extreme points of view would 
surround a centralised reference point. The weight of expert opinion can also be interpreted as a 
consideration of the most commonly held points of view. As can be seen in Table 5.13 the 
mean, median and the mode all provide different indications of a more central opinion of a 
collective group of values. The arbitrary selection of the statistical mean as the preferred 
indicator towards consensus for this research enables a distributed weighting over the collective 
opinion towards an optimum centralised point. The standard profile of agreement is presented as 
the optimum common viewpoint consisting of mean value opinions for consensus.  
 
The standard deviation in Table 5.13 is also useful as an indicator to determine the variation of 
agreement from the centralised points of opinion as indicated by the mean, median and mode.  
In this study the standard deviation is established as a rough indicator for the overall degree of 
consensus. For example, where a large spread of opinion is evident from a large standard 
deviation, this indicates that a particular element pair relationship may be fuzzy in its 
comprehension. The usefulness of the standard deviation as an indicator may be applicable in 
various ways including highlighting the potential for future hierarchical considerations to assess 
fuzzy universal elements. The standard deviation may also be used in this research in 
conjunction with the correlation technique as a basic indicator to check the consistency of the 
results which would indicate a high degree of consensus. 
  
The creation of relationship matrices presents an achievement as part of the objectives of the 
study. The list of statistical means presented in Table 5.13 can also be rearranged into a single 6 
by 6 matrix format. This can be completed for each Section A-H of the research with special 
consideration given to the relative ordering of the elements along each concept continuum 
through an overall value averaging process. The resulting matrices contain values for universal 
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elements specified in concept continuums that represent an overall directional benefit to security 
for these elements. The final matrices representing a conceptual mapping of the universal 
element of this study as knowledge structures for each Section A-H are considered in  
Table 5.14 which lists the appendix locations. Each of the knowledge matrices presented in 
Appendices G1-G8 are constructed from the statistical means over the composite group of all 
respondents.  
 
Table 5.14  A list showing the location of the knowledge matrices representing a conceptual 
mapping for the research over the specified boundary conditions 
Section of Questionnaire Relational descriptor  Appendix containing knowledge 
matrix 
Section A breaking Appendix G1. 
Section B climbing Appendix G2 
Section C evading Appendix G3 
Section D disabling Appendix G4 
Section E responding Appendix G5 
Section F motivation by asset  Appendix G6 
Section G  attack method by motivation  Appendix G7 
Section H  attack method by asset Appendix G8 
 
Table 5.15 has been included to provide an example of the matrix format of value assessments 
determined for Section A as one of the objectives of the study. As well as the value assessments, 
some additional information is included in the matrix giving an averaged value for each element 
across the 6 corresponding orthogonal concept continuum elements and an indication of the 
range (presented in brackets) over the orthogonal concept continuum elements. An example for 
Section A considers steel and averages several statistical mean values over the orthogonal 
values for rock, hammer, axe, oxy cutting, electric drill, and explosive. This creates a relative 
ordering for steel with an average value of 9.07 along the concept continuum of material 
strength. The benefits in providing this additional averaging are; firstly it allows the universal 
elements along the concept continuum to be ordered according to these averaged values and 
secondly, it provides a “general” case value when the type of attack on steel may be unknown. 
Thus for Table 8 the correct relationship rank ordering of the elements is steel (9.05), concrete 
(7.65), brick (5.63), wood (3.75), earth (1.24), and glass (0.46).  
 
For Table 5.15 the matrix has been arranged by order of increasing ranked benefit to physical 
security with the highest values represented in the top left hand corner. The ranked order of each 
continuum is averaged over the orthogonally considered concept continuum indicated for force 
attack and material strength and listed in the second column and the second row respectively. 
The labels of the universal elements are also included for each concept continuum. 
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Table 5.15:A Relative relationship mapping (in ranked order) indicating the concept 
continuums of force measured against strength for the action statement breaking (Section A). 
 force attack rock hammer axe oxy cutting electric 
drill 
explosive 
 
material 
strength 
Avg of means 
over 6 
elements 
(range) 
 
8.54 
(0.07-17.30) 
 
5.49 
(0.24-13.47) 
 
5.33 
(0.07-12.27) 
 
4.98 
(1.62-9.03) 
 
3.13 
(0.53-6.69) 
 
0.33 
(0.07-1.00) 
steel 
9.05 
(1.00 – 17.30) 17.30 13.47 12.27 3.57 6.69 1.00 
concrete 
7.65 
(0.38 – 14.52) 14.52 8.58 8.07 9.03 5.34 0.38 
brick 
5.63 
(0.22 – 10.87) 10.87 5.09 5.05 8.50 4.04 0.22 
wood 
3.75 
(0.07 – 7.73) 7.73 4.62 5.45 3.18 1.47 0.07 
earth 
1.24 
(0.22 – 3.99) 
0.73 0.91 1.04 3.99 0.53 0.22 
glass 
0.46 
(0.07 – 1.62) 0.07 0.24 0.07 1.62 0.69 0.07 
 
Table 5.15 presents an example for this thesis of mapped element relationships as an outcome of 
the research instrument in order to meet the objectives of the study. This particular knowledge 
structure represented for Section A identifies the defence in depth function of delay, and has the 
boundary condition determined by the relational descriptor considering breaking.  
Measurement of expert opinion along the orthogonal concept continuums of force attack and 
material strength provides a conceptual mapping which has established relative indications of 
importance to overall benefit for physical security. 
5.3.2 Stage 2: Determination of consensus 
The second stage of the analysis of the data includes an evaluation of consensus by the 
technique of correlation. The evaluation is conducted over all 288 value assessments as a single 
profile and seeks the relative amount of similarity in the list when comparing a range of profiles. 
Each group profile has independent membership and the composite group profile combines all 
respondent profiles. High similarity in correlation is evident in all group profiles for this 
research which suggest a High degree of consensus. Profiles for individual respondents have 
also been considered against group profiles to gauge the overall range for the degrees of 
consensus evident. A justification for the meaning of a High degree of consensus is further 
explored in this section. 
 
In applying considerations for validity and reliability in Chapter 4, it was suggested that the 
degree of consensus across the group profiles listed in Table 5.16 could be considered using a 
correlation technique across each of the four groups. The groups include: the composite group 
of all respondents (Composite), the group of Security Experts (SE), the group of Security 
Students (SS), and the group of Security Users (SU). The chosen technique requires that an 
independent parameter list is compared against a dependent parameter list of the same length.  
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The correlation process results in an indication of the extent of relative similarity between 
corresponding values over the two lists, and provides an output for an overall indication as a 
value between 1 and 0. For this research all correlations have been made using the Microsoft 
Excel function CORREL in version Office 2000. 
 
Table 5.16 lists the statistical mean values for Section A as profiles for the composite group and 
for each category group. The profiles in Table 5.16 have been complied using statistical means 
as the consensus point of value across the group membership. It is interesting to note that a 
simple visual comparison of the values in the four columns of Table 5.16 indicates a reasonably 
strong similarity for most element pair assessments.  
  
Table 5.16 Statistical mean values representing elemental relationships for the different 
groups of respondents as standard profiles for Section A. 
Element relationships using the following 
element combinations 
Standard 
Composite 
Group 
Standard 
Group SE 
Standard 
Group SS 
Standard 
Group SU 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN 
n=26 
MEAN 
n=5 
MEAN 
n=14 
MEAN 
n=7 
explosive glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
explosive wood 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
explosive brick 0.22 0.88 0.07 0.07 
explosive earth 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.64 
explosive concrete 0.38 0.88 0.36 0.07 
explosive steel 1.00 1.68 0.64 1.22 
electric drill earth 0.53 0.88 0.07 1.22 
electric drill glass 0.69 0.88 0.64 0.64 
electric drill wood 1.47 1.68 0.94 2.38 
electric drill brick 4.04 4.92 3.61 4.26 
electric drill concrete 5.34 4.92 5.15 6.00 
electric drill steel 6.69 7.20 6.55 6.58 
oxy cutting glass 1.62 0.88 1.80 1.80 
oxy cutting wood 3.18 3.29 2.68 4.12 
oxy cutting steel 3.57 5.75 2.67 3.82 
oxy cutting earth 3.99 0.88 4.92 4.35 
oxy cutting brick 8.50 9.20 8.10 8.80 
oxy cutting concrete 9.03 10.48 9.04 9.25 
axe glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
axe earth 1.04 0.07 0.64 2.54 
axe brick 5.05 4.92 4.70 5.86 
axe wood 5.45 7.56 4.77 6.82 
axe concrete 8.07 8.66 7.79 8.21 
axe steel 12.27 13.36 12.39 11.24 
hammer glass 0.24 0.88 0.07 0.07 
hammer earth 0.91 0.07 0.93 1.70 
hammer wood 4.62 4.11 4.69 4.92 
hammer brick 5.09 6.56 4.63 4.92 
hammer concrete 8.58 9.86 8.61 7.20 
hammer steel 13.47 14.80 13.84 11.62 
rock glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
rock earth 0.73 0.07 0.07 2.54 
rock wood 7.73 8.20 8.20 6.44 
rock brick 10.87 11.40 11.40 9.44 
rock concrete 14.52 14.70 14.70 14.03 
rock steel 17.30 17.30 17.30 17.30 
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Further details of the use of the correlation technique have been provided in Chapter 4.  
A complete list of the group profiles for each of Sections A-H is listed in Appendix H. 
 
It is necessary to determine the relationship between correlation and consensus that would 
suggests a useful scale for similarity or alternatively degree of consensus. The relationships 
proposed in Table 5.17 provide an arbitrary designation for this research. Where consensus is 
measured in degrees between 1 and 0, this proposal provides simple partial classifications for an 
initial correlation-consensus rating. The justification for these classifications will be developed 
as more correlations are introduced through the rest of this section. A special case exists for 
correlation-consensus purposes that provides for a correlation value of 1, where in this case a 
profile is effectively compared against itself and has a precisely matching correlation list. 
 
Table 5.17 An arbitrary rating scale for the correlation-consensus relationship 
Correlation values Consensus rating 
0.85 – 1.00 High 
0.70 – 0.85 Medium - High 
0.50 – 0.70 Low - Medium 
0.00 – 0.50 Low 
 
A key indicator for the achievement of consensus will be found in comparing the level of 
correlation between group profiles of different membership. The statistical means have been 
used to combine assessment values as profiles across different individuals within category 
groups to compare them against other group profiles. This research has provided an indication 
of how much variation is able to be seen between the groups over the 288 values assessments. 
Table 5.18 provides the results from this comparison using the correlation technique for each 
group profile against the other corresponding group profiles over 288 statistical mean value 
assessments. 
  
Table 5.18 Group standard profiles correlated against each other over the list of 288 
statistical means representing combined value assessments 
 
Composite 
(n=26) 
SE 
(n=5) 
SS 
(n=14) 
SU 
(n=7) 
Composite (n=26) 1 0.94 0.99 0.95 
SE (n=5) 0.94 1 0.90 0.86 
SS (n=14) 0.99 0.90 1 0.91 
SU (n=7) 0.95 0.86 0.91 1 
 
It is clearly evident from the values in Table 5.18 after consideration of the correlation-
consensus determination in Table 5.17, that the correlations all provide a High degree of 
consensus. It can be seen that the results for the composite group profile provide the highest 
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range of 0.94 to 0.99 in correlation results as a profile relative to its component groups.  
This range provides values very close to the correlation value of 1 indicating that groups of 
different membership are able to show similar assessment profiles to each other. This in turn 
suggests that any group profile considering statistical means may be able to develop a common 
knowledge profile irrespective of the expertise of the membership in that group. The results 
over all groups represented in Table 5.18 suggest that this study is able to achieve its objectives 
of creating a knowledge mapping for universal element relationships that can be supported by 
the consensus determination of all participants.  
 
Although the results from Table 5.18 have all been designated as correlating with a High degree 
of consensus, it is necessary to perform more correlations in order to establish that the arbitrary 
rating scale of Table 5.17 is valid. To suitably substantiate a High degree of consensus, some 
relative comparisons considering both Medium and Low degrees of consensus are required.  
 
Table 5.19 provides a similar correlation comparison using the statistical median values over the 
same group profiles of Table 5.18. The consideration of the median as opposed to the mean 
provides another potential reference point for the notion of consensus; however unlike the 
statistical mean, the median does not consider a weighted value of the range of opinion. 
  
Table 5.19 Group standard profiles correlated against each other over the list of 288 
statistical medians representing combined value assessments 
 
Composite 
(n=26) 
SE 
(n=5) 
SS 
(n=14) 
SU 
(n=7) 
Composite (n=26) 1 0.91 0.96 0.94 
SE (n=5) 0.91 1 0.86 0.84 
SS (n=14) 0.96 0.86 1 0.91 
SU (n=7) 0.94 0.84 0.91 1 
 
From Table 5.19 the values for correlation are slightly lower than for the corresponding profiles 
using the statistical mean in Table 5.18. Using the determinations from within Table 5.17, the 
values in Table 5.19 range from Medium-High to High. This small decline in the degree of 
consensus suggests that the statistical mean is a more appropriate indicator than the median. 
 
Consideration of the statistical mode in Table 5.20 provides even lower values for correlation 
and suggests a lower degree of consensus. Only two values in Table 5.20 would be designated 
High while most other values for correlation are within the Medium-High range for consensus. 
While the statistical mode provides an indication for a centralised reference point across the 
assessment values within a group, this centralised reference point appears to be less 
representative as a common point of view across groups than the mean or median. 
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Table 5.20 Group standard profiles correlated against each other over the list of 288 
statistical mode representing combined value assessments 
 
Composite 
(n=26) 
SE 
(n=5) 
SS 
(n=14) 
SU 
(n=7) 
Composite (n=26) 1 0.88 0.89 0.83 
SE (n=5) 0.88 1 0.80 0.79 
SS (n=14) 0.89 0.80 1 0.78 
SU (n=7) 0.83 0.79 0.78 1 
 
The results from Table 5.18, Table 5.19 and Table 5.20 provide an indication as to why the use 
of the statistical mean is the best representative profile for the degree of consensus among group 
profiles. These tables show that the levels of correlation drop away from High consensus to 
Medium-Low as the statistical indicator is changed over the mean, the median and the mode.  
As the correlation-consensus determinations of Table 5.17 are arbitrary, the comparisons across 
Table 5.18, Table 5.19 and Table 5.20 provide a relative range that is indicative of degrees of 
consensus.  
 
In order to establish that the determination for High consensus from Table 5.17 are truly relative 
as opposed to Medium-High and Low-Medium determinations, correlations using individual 
respondent’s profiles against group standard profiles were performed. Table 5.21, Table 5.22, 
Table 5.23 and Table 5.24 provide group-based summaries from the correlation results of 
individual profiles against the profiles for the composite group, Security Experts, Security 
Students and Security Users respectively. It is of interest to note that the range of correlation 
values in Table 5.18 of 0.86 - 0.99 is significantly higher than the majority of the values 
obtained from correlations of individual profiles against the group profiles.  
 
Table 5.21 provides a summary of the results of the correlation of individual respondent’s 
profiles using 288 values, against the profile for the composite group of all respondents.  
The results of Table 5.21 have been presented and summarised by group. This summary 
provides a mean correlation value across the individuals in each group, the range for correlation 
values across the individuals in each group and the standard deviation of the individuals within 
each group. 
 
Table 5.21 The standard profile for all respondents as the composite group over 288 values 
against individual respondents presented as a summary by group 
 Group SE (n= 5) Group SS (n= 14) Group SU (n=7) 
Correlation for individual 
respondents (averaged) 
0.804 0.732 0.684 
Range of correlation for 
respondents 
0.754-0.851 0.612-0.881 0.361-0.810 
Standard Deviation of 
correlation for respondents 
0.045 0.080 0.157 
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Table 5.21 shows that the group of Security Experts provides the best overall correlation results 
with the lowest standard deviation and the smallest range. The averaged individual 
determination for the group Security Experts is of Medium-High degree of consensus.  
The determination for both the other groups is Low-Medium degree of consensus.  
It is of interest to note that the highest individual consensus value is from the Security Students 
group with 0.881. This may be due to large representative nature of Security Students 
membership in the composite group standard. It is also worth noting that for Table 5.21 the 
standard deviation increases by a factor of nearly 2 across the different groups, where in the 
example of Security Experts to Security Students, the standard deviation doubles and then 
doubles again from Security Students to Security Users. 
 
Table 5.22 considers the standard profile for the Security Expert group. This standard is the 
combination of members of the group that are expected to have a high uniformity of structure in 
their knowledge. The low standard deviation that exists across correlation values of the Security 
Expert group suggests that the conceptual structure of knowledge among the members of the 
group is largely uniform. This idea is further supported by the medium increase seen in standard 
deviation across the Security Students group and the larger increase seen in the standard 
deviation of the Security Users group. It is expected that Security Students will have a slightly 
less uniform knowledge structure than Security Experts, with a slightly more uniform structure 
than Security Users who would represent typical user knowledge of security products.  
 
Table 5.22 The standard profile considering the group Security Experts (SE) over 288 values 
against individual respondents presented as a summary by group 
 Group SE (n= 5) Group SS (n= 14) Group SU (n=7) 
Correlation for individual 
respondents (averaged) 
0.852 0.665 0.620 
Range of correlation for 
respondents 
0.804-0.888 0.515-0.863 0.257-0.750 
Standard Deviation of 
correlation for respondents 
0.032 0.109 0.176 
 
From Table 5.22 the correlation values that can be seen in the group Security Experts exhibit a 
determination with a Medium-High degree of consensus. The correlation value range of  
0.804 - 0.888 represents the highest individual correlation values for the research and 
corresponds to the group Security Experts. This is within research expectations as individuals 
would be expected to correlate well when compared to their own group standard profile.  
The lowest overall correlation value that can be seen in Table 5.22 of 0.257 from the Security 
Users group is the lowest correlation value evident across all groups and all individual profiles.  
 
The results of Table 5.22 can be compared to the value range in Table 5.18 of 0.94 - 0.99 
representing a High degree of consensus. The determinations in Table 5.22 can be seen to be 
   
 103 
more indicative of the range in degrees of consensus with values covering all four ranges  
High, Medium-High, Low-Medium and Low. As Table 5.17 seems to be appropriate in 
interpreting the level of consensus for Table 5.22, it would also seem to conclude that the 
determinations from Table 5.17 are appropriate for Table 5.18 which suggests that the degree of 
consensus in this research is High. 
 
Table 5.23 provides results from the summary of the correlation values of each individual 
respondent’s profile against the standard profile for the group Security Students (SS).  
This standard profile is expected to have a medium level of uniformity within the structure of its 
values. 
 
Table 5.23 The standard profile considering the group Security Students (SS) over 288 values 
against individual respondents presented as a summary by group 
 Group SE (n= 5) Group SS (n= 14) Group SU (n=7) 
Correlation for individual 
respondents (averaged) 
0.769 0.742 0.654 
Range of correlation for 
respondents 
0.712-0.828 0.614-0.872 0.329-0.781 
Standard Deviation of 
correlation for respondents 
0.052 0.076 0.158 
 
Table 5.23 indicates that even when the Security Student (SS) group standard is used, the 
Security Expert group provides the strongest evidence of correlation to the standard.  
The averaged correlation values for the Security Expert group and the Security Student group 
are very similar for Table 5.23 and are determined at the Medium-High degree of consensus. 
The range of correlation values from within the Security Users group is large and this further 
supports the notion that the structure of this standard profile is less uniform than the 
corresponding Security Expert standard profile.  
 
Table 5.24 provides results from a summary of the correlation output of individual respondents 
against the standard profile of the group Security Users. This standard profile is comprised from 
values of the group whose membership is expected to provide the lowest level of uniformity in 
the structure of its knowledge profile. It is interesting to note that the Security Expert group still 
holds the highest level of correlation and lowest standard deviation for this standard profile even 
though the standard is not considered to particularly originate from instruction or tuition.  
The determination in degree of consensus for this standard profile for Security Experts and 
Security Users is Medium-High and for Security Students is Low-Medium. 
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Table 5.24 The standard considering the group Security Users (SU) over 288 values against  
individual respondents presented as a summary by group 
 Group SE (n= 5) Group SS (n= 14) Group SU (n=7) 
Correlation for individual 
respondents (averaged) 
0.739 0.673 0.721 
Range of correlation for 
respondents 
0.688-0.782 0.591-0.803 0.468-0.824 
Standard Deviation of 
correlation for respondents 
0.040 0.067 0.125 
 
Some other indications from Table 5.24 suggest that even though this standard profile is not 
expected to contain a high level of conceptual uniformity, the correlation values are still similar 
enough to provide a High degree of consensus of this standard to the composite standard (0.95) 
as is evident in Table 5.18. Thus an extended suggestion to the method of this research is that in 
combining value assessments over a group of people, even when that group is not expected to 
have high expertise, this combined group opinion is likely to provide a High degree of 
consensus and act like a source of high expertise. 
  
It is evident from Table 5.21, Table 5.22, Table 5.23 and Table 5.24 that individuals generally 
correlate best when considered against the representative group profile of their own group.  
For an example members of the group Security Experts correlate at 0.852 (mean correlation of 
all members) when the standard profile for SE group is used. It has been pointed out that the 
group Security Experts also correlates the strongest over the entire range of group standards. 
This is most likely attributed to the uniform knowledge structures that can be gained through 
professional exposure and academic instruction. The next strongest group to correlate to each of 
the standard profiles is the group Security Students for nearly all cases except when the Security 
Users group standard is used. These results show a clear trend toward uniform structures in the 
professional acquisition of knowledge tending towards higher degrees of consensus in 
knowledge structures.  
 
The comparison of group standard profiles and individual respondent’s profiles uses the same 
method of correlation. The indications from Table 5.18 and Table 5.21 suggest that the 
composite group standard profile provides the strongest correlation for all respondents. 
Therefore the most appropriate group profile to represent the highest degree of consensus 
among participants of this study is the composite group profile. This study suggests that the 
statistical mean values contain the appropriate properties for profiling over the entire group of 
respondents. This composite profile represents an optimum in consensus for this study and 
provides validity for the data in the matrices of the knowledge structure. Thus the knowledge 
structures presented in Appendix G1 through to Appendix G8 may be seen as valid 
representations of expert opinion within the limitations of the research. 
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5.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has presented the results of the study in two sections. The sections are designed to 
firstly process the data that has been obtained from the research questionnaires, and secondly 
analyse the data to create knowledge matrices and validate the data to determine the degree of 
consensus with the results. The first section of this chapter considers the processing raw data of 
the research and the second considers the analysis of the data.  
 
The section on processing the raw data considers the path of the data from the respondent to a 
computer database. The feedback components of the questionnaire are summarised for their 
relevance to the study and have been identified from comments of respondents. These relate to 
the relative ordering of the universal elements as well as identifying extended element lists for 
the concept continuums.  
 
The section on the analysis of the data considers the knowledge structures of the universal 
elements of the research and identifies values for the universal element relationships from expert 
opinion. The different groups of respondents are identified for the purposes of data collection 
and the composite group that contains value assessments from all respondents is recognised as 
the most appropriate group representing the highest degree of consensus. The use of statistical 
means to create profiles for each respondent group forms the content of the knowledge matrices. 
This is identified as one of the objectives of the study. 
 
The technique of correlation is applied across the different groups within the study in order to 
establish the degree of variation in knowledge profiles. This demonstrates that the data proposed 
in the knowledge matrices is representative of knowledge in the area of physical security.  
The correlations applied over the different category groups of the study have determined that 
there is a High degree of consensus within the data collected from the different groups of the 
research and this suggests that the information within the knowledge matrices contains the 
properties of both validity and reliability.  
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6  Interpretation and discussion of the results 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter looks at the results of this study and provides a discussion with an interpretation of 
the conceptual mapping as one of the main research objectives. A suggestion for modelling of 
the results is introduced in this chapter based on a novel proposal that incorporates a 
mathematical approach using tangent functions for holistic modelling of physical security.  
This well known trigonometric function is able to be used to assess effectiveness between 
dissimilar conceptual entities as conceptual maps presented for the concepts of delay 
probability, detection probability and response probability. For this chapter the interpretations 
of the results have been divided into two areas for consideration. The first area considers an 
application of the results modelled considering a physical security environment. The second part 
recognises the method used in the research and considers the general form of this method to 
potentially be applicable outside the field of physical security. 
 
A series of figures are presented in this chapter that describe the attributes of conceptual 
mappings of physical security functions. Special consideration is given to two suggested 
attributes that are able to produce the shape of the delay probability, detection probability and 
response probability curves. These attributes can be identified as the gradient of a generated 
curve and the lateral shift of each curve. In order to represent the universal elements of a facility 
in a physical security arrangement, distinct values have been selected from each of the Sections 
A-E of the knowledge matrices discussed in Chapter 5. These have been incorporated into an 
empirical model that derives a gradient and a lateral shift for representative tangent curves.  
 
A series of test cases have been presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the model when 
selecting values from each of the knowledge matrices and providing interpretations relating to 
physical security. As relative assessments of effectiveness in specific arrangements of physical 
security, these test cases are discussed for their relative implications in assessing physical 
security scenarios. Particular regard is given to both the output of the model and the required 
parameter inputs for the model. A brief discussion has also been presented in the interpretation 
of the research. This considers that the objectives of this study such as the development of 
knowledge matrices may be applicable to the wider community. Although the primary focus of 
the research has been within the field of physical security, some of the methods that have been 
presented in this study may achieve the reduction of complexity with effective modelling in 
other disciplines that exhibit high levels of complexity within their systems. This chapter 
provides some comment on the transferability of the method. 
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The first aspect of the interpretation of the results seeks to determine the effectiveness of 
physical security arrangements via the consideration of distinct physical security attributes. 
These attributes are able to be derived from values in the knowledge matrices to represent 
simple relationship likelihood functions for the dissimilar entities of delay, detection and 
response. Effectiveness measures of different combinations of the universal elements can be 
determined for each of these dissimilar entities through the conceptual mapping of relationships 
of physical security functions. The eight knowledge matrices of this research have mapped a set 
of universal elements into structures.. The data for this is located in the first five matrices from 
the research objectives labelled Sections A-E. These knowledge matrices are available for 
further viewing as Appendix G1 through to Appendix G5.  
 
The second aspect of the interpretation of the results considers the method of inquiry and the 
techniques of this research as a foundation for providing an alternative means to establish 
knowledge structures and providing the potential for modelling in other complex fields of 
research and investigation. While the knowledge mapping is valid only over the boundary 
conditions of this research, the method that has established the knowledge structures could be 
conceptually applied to other disciplines and similar modelling techniques adapted for the 
content of knowledge matrices. In this way the research has a wider application than may be 
evident from identifying the objectives in terms of physical security. 
 
This study has based its method of inquiry as an investigative approach into the complex 
relationships of physical security universal elements. This investigation into the knowledge 
matrices for physical security scenario assessments provides for another of the study’s 
objectives. 
6.2 Interpretations within the field of physical security 
This research has established a conceptual mapping by measuring expert opinion for universal 
element relationships. The relationship values have been determined from expert opinion and 
can derive functions of defence in depth describing delay, detection and response. In seeking to 
establish one of its objectives, the research attempts to evaluate the overall risk to security 
through a conceptual mapping. The overall regard for any facility can be recognised through a 
consideration for individual regions of a facility containing a set of recognisable elements.  
A combination of elemental values from the conceptual mapping is able to provide a relative 
effectiveness for an overall risk to physical security by generating tangent curves representing 
delay probability, detection probability, and response probability. In order to determine a single 
value for the overall risk to a facility, the terms suitable and unsuitable need to be defined in 
relation to the functions of defence in depth.  
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A conceptual map identifying risk curves for the terms delay probability and detection 
probability has been presented in the example of Figure 6.1. The series of curves in Figure 6.1 
have been established relative to a horizontal axis that uses time as its scale (has an origin but no 
end) and vertical axes which considers a percentage of probability (or likelihood) along its 
scale. The intersections of these presented curves define a set of quadrants where each 
representation of probability is further separated into two effective regions suitable and 
unsuitable. In a real-world scenario the regions corresponding to each of the quadrants will be 
influenced by a combination of the defence systems of any facility and also by the total 
resources of a potential attacker. A mapping of this combination of influences will determine 
the shape of the curves and therefore determine the total area available for each quadrant.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Conceptual diagram for delay probability and detection probability 
 
Delay probability is presented as a concept in the physical security model of Figure 6.1 where 
the path of an attack through a facility and therefore the delay is defined by the relationship of a 
facility’s barrier system to the resources of an attacker. Delay probability effectiveness may be 
considered as suitable only while the likelihood exists that an attack does not defeat a barrier 
system. As time increments from t=0 (the origin of time) onwards, the curve for delay 
probability commences at 100% suitable and decreases to 0% or unsuitable after some elapsed 
increment of time. In Figure 6.1 it can be seen that Quadrant 1 and Quadrant 2 represent the 
regions of the conceptual map that contain suitable delay. This can be defined as the region 
commencing from t=0 bounded in time by the curve representing delay probability for all 
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values along t. Quadrant 3 and Quadrant 4 in this case represent the regions for unsuitable 
delay.   
 
Detection probability is presented as a concept in the physical security model of Figure 6.1 
where a security system is able to detect that a breach of physical security has occurred.  
The effectiveness of detection probability may be considered as suitable only after a correct 
response to an attack can be generated. As time increments from t=0 onwards, the curve for 
detection probability commences at 0% suitability and will increase over time after an attack 
depending upon both the attack resources and the ability of the detection systems in place. 
Suitability will eventually approach 100% after some elapsed time interval for any attack. 
  
It is assumed that without a detection system there is infinite time available to breach physical 
security systems. In Figure 6.1 it can be seen that Quadrant 2 and Quadrant 3 represent the 
regions of the conceptual map that contain suitable detection. This region is bounded by the 
curve representing detection probability and continues for all values for t increasing along the 
time axis. Quadrant 4 and Quadrant 1 in this case represent the regions for unsuitable detection. 
This region commences at t=0 and is bounded by the curve for detection probability.  
 
The main interpretation from Figure 6.1 for describing the risk estimate of the overall 
effectiveness of physical security suggests that when a larger region for Quadrant 2 exists, the 
better the overall effectiveness of physical security. In comparison when a larger region of 
Quadrant 4 exists, a poorer overall effectiveness for physical security will result. Figure 6.1 also 
identifies an optimum region (or point) of effectiveness for physical security determined by the 
intersection of the curves for delay probability and detection probability. Increasing this 
intersection point maximising Quadrant 2 and minimising Quadrant 4 corresponds to increasing 
the probability value. Similarly decreasing this intersection point in probability value effectively 
corresponds to minimising Quadrant 2 and maximising Quadrant 4. 
6.3 Conceptual mappings as a description of the phenomenon 
In a scenario-type example, delay probability could be expressed in terms of attack time (t), 
where as t approaches zero, the corresponding ability for a facility to delay an attack is closest to 
100% for all barrier systems and the detection probability is closest to 0%. As t gradually 
increases, delay will remain at 100% until an attack is able to compromise the barrier system. 
For example poorer barrier systems and better attacker resources will lower the ability of the 
barrier causing the delay curve to approach 0% more rapidly in time. In a similar manner the 
detection probability can also be expressed in terms of the attack time (t) and the likelihood of 
detection can be described commencing at 0% and increasing in time to approach 100%.  
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For example better detection systems and poorer attack resources will increase the likelihood of 
detection causing a more rapid approach to 100%. 
 
Figure 6.2 presents a single case using a delay probability curve and a detection probability 
curve of a hypothetical facility with a demonstrated optimum point of effectiveness for physical 
security. The examples illustrate the intersection points of the curves. This point is dependent 
upon the gradient of each curve as well as the relative start of each curve and end of each curve 
along the axis for time.  
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Figure 6.2: Conceptual diagram for delay probability and detection probability 
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To consider the effects of the curve representing detection probability, Figure 6.3 presents a 
case for improved overall effectiveness of the original facility arrangement where the curve for 
delay probability has been kept constant to that of Figure 6.2 and the curve for detection 
probability has been altered so that the gradient between 0% and 100% is much steeper.  
This results in the optimum point of effectiveness increasing along the vertical axis and a 
corresponding larger region for Quadrant 2. The curve for detection probability, although much 
steeper in gradient than the detection probability curve in Figure 6.2, begins at the same point 
along the axis of time. The change in the intersection point between the two graphs signifies a 
large increase in the effectiveness of the physical security arrangement over the facility in  
Figure 6.3. An electronic computer controlled system such as a microwave detection system 
may provide a real-life example of a curve for a detection system that might steeply change 
from 0% detection to 100% detection. 
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Figure 6.3: Conceptual diagram for delay probability and detection probability 
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In Figure 6.4 the curve for delay probability has been kept constant once more. The curve for 
detection probability has the same gradient as the original facility’s detection probability curve 
of Figure 6.2, however it has been shifted laterally so that now the curve approaches the origin 
at t=0. By shifting the whole curve closer to the origin on the axis of time, the point of 
intersection of the two curves has increased relative to Figure 6.2. This means that the optimum 
point of the conceptual map has increased compared to the intersection point in Figure 6.2 
which therefore corresponds to larger region for Quadrant 2. While in this example the curve for 
detection probability from 0% to 100% has a more gradual slope to that of Figure 6.3, the 
concept mapping suggests that an earlier detection capability achieves the same outcome of 
increased effectiveness in overall security. For a real-world example of this type of curve, where 
early signs of an attack may be detected but cannot be necessarily confirmed until more 
evidence is received (dictating a more gradual slope), could be conceptualised as a CCTV 
system. 
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Figure 6.4: Conceptual diagram for delay probability and detection probability 
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In Figure 6.5 the curve for delay probability is again unchanged. The curve for detection 
probability in this case has been shifted taking the curve further from the origin and opposite in 
direction to the example of Figure 6.4,. The gradient of the curve remains the same as the curve 
for detection probability in Figure 6.2, however by shifting the whole curve further from the 
origin, the point of intersection has decreased relative to Figure 6.2. This decrease in the 
optimum point represents poorer overall effectiveness of physical security in the conceptual 
map and presents a smaller corresponding region for Quadrant 2. The conceptual map in  
Figure 6.5 provides an example of the detection probability shifted along the axis of time.  
The real world equivalent may be synonymous with not having the benefit of early detection of 
an attack or fast action after initial warning signs of an attack. An example of this type of 
detection system may include a mobile security patrol, where the human ability to detect is 
based on several parameters such as experience, competence, patrol schedules and 
communication equipment. 
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Figure 6.5: Conceptual diagram for delay probability and detection probability 
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In Figure 6.6 the curve for delay probability has now changed while the curve for detection 
probability has been returned as the same curve as that of Figure 6.2. The gradient of the curve 
for delay probability has decreased creating a more gradual curve from 100% towards 0%.  
By decreasing the gradient of this curve, the point of intersection has increased relative to 
Figure 6.2. This results in the optimum point of the conceptual map increasing and a 
corresponding larger region for Quadrant 2. A barrier system that may fit this example to 
provide a longer gentler curve would be a substance with high material strength that takes a long 
time to defeat by force which may include substances like reinforced concrete. The gradient for 
this example suggests that while localised parts of concrete can be damaged through force, 
reinforced concrete will maintain most of its barrier qualities and the corresponding suitability 
of the defence will be somewhere between 100% to 0% over a period of time. 
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Figure 6.6: Conceptual diagram for delay probability and detection probability 
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In Figure 6.7 the curve for detection probability is the same as the curve from Figure 6.2 and the 
curve for delay probability has now been shifted along the time axis so that the 100% starting 
point of the curve begins further from the origin (t=0). The gradient of the curve is the same as 
the curve for delay probability in Figure 6.2, however by shifting the whole curve further from 
the origin, the point of intersection has increased relative to Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.6.  
This represents an increase in overall effectiveness for physical security. For this example the 
shift along the axis away from the origin suggests that the initial difficulties to defeat the barrier 
require significant attacker resources. A real-life example of this kind may include a strong 
sheet metal fence that is difficult to climb or defeat with force but may be defeated with 
specialised cutting devices that take a longer period of time to set up. 
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Figure 6.7: Conceptual diagram for delay probability and detection probability 
 
The real-world suggestions that have been provided in the examples are simply meant to 
illustrate an application of the conceptual maps and are not meant to be accurate representations. 
The conceptual maps in Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.7 have been presented to demonstrate changes to 
the optimum point for overall effectiveness of physical security through a combination of the 
dissimilar entities of delay probability and detection probability. These conceptual maps have 
also been used as an example to consider the four quadrants defining suitability. 
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6.4 A novel proposal for holistic modelling  
This section presents a novel approach to simulating the curves of delay probability, detection 
probability and response probability through an interpretative model. The model will be 
presented to initially consider the curves of delay probability and detection probability in order 
to simulate an inter-relation between these dissimilar conceptual entities. The inter-relation will 
be determined as the intersection point of the two curves and will represent the relative 
effectiveness of a physical security arrangement. Seven test cases have been applied to the 
model. The model has also been extended to simulate a three way inter-relationship between the 
measures of delay probability, detection probability and response probability in order to assess 
effectiveness between these three dissimilar conceptual entities. Several more test cases have 
been considered to interpret the model’s applicability within the knowledge matrices and to 
real-world scenarios 
 
The model is initially presented in an attempt to consider the curves of delay probability and 
detection probability to simulate an inter-relational reference measure between these dissimilar 
conceptual entities. The inter-relational measure will be defined as the intersection point of 
these two curves and will represent the relative effectiveness in risk of a series of physical 
security arrangements.  
 
The novel concept for a model in this paper is based on mathematical tangent functions and it 
has been presented in the absence of any similar type of modelling available in literature.  
The tangent function commonly used in trigonometry (for right angles triangles) can be graphed 
as a function of angle (θ). Figure 1 displays a family of tangent curves for tan θ, where θ is 
considered from -90° to 90 with further data available in Appendix I.  
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Figure 6.8: A representative family of tangent curves 
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It is proposed that the tangent curve is able to represent the curves of delay probability and 
detection probability as interrelating approximations based on the particular shape attributes of 
the conceptual maps with examples provided in Figure 6.8. The family of tangent curves can be 
written as: 
   T =  m tan θ + b 
 
The examples in Figure 6.8 are as follows: 
   T = tan θ   for (-90° < θ < 90°)  
T = 5 tan θ  for (-90° < θ < 90°) 
T = 10 tan θ  for (-90° < θ < 90°) 
T = 5 tan θ + 50  for (-90° < θ < 90°) 
T = 5 tan θ + 10  for (-90° < θ < 90°) 
 
The angles of θ are considered across the horizontal axis between -90° and 90° (which can also 
be written mathematically as -π/2 < θ < π/2). In Figure 6.8 the gradient (or slope) of the tangent 
curve is determined by the multiplying coefficient m preceding the tangent functions, and the 
lateral shift along a relative axis (T) determined by the value of the constant b. 
 
A striking similarity exists between the attributes of the curves in the conceptual maps proposed 
in Figures 6.1 to Figure 6.7 with the family of tangent curves represented in Figure 6.8.  
The similarity is identified as the transfer between a relative maximum (minimum) value to a 
relative minimum (maximum) value via a variable gradient with an extended tapering toward 
both the maximum and minimum points. In order to apply the tangent function to represent the 
curves of the concept maps in Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.7, a suitable translation between graphs is 
needed that identify corresponding axes. The axis that represents probability along the vertical 
axis in Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.7 for example as 100% to 0% would need to correspond to the 
range of angles (over θ) from -90° to 90° in Figure 6.8. The most appropriate translation of this 
axis is: 90° equates to 100% probability, 45° equates to 75% probability, 0° equates to 50% 
probability, -45° equates to 25% probability, -90° equates to 0% probability. The remaining 
relative axis determined by the value of the constant b is able to represent time from a zero 
origin onwards. 
 
This study further proposes that the matrices containing value assessments reported in the 
results are able to be supply the data for each individual tangent function. The intersection point 
of the tangent functions is the indicator that is able to provide a measurement of relative 
effectiveness over arrangements of physical security. The modelling of tangent functions using 
data from the knowledge matrices is an interpretation of the results of this research and fulfils 
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one of the objectives of the study. The numerical values that appear in the matrices for each 
element pair providing relationship measures are relative indications of value over each specific 
boundary condition described in Sections A-H of the research questionnaire. Each boundary 
condition considers relationship values of universal elements with respect to physical security 
relational descriptors and the function of defence in depth.  
6.4.1 Simple Model 
In the model a combination of universal elements from each function of defence in depth has 
been used to represent the gradient component m of each tangent curve. It is suggested from 
Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.7 that for delay probability, a combination of stronger barriers coupled 
with poorer attacker resources (i.e. a higher ranking of universal elements in their overall benefit 
to security), would suggest a more gradual curve between a delay probability of 100% and 0% 
over the axis of time. Thus for the representation, the higher the values substituted for m, the 
more gradual the curve of the tangent function. In a similar way the combination of better 
detection systems coupled with poorer attacker resources (i.e. a higher ranking of universal 
elements in their overall benefit to security), would produce a steeper curve between the 
detection probabilities of 0% and 100% over the axis of time. Therefore it is proposed that the 
lower the value substituted for m for detection probability, the steeper the curve of the tangent 
function. The conceptual representations from Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.7 have proposed that the 
region for Quadrant 1 indicates suitability for delay probability and increases as its 
representative curve is shifted along the time axis away from the origin at t=0.  
Figure 6.1 also proposes that as suitability increases in the region for Quadrant 3, detection 
probability as a curve is shifted along the time axis towards the origin at t=0.  
 
The following relationships will hold for the model based on the data contained within the 
knowledge matrices: 
• The relative benefit to physical security increases for both Section A and Section B 
knowledge matrices as the values in both of the matrices increases. Thus an additive 
combination of Section A and Section B values determine relatively higher values for m. 
• The relative benefit to physical security increases for Section D as values in the matrix 
increase, while in contrast the relative benefit to physical security decreases as values in the 
Section C knowledge matrix increase. An additive combination of Section D with an 
inverse of Section C values determines relatively higher values for m.  
• The horizontal intercepts of the tangent curve’s b constant shift will be identified by a 
multiplicative combination of Section A and Section B values for delay probability.  
• A multiplicative combination of Section D and Section C values will determine a b constant 
shift value for the detection probability tangent curve.  
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The following model is presented as Figure 6.9 and has been empirically determined to present 
a method of mathematical combination for the dissimilar concepts of delay and detection using 
values within the knowledge matrices determined in this study. The principle functions of 
defence in depth present a relative level of effectiveness for any physical security arrangement. 
The test cases that follow the model in Figure 6.9 demonstrate the applicability of the research 
data through the knowledge matrices in the proposed model.  
 
This conceptual model uses tangent functions from -90° < θ < 90° to represent delay 
probability and detection probability and obtains its data from the knowledge matrices of the 
research labelled Section A through to Section D. 
 
For Delay Probability tangent function T =  m tan θ + b: 
Let m value = (Section A) + (Section B)    (minimum 0, maximum 34.6) 
Let b value = - (Section A) * (Section B)    (minimum -299.29, maximum 0) 
 
For Detection Probability tangent function T =  m tan θ + b: 
Let m value = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D)     (minimum -34.6, maximum 0) 
Let b value =((17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D)) – (299.29 / 2)   (minimum -150, maximum 0) 
 
Then Probability for Effectiveness (PE) for overall benefit to physical security is given (along 
T and θ) by: 
PE = Delay Probability ∩ Detection Probability 
Figure 6.9: A model for the representation of the effectiveness of physical security using 
tangent functions 
 
To establish the validity of this proposed model a series of test cases have been considered 
based on a series of defensive-type universal elements of this study. For the series of examples 
labelled Test Case 1 to Test Case 7, the input to the model will be selected from averaged values 
of universal elements in the knowledge matrices for Section A through to Section D.  
Using these values the model is able to demonstrate the relationship between delay probability 
and detection probability.  
 
A brief consideration of the defensive-type universal elements available in the knowledge 
matrices suggests that for the averaged values of the universal elements (averaged values over 
all listed attack-type elements in the orthogonal continuum), there are six potential tangent 
functions along a single concept continuum for the detection probability curves and thirty six 
potential tangent functions along two concept continuums for delay probability curves.  
The test cases have been specifically chosen to demonstrate the range of output of the model.  
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In order to directly compare the output of the test cases, several input parameters will be held 
constant over the series of cases while other parameters are altered slightly to provide an 
indication of how the model responds to variation.  
 
For all of the conceptual graphs in the test cases, a “theta (degrees) - probability shared axis (P)” 
will be considered from -90° < θ < 90° along the tangent curves representing physical security 
effectiveness. For all conceptual graphs -90° corresponds to 0% probability and 90° corresponds 
to 100% probability. The conceptual graphs are limited to providing relative information with 
the intersection points of the various curves. Thus numbers on the “theta (degrees) - probability 
shared axis (P)” have been provided for relative indications only.  
6.4.1.1 Test Case 1: Worst Case Scenario 
Identifying the worst case scenario of poor delay and poor detection values of physical security 
effectiveness in the knowledge matrices (averaged values over all listed attack-type elements in 
the orthogonal continuum). Considering the defensive-type universal elements we can assign 
values for: 
1. Section A, where the lowest averaged strength value is 0.46 (e.g. high percentage of glass in 
the structure).  
2. Section B, where the lowest averaged material dimensions value is 0.76 (e.g. equivalent to a 
3 human high steel small mesh fence). 
3. Section C, where the highest averaged detection value is 11.71 (e.g. chance detection). 
4. Section D, where the lowest averaged detection value is 8.95 (e.g. chance detection). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.9. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 1.22  
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -0.35 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -20.06 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -99.61 
 
Figure 6.10 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 1 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection point is approximately -78°. 
   
 121 
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
theta (degrees) - probability shared axis (P)
T
a
n
 t
h
e
ta
 -
 T
im
e
 s
h
a
re
d
 a
x
is
 (
T
)
delay probability curve
detection probability curve
 
Figure 6.10 Test Case 1: A conceptual map for demonstrating worst case scenario effectiveness 
of physical security 
 
The example for Test Case 1 presents the worst case of averaged values from the knowledge 
matrices. The worst case intersection point of approximately -78° can be used as a reference 
indicator for the other test cases. Any other test cases with intersection points in the vicinity of 
this value will represent a poor physical security arrangement. In consideration of the proposed 
quadrants of Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.7, the corresponding Quadrant 2 equivalent in the conceptual 
graph of Figure 6.10 would equate to a very small region. 
6.4.1.2 Test Case 2: Best Case Scenario 
Identifying the best case scenario of strong delay and strong detection values of physical 
security effectiveness in the knowledge matrices (averaged values over all listed attack-type 
elements in the orthogonal continuum). Considering the defensive-type universal elements we 
can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where the highest averaged strength value is 9.05 (e.g. high percentage of steel 
structure). 
2. Section B, where the highest averaged material dimensions value is 7.22 (e.g. 5 human high 
steel small mesh with razor wire).  
3. Section C, where the lowest averaged detection value is 4.62 (e.g. multiple detection 
systems). 
4. Section D, where the highest averaged detection value is 9.35 (e.g. multiple detection 
systems). 
 
 
 
   
 122 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.9. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 16.27  
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -65.34 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -12.57 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -31.09 
 
Figure 6.11 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 2 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection point at approximately 50°. 
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Figure 6.11 Test Case 2: A conceptual map for demonstrating best case scenario effectiveness 
of physical security 
 
The example for Test Case 2 presents the best case scenario of averaged values from the 
knowledge matrices. The best case intersection point of approximately 50° can be used as a 
reference indicator in conjunction with the result for Test Case 1 as the worst case scenario.  
All test cases with intersection points in the vicinity of 50° will represent a good physical 
security arrangement. In comparison to Figure 6.10 the Quadrant 2 area in Figure 6.11 equates 
to a much larger region. 
 
The results of Test Case 1 and Test Case 2 suggest that the output of the model should display 
effectiveness indications between the two reference indicators of -78° and 50° for each delay 
probability - detection probability intersection point. 
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6.4.1.3 Test Case 3: Medium – Strong Case Scenario 
Identifying a case for medium to strong delay and medium to strong detection values of physical 
security effectiveness in the knowledge matrices (averaged values over all listed attack-type 
elements in the orthogonal continuum). Considering the defensive-type universal elements we 
can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high averaged strength value is 5.63 (e.g. high percentage of brick 
structure). 
2. Section B, where a high averaged material dimensions value is 6.58 (e.g. 5 human high 
smooth brick wall).  
3. Section C, where a low averaged detection value is 4.84 (e.g. infrared detection). 
4. Section D, where a high averaged detection value is 8.78 (e.g. infrared detection). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.9. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 12.21  
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -37.05 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -13.36 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -40.25 
 
Figure 6.12 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 3 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection point at approximately -7°. 
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Figure 6.12 Test Case 3: A conceptual map for demonstrating medium – strong case scenario 
effectiveness of physical security 
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The example for Test Case 3 presents a medium to strong case of averaged values from the 
knowledge matrices. The intersection point of approximately -7° can be considered with the 
results of Test Case 4 and Test Case 5 that both provide slight changes in parameter input to the 
model. The single parameter that has been altered for Test Case 4 assumes a slightly lower 
barrier height than Test Case 3.  
 
6.4.1.4 Test Case 4: Medium Case Scenario 
Identifying a case for strong delay (however slightly weaker than Test Case 3 with a slightly 
lower barrier height) and strong detection values of physical security effectiveness in the 
knowledge matrices (averaged values over all listed attack-type elements in the orthogonal 
continuum). Considering the defensive-type universal elements we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high averaged strength value is 5.63 (e.g. high percentage of brick 
structure). 
2. Section B, where a high averaged material dimensions value is 3.52 (e.g. 3 human high 
smooth brick wall).  
3. Section C, where a low averaged detection value is 4.84 (e.g. infrared detection). 
4. Section D, where a high averaged detection value is 8.78 (e.g. infrared detection). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.9. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 9.15  
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -19.82 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -13.36 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -40.25 
 
Figure 6.13 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 4 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection crosses at -41°. 
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Figure 6.13 Test Case 4: A conceptual map for demonstrating medium case scenario 
effectiveness of physical security 
 
With the slight reduction in barrier height of Test Case 4 sees Figure 6.13 identifying the 
corresponding output of the model as an intersection point of approximately -41°.  
This can be compared against the Test Case 3 of -7° and it is evident that a drop in the barrier 
height causes the model to significantly lower the intersection point of the curves and indicate a 
significantly reduced effectiveness of the physical security arrangement.  
 
This result can also be compared against the absolute reference indicators of Test Case 1 and 
Test Case 2. This comparison suggests that the significant reduction in effectiveness of physical 
security is able to indicate how Test Case 4 compares as a much poorer arrangement for 
effectiveness that the corresponding arrangement of Test Case 3. 
6.4.1.5 Test Case 5: Medium – Weak Case Scenario 
Identifying a case for strong delay (same as for Test Case 3) and medium detection values of 
physical security effectiveness in the knowledge matrices (averaged values over all listed attack-
type elements in the orthogonal continuum). Considering the defensive-type universal elements 
we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high averaged strength value is 5.63 (e.g. high percentage of brick 
structure). 
2. Section B, where a high averaged material dimensions value is 6.58 (e.g. 5 human high 
smooth brick wall).  
3. Section C, where a medium averaged detection value is 8.09 (e.g. closed circuit TV). 
4. Section D, where a medium averaged detection value is 7.23 (e.g. closed circuit TV). 
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These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.9. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 12.21  
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -37.05 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -18.16 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -83.06 
 
Figure 6.14 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 5 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection point at approximately -58°. 
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Figure 6.14 Test Case 5: A conceptual map for demonstrating medium – weak case scenario 
effectiveness of physical security 
 
The delay probability parameters of Test Case 5 are the same as Test Case 3; however a change 
in detection parameter input has significantly reduced the intersection point of the two curves in 
Figure 6.14 to -58°. This can then be considered relative to the output of the model in  
Figure 6.12 of approximately -7°. Both values can be compared with the Test Case 4 
intersection point of approximately -41°. The moderate reduction in detection probability causes 
the model to significantly lower the intersection point of the two curves and therefore indicate a 
significantly reduced effectiveness of the physical security arrangement. The model suggests 
that this change of detection system presents a relatively poorer level of effectiveness than a 
lower barrier height. 
   
 127 
6.4.1.6 Test Case 6: Medium Case Scenario II 
Identifying a test case for medium delay (low strength but tall wire mesh barriers) and strong 
detection values of physical security effectiveness using data in the knowledge matrices. 
Considering the defensive-type universal elements we can assign values for:  
1. Section A, where a low averaged strength value is 3.75 (e.g. the equivalent in this case is a 
high percentage of wood in the structure). 
2. Section B, where the lowest averaged material dimensions value is 7.22 (e.g. equivalent to 5 
human high steel small mesh with razor wire).  
3. Section C, where the highest averaged detection value is 4.53 (e.g. microwave detection 
systems). 
4. Section D, where the lowest averaged detection value is 8.86 (e.g. microwave detection 
systems). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.9. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 10.97 
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -27.08 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -12.97 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -36.50 
 
Figure 6.15 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 6 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection point at approximately -21°. 
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Figure 6.15 Test Case 6: A conceptual map for demonstrating medium case scenario 
effectiveness of physical security 
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Test Case 5 represented in Figure 6.15 can be loosely compared to the previous test cases with 
an intersection point of approximately -21°. The output of the model suggests for this example, 
that the effectiveness of the physical security arrangement is inferior to Test Case 3 but superior 
to Test Case 4.  
6.4.1.7 Test Case 7: Medium Case Scenario III 
Identifying a test case for strong delay (high strength and tall wire mesh barriers) and medium 
detection values of physical security effectiveness in the knowledge matrices (averaged values 
over all listed attack-type elements in the orthogonal continuum). Considering the defensive-
type universal elements we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a low averaged strength value is 9.05 (e.g. equivalent to a high percentage 
of steel in the structure). 
2. Section B, where the lowest averaged material dimensions value is 7.22 (e.g. equivalent to 5 
human high steel small mesh with razor wire).  
3. Section C, where the highest averaged detection value is 9.47 (e.g. mobile human guard). 
4. Section D, where the lowest averaged detection value is 8.88 (e.g. mobile human guard). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.9. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 16.27 
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -65.34 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -17.89 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -80.11 
 
Figure 6.16 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 7 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection point at approximately -24°. 
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Figure 6.16 Test Case 7: A conceptual map for demonstrating medium case scenario 
effectiveness of physical security 
 
It can be seen from Test Case 1 to Test Case 7 that the model provides reasonable indications 
for relative effectiveness of physical security arrangements. This research acknowledges that 
indications by the model for relative effectiveness may find only partial acceptance among all 
security practitioners. It should be remembered however, that the model that has been presented 
uses input data that has undergone analysis that has considered a High degree of consensus and 
potentially representing common knowledge. The knowledge matrices have provided data to the 
model of the study, based on the relationships between universal elements as reference levels on 
concept continuums. The model has demonstrated that this data provides relative indications of 
physical security effectiveness. To be able to include the concept of response probability into 
the determination for effectiveness, an extension to the model is now considered. 
6.4.2 Extended Model 
The defence in depth function of response is a concept that is has been recognised by this study 
as strongly dependent on the detection probability. This means that for a proposed response 
probability to be suitable, the defence in depth function of detection in a physical security 
scenario must have already occurred. The shape of the curve of response probability would 
ideally be very similar to the shape of the curve for detection where as t gradually increases 
response will commence at 0% probability increasing to 100% in time. The notion of response 
probability is also co-dependent on the defence in depth function of delay as response 
probability will only be suitable if an attack on a facility is delayed over a sufficient period of 
time for the response action to be commenced.  
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This co-dependency will generate a series of curves for response between 0% and 100%.  
The model suggests that with better response systems the curve’s gradient increases achieving 
100% in less time after detection. Conversely poorer response systems decreases the curve’s 
gradient over time. For the purpose of an extension to the model, response probability has been 
interconnected to the detection probability curve through a common b value and interconnected 
with the delay probability curve at its intersection point which has been designated as the point 
representing overall effectiveness and benefit to physical security. It is worth noting that as 
values in the knowledge matrix of Section E decrease, the benefit to security increases. 
Therefore a strong response to an attack on physical security will have a corresponding low 
value from the matrix. 
 
An extension to the model provided in Figure 6.9 is presented as Figure 6.17. The extended 
model has been empirically determined to present a method giving a mathematical combination 
for the dissimilar concepts of delay, detection and response selecting values from within the 
knowledge matrices determined in this study. The two test cases following Figure 6.17 
demonstrate a further interpretation of the data in the knowledge matrices of the research. 
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This conceptual model uses tangent functions from -90° < θ < 90° to represent delay 
probability, detection probability and response probability and obtains its data from the 
knowledge matrices of the research labelled Section A through to Section E.  
 
For Delay Probability tangent function T =  m tan θ + b: 
Let m value = (Section A) + (Section B)    (minimum 0, maximum 34.6) 
Let b value = - (Section A) * (Section B)    (minimum -299.29, maximum 0) 
 
For Detection Probability tangent function T =  m tan θ + b: 
Let m value = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D)  (minimum -34.6, maximum 0) 
Let b value =((17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D)) – (299.29 / 2) (minimum -150, maximum 0) 
 
For Response Probability tangent function T =  m tan θ + b: 
Let m value = - (Section A) * (Section B) * ((17.3 / (Section E)) - 1)  
    (minimum -5180, maximum 0) 
Let b value =((17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D)) – (299.29 / 2) (minimum -150, maximum 0) 
 
Then Probability for Effectiveness (PE) for overall benefit to physical security is given (along 
T and θ) by: 
PE = (Delay Probability ∩ Detection Probability), (Delay Probability ∩ Response Probability) 
Figure 6.17 An extended model for the representation of the effectiveness of physical security 
using tangent functions 
 
To establish the validity of the extended model, two test cases will be considered for the 
defensive-type universal elements of this study and a further four test cases will be available for 
consideration in the appendices. The examples presented in the text will be labelled Test Case 8 
and Test Case 9. The input to the model will be selected from the values of universal elements 
in the knowledge matrices of Sections A through to Section E (see Appendices G1-G5).  
The test cases have been specifically chosen in order to demonstrate the relationship for delay 
probability, detection probability and response probability.  
 
Test Case 8 has selected its input parameters from a combination of brick wall and infrared 
detection systems and represents a similar arrangement to Test Case 3. Selected attack methods 
have been chosen to enable specific values from within the knowledge matrix to provide a full 
demonstration of the model and its application in determining the effectiveness of physical 
security. 
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6.4.2.1 Test Case 8: Strong Attack – Strong Defence – Medium Response 
Identifying a case for strong delay, strong detection and medium response values of physical 
security effectiveness in the knowledge matrices (considering all values over all listed attack-
type elements in the orthogonal continuum). Considering the universal elements for both 
defence and attack we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high strength value is 4.04 (e.g. high percentage of brick structure 
considering an attack by electric drill). 
2. Section B, where a high material dimensions value is 6.13 (e.g. 5 human high smooth brick 
wall considering an attack by a ladder).  
3. Section C, where a low detection value is 4.15 (e.g. infrared detection considering an attack 
creating false alarms). 
4. Section D, where a high detection value is 5.55 (e.g. infrared detection considering an attack 
using system knowledge). 
5. Section E, where a medium response value is 7.31 (e.g. high tech response considering 
corporate data as an asset). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.17. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 10.17 
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -24.77 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -15.90 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -76.66 
For Response Probability: 
m value  = - (Section A) * (Section B)  * ((17.3 / (Section E)) - 1) = -33.84 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -76.66 
 
Figure 6.18 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 8 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection point at approximately -64°. 
Figure 6.18 also presents the delay probability - response probability intersection point at 
approximately -50°. 
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Figure 6.18 Test Case 8: A conceptual map for demonstrating effectiveness of physical security 
 
In the example for Test Case 8 the intersection points of the delay probability – detection 
probability curves is approximately -64° which corresponds to a relatively poor overall 
effectiveness for a physical security arrangement. The same defensive-type universal element 
arrangement exists in Test Case 3 which has an intersection point of -7°, however the attacking-
type universal elements that have been selected for Test Case 8 can be considered as very strong 
and therefore the physical security effectiveness intersection has been significantly reduced in 
Figure 6.18 for the delay probability curve and the detection probability curve. The results from 
Test Case 8 also indicate that the intersection point for the delay probability – response 
probability curve is approximately -50°.  
 
Test Case 9 considers similar input parameters to Test Case 8 considering a slight change in 
response input that implies a weaker response. 
6.4.2.2 Test Case 9: Strong Attack – Strong Defence – Medium Weak Response 
Identifying a case with similarity to Test Case 8 considers slightly weaker response values of 
physical security effectiveness in the knowledge matrices (considering all values over all listed 
attack-type elements in the orthogonal continuum). Considering the universal elements for both 
defence and attack we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high strength value is 4.04 (e.g. high percentage of brick structure 
considering an attack by electric drill). 
2. Section B, where a high material dimensions value is 6.13 (e.g. 5 human high smooth brick 
wall considering an attack by a ladder).  
3. Section C, where a low detection value is 4.15 (e.g. infrared detection considering an attack 
creating false alarms). 
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4. Section D, where a high detection value is 5.55 (e.g. infrared detection considering an attack 
using system knowledge). 
5. Section E, where a medium response value is 8.76 (e.g. security patrol response considering 
personal valuables as an asset). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 6.17. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 10.17 
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -24.77 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -15.90 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -76.66 
For Response Probability: 
m value  = - (Section A) * (Section B)  * ((17.3 / (Section E)) - 1) = -24.14 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -76.66 
 
Figure 6.19 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 9 as tangent curves for the model 
showing the delay probability - detection probability intersection point at approximately -64°. 
Figure 6.19 also presents the delay probability - response probability intersection point at 
approximately -58°. 
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Figure 6.19 Test Case 9: A conceptual map for demonstrating effectiveness of physical security 
 
The results from Test Case 9 indicate that the intersection for the delay probability – response 
probability curve has dropped slightly to -58° from the Test Case 8 indication of -50°.  
This demonstrates a slightly lower effectiveness for response probability. This result suggests 
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that the model correctly considers a weaker response parameter input to equate to a lower 
intersection point on the response probability curve. While the model does not give any specific 
meaning to the magnitude of this change (approximately 8°), the direction of the change is 
logically correct. 
6.4.3 The Extended Model summarised 
Test Case 10, Test Case 11, Test Case 12 and Test Case 13 have been based on the model in  
Figure 6.17 and can be further considered for validity in Appendix J.  
 
A brief summary of these is included in this text for information. Test Case 10 seeks to further 
demonstrate the interrelationship between the response probability and the delay probability for 
the model. Test Case 11 provides a similar consideration to Test Case 10 but additionally 
demonstrates the relationship between detection probability and response probability. Test Case 
12 provides an example of an increase to the delay probability - response probability curve 
intersection point for a stronger response system. Test Case 13 has been included to 
demonstrate the strongest case for response consideration and is useful to be able to consider the 
magnitude of the changes relating to the intersection point of the delay probability – response 
probability curves in the previous examples. 
   
The test cases for both the original model and the extended model in this section have 
demonstrated an interpretation for the knowledge matrices of this study for relative 
effectiveness of physical security arrangements. The model has been empirically determined 
and presented as a novel method to interrelate the dissimilar defence in depth concepts of delay, 
detection and response using values considered as a consensus of expert opinion in this study. 
 
Three sections of the questionnaire Section F, Section G and Section H have not been 
incorporated in either the simple or the extended model, but nevertheless provide some relative 
indications for the motivation and attack. A suggestion for future work is to incorporate the data 
from the remaining three knowledge matrices into both models presented in this chapter in order 
to provide consideration of the concept continuums of asset and motivation into the 
effectiveness of physical security. This may be achieved with further analysis of the axes that 
has been used as representations of the model. As a suggestion, the effects of asset and 
motivation may be able to better determine the numerical magnitude along the axis labelled 
“Tan theta - Time shared axis (T)”. 
  
The model presented in this chapter is strictly an indicative device for relative comparisons. 
While the validity of the model may be critiqued in its own right, the model’s primary purpose 
in this study is to provide a means of interpretation for the results of the study presented in the 
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knowledge matrices. These knowledge matrices represent the relationship assessment values for 
the universal elements of the research. The model is presented as a vehicle to enable the data 
within the matrices to be interpreted by the theoretical conceptualisation of physical security. 
The theory for physical security has provided graphical interpretations for evaluating 
effectiveness and the model has represented its novel approach designing the curves of delay 
probability, detection probability and response probability as mathematical tangent functions. 
 
The investigative nature of this research has been able to construct the knowledge matrices from 
expert opinion and the model has been able to be constructed based on these knowledge 
matrices as part of a conceptual mapping that incorporates existing theory from physical 
security literature. The interpretation of the model suggests that the information within the 
knowledge matrices is able to determine effectiveness over the range of universal elements 
determined for the study. As the universal elements of the study represent reference levels along 
a dimension for each concept continuum, both the knowledge matrices and the model may be 
indicative for the majority of non-universal elements by a method of ranking non-universal 
elements relative to the universal elements along each concept continuum. 
 
The application of the model to facility specific requirements may be undertaken with the use of 
a percentage representation of universal elements for each facility arrangement. This suggestion 
proposes that each region or part of a facility can be represented by the concept continuums of 
the model. In this way, the arrangement that is most appropriate in comparative effectiveness of 
a physical security scenario can be supported by this research and in the presented model. 
 
This study has considered high level concepts in the hierarchical structure of physical security. 
The knowledge matrices provide relationship values for universal elements as reference levels 
along concept continuums, however there is likely to be a fuzzy range within each of the 
universal element reference levels that depend upon lower order hierarchical considerations.  
An example of this would be the performance of detection systems based on a harsh weather 
environment. The scope of this research has not enabled the model to go to this level of 
consideration for universal elements and this may lead to criticism of the model and the 
knowledge matrices. It should be pointed out however that the method that has been used to 
establish the knowledge matrices and construct the model is able to be further considered by 
extending iterations of the universal elements of physical security. With further considerations 
and iterations of lower order hierarchical concept continuums for universal elements, a greater 
range of depth may be approached within the research and the model. 
 
Finally, it is important to understand that this research has intended an investigative approach 
mapping universal elements of physical security to provide a platform for holistic modelling. 
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The data that has been collected in this case should be viewed as indicative of the type of 
knowledge structure that may enable modelling. A suggested extension to this study can be 
recognised as the calibration of the model in this research. The notion of a calibration in this 
instance implies the refining of all parameters and mechanisms of the model to produce 
outcomes that are better aligned with real-world data. An extension to this study would involve 
testing the calibration of the model with the development of additional theory in physical 
security. 
6.5 Interpretations outside of the field of physical security 
The objectives of this study have been predominantly targeted toward the field of physical 
security. Although this focus has directed the investigative method and the techniques in this 
thesis, the method of construction of the knowledge structures should be equally valid outside 
the discipline of physical security.  
 
The method of inquiry of this research was chosen in order to address the complex nature of the 
problems involved in modelling physical security effectiveness. This study has presented 
several interesting proposals that may be of value in research outside of physical security, where 
complexity exists in latent variables of each discipline makes modelling of the issues difficult. 
Where it can be identified that modelling would provide some assistance in decision making, 
the process of creating knowledge structures in other disciples may be highly relevant. 
 
Phenomenological sociology has suggested that a consideration of the universal elements as 
well as a focus upon the universal element relationships of any particular discipline leads to a 
better understanding of the phenomenon. This study has demonstrated that where universal 
element relationships can be assessed for value by expert opinion, knowledge matrices can be 
created to provide a foundation for modelling within the discipline. While the actual working 
models for different disciplines may vary widely in structure, the theory of knowledge 
supported by the literature for each discipline should be able to provide data in a similar matrix 
format for boundary conditions considering relational descriptors and concept continuums as in 
this research. 
 
In this research the selection of universal elements from a larger number of potential elements is 
suggested as one of the methods of distillation of complexity. This study has selected universal 
elements based on reference levels along dimensions of concept continuums in order to reduce 
complexity. The method in designing the creation of knowledge hierarchies has suggested that 
suitable reduction in complexity can be achieved by controlling the number of universal 
elements to be considered as reference levels. The consideration of relational descriptors in 
conjunction with the use of concept continuums provides a foundation for the framework of 
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appropriate questionnaires that could assess knowledge relationships in any discipline.  
The relational descriptors would form boundary conditions similar to those of this study and 
could be applied to each question to support the value assessments of elements relationships. 
 
This research has used quasi-qualitative measure of time to indicate relative value in universal 
element relationships. Time measurement has been enabled due to the relational descriptors 
having action-based properties. The time based value assessments in this research were able to 
indicate relative benefit to physical security as well as being able to indicate an order of 
magnitude of the benefit through exponential values indicating time. This concept of time 
measurement can realistically be applied in knowledge structures in other disciplines using 
selected universal elements. This method would provide an alternative to the commonly used 
social indicators of agreement and disagreement used in multidimensional scaling in attitude 
measurement studies. 
 
The quasi-qualitative time indicators may also provide a further benefit to other studies in 
developing knowledge structures, in that they allow for a degree of fuzziness for the estimations 
of expert opinion. Time measurements using the presented scale such as seconds, minutes, 
hours, etc. allow for an approximation to be made in the order of time that expert opinion 
considers to best represents the element pair consideration and the boundary condition. 
 
This study has suggested a method that establishes a case for consensus from a range of expert 
opinion collected through the research questionnaire. The method used to determine the degree 
of consensus in Chapter 5 is relatively uncomplicated in that it does not require specialised 
computing software packages. The correlations considered over the statistical means of the 
selected groups correlated between category groups have been able to demonstrate convergence 
of opinion over the boundary conditions that were established in the research questionnaires.  
 
It is the proposal of this study that the method described in this research will have potential 
applications in other disciplines where large complexity is present and where modelling may 
provide assistance in decision making. The development of knowledge matrices in other 
disciplines may assist many potential applications in problem solving although specific 
modelling. However it will inevitably be dependent upon the nature of the knowledge for that 
field. Knowledge structures may have significant application in future for all research. 
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6.6 Concluding remarks 
For the consideration of decision support with regard to the effectiveness of physical security 
arrangements, the data that has been collected in the research and presented as knowledge 
matrices are able to be interpreted in a concept mapping. This concept mapping relates to time-
based security considerations for the functions of defence in depth of physical security.  
The conceptual mappings are presented as a selected set of curves where the gradient and the 
relative positioning of the curves determine an overall benefit to physical security.  
Selected curves relating to a facility can display an optimum point for the effectiveness of 
physical security arrangements. Further consideration of the regions separated by the 
intersection of the curves determines quadrants that are useful in describing physical security 
mapping concepts. The concept of suitability has been introduced into the concept mappings in 
order to define the regions created by these curves. 
 
The model that has been presented in this section proposed a method for representing the 
conceptual mappings of defence in depth functions and physical security effectiveness.  
This method suggests the use of mathematical tangent curves to represent the concepts of delay 
probability, detection probability and response probability. The input of the model has 
considered the value assessments from the knowledge matrices of the research.  
A number of examples have been presented in this chapter as test cases to provide relative inter-
relationship determinations for dissimilar concepts in physical security. The model has been 
able to demonstrate its ability to represent relative effectiveness of physical security 
arrangements. The series of test cases that have been used for examples considered selected 
input parameters to demonstrate relative indicators for the probability measures that represent 
delay probability, detection probability and response probability.  
 
This study represents a method of interpreting universal element relationships in the field of 
physical security and may potentially have applications for research in other disciplines.  
The topic of physical security has provided a platform to demonstrate a concept mapping in 
order to achieve the research objectives. This study has considered theoretical suggestions for 
the conceptual mapping to establish a hierarchical framework supportive of knowledge.  
Other disciplines may also be able to use techniques such as time measurement and value 
assessments through the consideration of relational descriptors and concept continuums.  
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7 Conclusion 
This study has described the research undertaken as an investigative approach to create 
universal element hierarchies by conceptually mapping element relationships. The research has 
based its data collection on an instrument used to assess the expert opinion of practitioners in 
the field of physical security and has obtained a consensus of knowledge. The study has created 
knowledge matrices that contain relationship information over universal elements of physical 
security in order to represent a holistic view of modelling the effectiveness of physical security 
arrangements for the purpose of supporting decision making. 
 
The unusual investigative technique used for this study has been able to combine theoretical 
considerations from a wide range of fields to achieve the data sets representing knowledge 
through expert opinion. The method of inquiry chosen for this research described by Green et al. 
(1997) as phenomenology is unusual in that it identifies an investigative approach toward a 
phenomenon by the determination of its elements and element relationships without proposing 
any set hypotheses. The study has also proposed a novel method that is able to model its results 
using the well known mathematical tangent function to conceptualise effectiveness between 
dissimilar conceptual entities.  
 
The concept of modelling physical security effectiveness has been previously considered in 
literature with most of the previous work recognising the functions of defence in depth as a 
primary focus. This research has identified the relative effectiveness of delay probability, 
detection probability and response probability to produce a single relative risk value for each 
physical security arrangement. The comparison of relative risk values over a single facility or a 
range of facilities can support decision making in the procurement process.  The benefit of using 
this modelling process may be able to eliminate labour intensive risk analyses as well as 
minimising the subjective nature of practitioner’s techniques of security risk analysis for 
complex physical security arrangements. 
 
The original problem that was identified by this research considers the possibility where human 
adversaries can defeat a physical security arrangement to obtain the benefit of an asset.  
Thus the effectiveness of physical security can ultimately be expressed as a probability of 
success or probability of failure. Currently practitioners in the field of physical security 
undertake security risk assessments with analysis of complex risk scenarios that lead to 
combinations of success or failure. Modelling of physical security effectiveness needs to be able 
to cope with the human adversary factor and generalise for limited information across many 
types of physical security arrangements.  
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The method of inquiry undertaken in the study has provided an investigation into the universal 
element relationships of physical security terminology targeting expert opinion from 
practitioners in the field of physical security and has measured these relationships as value 
assessments. The results of the value assessments of the research have been presented in 
decision matrices. The data from the matrices have been used in the study’s novel suggestion for 
modelling of physical security arrangements and has been able to provide relative indications of 
effectiveness which provides support in decision making over a range of scenarios and facilities.  
 
The knowledge matrices developed in this research have demonstrated that for a given set of 
boundary conditions, universal elements representing reference levels along orthogonal concept 
continuums have been able reduce the complexity of a physical security scenario. The study has 
developed methods to obtain the knowledge matrices from a theoretical framework in order to 
structure a conceptual mapping of the phenomenon. The techniques establishing hierarchical 
structure use time as a measurement indicator in value assessments through the consideration of 
relational descriptors which are effectively action statements (Smith, 1984) as directional 
indicators. The technique used to create the knowledge matrices may be applicable for 
disciplines outside the field of physical security. 
7.1 Overview of the study 
This research has proposed several ideas that have been supported through an investigation into 
the consensus of expert opinion of respondents. The final overview of the study considers the 
approach to develop the research questionnaire and construct the data sets for modelling. 
 
The research questionnaire was recognised as the primary source of data for the study and the 
development of its structure was important in order to maximise the usefulness of the 
information obtained for analysis. The method of inquiry concentrated on determining the 
universal elements and element relationships to achieve the best likelihood of a holistic 
consideration of the topic. The method of inquiry considers phenomenological sociology or 
phenomenology, and is presented as the most flexible investigative approach for determining 
the universal elements of the phenomenon. The best method for determining universal element 
relationships was considered to be expert opinion in a Delphi-like approach. 
 
The literature review identified methods of data collection to obtain expert opinion through in-
depth interviews and questionnaires. The complete source of data for the research was 
considered to be found within the collective knowledge of practitioners in the field of physical 
security. This range of expert opinion was targeted for the properties that would lead to a 
determination of a degree of consensus through the inter-comparison of respondent groups.  
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The content and structure of the research questionnaire was considered to provide the 
framework to assess the universal elements relationships of the study. The questionnaire also 
provided a mechanism for self-assessment of the techniques used. The universal elements that 
were listed in the questionnaire represented arbitrary reference levels along a dimension as a 
scale over a continuum of concept measurement. All listed elements of the research 
questionnaire were considered to be universal elements. The universal elements were arranged 
on the questionnaire so that defensive-type elements were paired against attacking-type 
elements to enable relationships determinations. The questionnaire structured universal elements 
from a theoretical consideration of a hierarchy of the elements associated with their respective 
functions of defence in depth. The hierarchical structures were determined by considering 
orthogonal concept continuums as measurement scales and relational descriptors that produced 
directional boundary functions relative to each of the functions of defence in depth.  
 
The nature of the questionnaire sought to capture the instinctive considerations for each 
respondent in the relative ordering of the elements of physical security. The individual value 
assessments for each respondent created a profile as a list of 288 indications representing 
element pair relationships of the study. The 288 value assessments from the questionnaire were 
able to be transformed into numerical values to enable statistical analysis and consideration 
towards consensus. Matrices were developed using a standard list of element pair relationships. 
The assessment labels of time in the questionnaire were deliberately fuzzy to allow for each 
respondent’s process of generalisation to be more effective. In this context of this study 
generalisation has been used to mean the ability to take a complex scenario and incorporate 
generalised or additional detail of the numerous complex factors where specific information 
may be unavailable. The questionnaire was considered to contain a quasi-qualitative approach. 
The three groups of respondents chosen for the research provided an adequate separation of 
profiles to obtain consensus using the technique of correlating the different group profiles. 
  
Group profiles were compared to each another as well as to a standard profile developed from 
the composite group. The degree of consensus was able to be ascertained from these 
comparisons. The process considered a correlation technique applied to the mean values for 
each group’s element pair relationships as a list of 288 numerical variables. The group profiles 
were able to establish a consensus for a standard list through comparisons to each other.  
Each individual respondent’s profile was also correlated against the series of group standards to 
ascertain the degree of consensus by a series of comparisons. 
 
The creation of relationship matrices establishes one of the primary objectives of the study and 
has been presented in 6 by 6 orthogonal format for each of the eight sections labelled Section A 
to Section H of the research. The matrices contain values for universal elements relationship 
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links over the concept continuums measurement scales. The matrices were each used to 
represent a knowledge structure that indicates a directional benefit of physical security 
effectiveness. These have been represented through ranked ordering of universal elements over 
orthogonal concept continuums for a specific boundary condition. The data for the matrices has 
been supplied from value assessments of expert opinion that represents a consensus relationship 
mapping of universal elements. 
 
A novel interpretation for modelling of the results has been proposed by the study using 
mathematical tangent functions to assess effectiveness between dissimilar conceptual entities. 
The model was designed using empirically based coefficients for tangents functions that 
represented delay probability, detection probability and response probability. These tangent 
curves were able to establish an indication for overall relative effectiveness over a series of 
specific physical security arrangements. The model demonstrated several test cases using 
selected data from the knowledge matrices of the research. The results from the test cases 
confirm that the model is able to predict overall benefit to security over a range of physical 
security element combinations.  
7.2 Research aims and objectives 
The study objectives have been met by this research as follows: 
7.2.1 Determine a set of universal elements for physical security  
Phenomenological sociology as the method of inquiry adopted by this study has required that 
the universal elements related to the phenomenon be determined. This was seen as a highly 
significant component of the study considering the large number of potential elements that may 
be identified within the field of physical security. Therefore an objective of the study was to 
establish the notion of when a potential element would constitute a universal element.  
 
While sources from literature suggested methods of grouping elements into clusters based on 
the properties of the elements, other suggestions have included the use of concept continuums 
(Smith, 1984). Combining the beneficial ideas from both of these concepts considers the 
clustering of all elements around dimensional reference points using scales of concept 
continuums. The determination of universal element status from all possible elements of 
terminology was enabled by stating that universal elements would be considered as simple 
arbitrary reference levels along the scales of each of the concept continuums.  
Universal elements could also be considered along other concept continuums and in this way all 
elements relationships of physical security could be represented by a discrete list of universal 
elements. 
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The most important universal elements in each concept continuum were identified as those that 
represented the outermost reference levels for each concept continuum. These outermost or end 
reference points created the relative maximum and relative minimum conceptual opposites 
along the dimension chosen for the concept continuum. The other listed universal elements 
arranged between these end point values could ultimately be interchangeable with other non-
universal elements with the assumption that the dimension could be adequately represented in 
increments between these relative end points. Each universal element along the scale of the 
concept continuum would be considered as an arbitrary point representing a reference level that 
could cluster a group of elements of similar properties. The study determined that it was not 
important for the scale across the dimension to be represented by equal divisions, yet it 
remained important that the universal elements along the scale were dissimilar enough to be 
able to be separated in conceptualisation. 
 
The number of elements chosen for each concept continuum in the study was six. This number 
was determined as adequate for a scale of ordered universal elements to be conceptualised and 
allowed the possible separation of the scale into quintiles. The study determined that some for 
dimensions the universal elements would be closer together along the concept continuums while 
for others they would be more separated. The determination of mathematical values for the 
separation of the universal elements was identified as the required outcome of the investigation 
by the research instrument. The separation between ordered universal elements was identified in 
the knowledge matrices for each element over the orthogonal concept continuum using the 
averaged positions along the scale. This was determined to be a useful indicator of the overall 
relationship ranking between the universal elements. 
 
The listed universal elements were chosen for the research as reference levels along concept 
continuums and were mainly identified from literature. Suggestions from the pilot study were 
also used to develop incremental terminology considerations for each concept continuum.  
The universal elements were representative of physical security terminology combinations and 
manifested as a range from a single word element to descriptive phrase. This study has made the 
assumption that the universal elements of the research are valid and that they adequately 
represent reference levels on the various dimensions of the concept continuums.  
The questionnaire has considered a method to check this for validity and verify that a reasonable 
framework has been presented. This method has enabled the respondents of the study to provide 
comments or objections to this assumption. 
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7.2.2 Create a tool that measures expert opinion as values to 
provide knowledge structured data-sets for the universal 
element relationships of physical security scenarios.  
The main data collection instrument of this study is the research questionnaire and it has been 
designed to provide value assessments from expert opinion. The questionnaire has been created 
from an investigative analysis of the theory of physical security and conceptual suggestions 
from other areas of research. The method of inquiry has sought the determination of universal 
elements and the apprehension of universal element relationships. The work of Smith (1984) has 
suggested the foundation for the elemental scales that have been presented to experts in the 
research questionnaire to assess their opinion and to ultimately build a knowledge structure 
from complex element relationships. 
 
The notion for considering a continuum of values for each dimension while using propositional 
relations or relational descriptors (Smith, 1984) has provided a directional aspect to 
relationships along concept scales that structure a hierarchy of knowledge. This study has 
identified action-based relational descriptors where each universal element can be relatively 
conceptualised in multidimensional space considering an action-bound boundary condition. 
Orthogonal concepts are measured over the action sequence using increments of time as a 
common link. One of the most important attributes of time as a measure is that it allows for a 
relative scale of magnitude to be established, where for example the term seconds is 
semantically very much smaller than the term days while it is much closer to the term minutes. 
The relationships between concepts have been determined as a value assessment in time where a 
relative increase/decrease in time represents a change in effectiveness of physical security. 
 
The measurement of time in the questionnaire has attempted to standardise action-based 
measurements in a common understanding over many different concepts. The designation of the 
time structure chosen for the questionnaire enables a relative distribution of time judgements 
that can signify importance. This relative importance is only able to be established after 
establishing whether an overall benefit in a security sense is associated with shorter time frames 
or longer time frames. The questionnaire identified common units of time as labels available to 
the respondents that were then able to be transformed into a logarithmic-linear scale to enable 
statistical analysis. This analysis is able to identify a relative order of magnitude of importance 
in benefit to overall effectiveness of physical security. 
 
The selection of action-based relational descriptors was important in the questionnaire as it 
determined how the structure of elements would relate in each of the primary functions of 
defence in depth. This selection provided eight repeating sections for the questionnaire.  
The selection of relational descriptors determined were two for the function of delay, two for 
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the function of detection and one for the function of response, as well as three additional 
relational descriptors to compliment the functions of defence in depth including asset, attacker 
and attack. 
 
The questionnaires were developed to represent the hierarchical structure of physical security 
acknowledging the functions of defence in depth, relational descriptors, and universal elements 
through concept continuums. Respondents were able to make value assessments considering 
universal elements pairs from orthogonal concept continuum scales relative to a set of boundary 
conditions that indicated a directional preference for time as an overall benefit to physical 
security. This structure allowed respondents to provide value assessments as relative measures 
of benefit over the entire list of universal elements based upon their knowledge, experience or 
instinctive preferences. One of the main assumptions of the questionnaire is that the “instinct” 
of the respondent has been the most appropriate answer in all cases. 
7.2.3 Establish data matrices of elemental relationships 
representing a knowledge structure. 
The complex questions of the questionnaire have identified directional indications of time that 
were able to imply overall benefit to security. The result of this outcome is that for each profile 
of 288 value assessments, a relative benefit to security that has been identified for each 
universal element pair depending upon the relevant boundary condition. A quasi-qualitative to 
quantitative transformation was applied to each of the 288 value assessments within the 
research. As the scale of time is exponential in nature, linear relations for the purpose of this 
research have been determined from natural logarithms substituted as approximations in time for 
convenience and conceptualisation. For the purposes of concept mapping, time has been 
arbitrarily set at its minimum semantic value to demonstrate relativity between the ranked 
values of element relationships. 
 
The creation of relationship matrices as the main objective of the study has been presented as a 
series of 6 by 6 matrices for each of the Sections A-H of the research. Special consideration has 
been given to the ordering of the elements along the concept continuum using an averaging 
process across data. The resulting matrices contain values for universal elements that are 
specified along concept continuums and represent the relationship links between the universal 
elements. 
 
The matrices have been designed to represent knowledge structures that indicate a directional 
benefit to physical security effectiveness based on ranked ordering of universal elements over 
orthogonal concept continuums for a specific boundary condition. The matrices have been 
developed from value assessments using the expert opinion of respondents of the study to 
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represent a demonstrated consensus of universal element relationships. The values collected 
through this research forming a profile for each respondent comprising of a list of 288 
numerical values comprising eight sections with each containing 36 element pair relationship 
assessments. 
 
A validity test for these knowledge matrices has demonstrated that they are strongly 
representative of a consensus in expert opinion. The demonstration of consensus has been 
achieved by means of conducting correlation measures based on comparisons of profiles 
representing universal element relationship values, over the different groups of respondents and 
over individual profiles. This key indicator for the achievement of consensus exhibited a high 
degree of correlation between group profiles of different membership. The research has 
considered a group’s interpretations to the boundary conditions of each question through 
statistical means and obtained a combined assessment of values for each boundary condition.  
7.2.4 Determine that the knowledge structure is representative of 
common knowledge by checking the degree of consensus to 
the data-sets among participants. 
The notion of consensus implies a collective opinion or alternatively a standard of agreement 
and therefore a common reference over all dimensions provided for agreement purposes.  
In identifying the weight of collective opinion, an arbitrary selection of the statistical mean has 
determined the preferred indicator towards consensus. An assessment of the validity of the 
statistical mean was undertaken by checking correlation over alternative statistical indicators 
using the median and the mode. While all three indicators have provided strong evidence of 
consensus, the profile of mean values provided the best indicator for consensus. A combined 
statistical mean profile has enabled the collective opinion of all respondents to be viewed 
representing the collective knowledge structure through a moderate weighted position. This then 
can be considered as a standard structure of knowledge over the boundary conditions.  
 
The comparison of group standard profiles with individual respondent’s profiles has used the 
same method of correlation and has demonstrated a relatively high degree of individual 
agreement to each group standard. The indications in this research suggest that the composite 
group standard (containing the averaged data over all respondents) has provided the strongest 
correlation for all respondents and it also has suggested that the statistical mean values for the 
profile of the entire group of respondents represented the optimum consensus. Thus the matrices 
of the knowledge structure are valid as representations of expert opinion within the limitations 
of the research. 
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7.2.5 Present a method of modelling dissimilar conceptual entities 
for an overall risk to physical security that acknowledges the 
functions of defence in depth with appropriate theoretical 
considerations. 
The effectiveness of physical security arrangements has been interpreted as a concept mapping 
diagram relating to time-based security considerations for the functions of physical security 
incorporating defence in depth. Interpretations of the conceptual mapping have been presented 
as a selection of curves where the gradient and the relative positioning of the curves relate to an 
overall benefit to physical security and are able to display an optimum point with regions of 
suitability for the effectiveness of physical security arrangements.  
 
The model that has been presented in this study has proposed a novel method for representing 
the conceptual mappings of delay probability, detection probability and response probability 
curves for physical security effectiveness. This method uses mathematical tangent curves to 
represent the conceptualised modelling for each of delay probability, detection probability and 
response probability. The model is able to select its input from the value assessments in the 
knowledge matrices as coefficients for the respective tangent functions to determine the gradient 
of the curves as well as the horizontal shift of the curves. 
 
The application of the model has been demonstrated using a series of test cases using data from 
the knowledge matrices of the study. The results from the test cases indicate relative 
effectiveness can be determined for scenarios involving physical security element combinations. 
7.2.6 Identify future applications for this research and consider 
areas requiring additional investigation. 
This study has considered high level concepts in developing the hierarchical structure of 
physical security. The knowledge matrices provide relationship values for universal elements as 
reference levels along concept continuums. It is acknowledged that there is likely to be a range 
within each of the universal element reference levels that is fuzzy depending upon the 
complexity of lower order hierarchical considerations. The scope of this research has not 
enabled the model to proceed beyond high level concepts in the consideration of universal 
elements; however a suggestion for future applications of this research may consider additional 
iterations with slightly modified questionnaires using the same techniques as this study in order 
to fine tune the universal element relationship values of the existing knowledge matrices.  
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This study has suggested a method that establishes a case for consensus over the range of expert 
opinion that has been collected from the research questionnaire. The method used to determine 
the degree of consensus has been able to demonstrate convergence of opinion over the boundary 
conditions that were established in the research questionnaires. A suggestion for a further 
application of this research proposes that the method has potential application in other 
disciplines where large complexity is present among systems and where modelling may provide 
assistance in decision making. The development of knowledge matrices for other disciplines 
may determine that similar modelling applications can assist in problem solving although 
specific hierarchical development will inevitably be dependent upon the nature of knowledge in 
that field. Knowledge structures should have significant application in future for all research. 
7.3 Final summary 
This study establishes a methodology that is able to construct a theoretical hierarchy of physical 
security elements in order to determine the complex relationships in a physical security 
scenario. The research has provided a set of data matrices as an outcome that is able to represent 
a knowledge structure.  
 
The method that has been used to investigate the terminology of physical security has combined 
an appropriate theoretical background through a combination of different literature sources.  
The data that has been collected in this study provides relationships value assessments for a set 
of universal elements and establishes that a consensus of expert opinion is able to determine a 
universal element conceptual mapping. This study also provides discussion on the reliability and 
validity of the results and especially considers the requirements to demonstrate the degree of 
consensus of the final knowledge matrices. The applicability of the results to real-life scenarios 
has been successfully identified through modelling using several test cases. The study has 
essentially provided a theoretical structure for conceptual mapping toward the view to 
improving decision making in the field of physical security.  
 
The methodology of this study, although primarily directed toward modelling physical security, 
has the potential for application in disciplines outside of physical security in areas where large 
complexity exists and where modelling may assist decision making. 
  
 
 
 
   
 150 
References 
Abernethy, M.A., Horne, M., Lillis, A.M., Malina, M.A. and Selto, F.H. (2005). A multi-
method approach to building causal performance maps from expert knowledge. Management 
Accounting Research Kidlington: Jun 2005. Vol. 16 Iss. 2, pp 135-155. 
 
Aidman, E.V. and Egan, G. (1998). Academic Assessment through Computerized Concept 
Mapping: Validating a Method of Implicit Map Reconstruction. International Journal of 
Instructional Media, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp 277-294. 
 
Anderson, L.W. (1988). Likert Scales. In Keeves, J.P. (Ed). Educational Research, 
Methodology, and Measurement: An International Handbook. Permagon Press, Oxford. pp 427-
428. 
 
Armstrong, D. and Peile, C. (2005). Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems Performance 
Standard. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual 2005 International Carnahan Conference on 
Security Technology, 11-14 October, pp 33-36. 
 
Armstrong D. (2005). A Model for the Evaluation of Barriers and Containers and Their 
Resistance to Physical Attack. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual 2005 International Carnahan 
Conference on Security Technology, 11-14 October, pp 263-266. 
 
Barb, A. and Shyu, C.R. (2003). Semantics Modeling in Diagnostic Medical Image Databases 
Using Customised Fuzzy Membership Functions. The IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy 
Systems, 2003. pp 1159-1164. 
 
Barron, F.H. (1975). An Information Processing Methodology for Inquiring into Decision 
Processes. In White, D.J. (Ed). Theories of Decision in Practice. Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. pp 195-206. 
 
Beach, L.R. (1990). Image Theory: Decision Making in Personal and Organizational Contexts. 
John Wiley and Sons. England. 
 
Bell, P.M. and Badiru, A.B. (1993). Concept mapping as a knowledge acquisition tool in the 
development of a fuzzy rule-based expert system. Computers and Industrial Engineering. New 
York: Sep 1993. Vol. 25, Iss. 1-4, pp 115-119. 
 
Bennett, J.L. (1984). Overview. In Bennett, J.L. (Ed). Building Decision Support Systems. 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. California. 
 
Bevington, P.R. (1969). Data Reduction and Error Analysis for the Physical Sciences. 
McGraw-Hill Inc. New York, U.S.A. 
 
Bradley, J.H., Paul, R. and Seeman, E. (2006). Analyzing the structure of expert knowledge. 
Information & Management. Amsterdam: Jan 2006. Vol. 43, Iss. 1 pp 77-91. 
 
Brooks, D. and Smith, C.L. (2002). Public Street Surveillance: A psychometric study on the 
perceived social risk. 3rd Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference. Perth, 
Western Australia, 28-29 November 2002. Edith Cowan University. pp 28-37. 
 
Bunn, D.W. and Thomas, H. (1975). Assessing Subjective Probability in Decision Analysis. In 
White, D.J. (Ed). Theories of Decision in Practice. Hodder and Stoughton, London. pp 117-127. 
 
Chang, K.E., Sung, Y.T. and Chen, I.D. (2002). The Effect of Concept Mapping to Enhance 
Text Comprehension and Summarization. Journal of Experimental Education, Vol. 71 No. 1, 
2002, 5-23. 
   
 151 
Chiu, C.W.T. and Wolfe, E.W. (2002). A method for Analyzing Sparse Data Matrices in the 
Generalizability Theory Framework. Applied Psychological Measurement, Vol. 26 No. 3, 
September 2002, pp 321-338. 
 
Dunn-Rankin, P. and Zhang, S. (1997). Scaling Methods. In Keeves, J.P. (Ed). Educational 
Research, Methodology, and Measurement: An International Handbook. Second Edition. 
Permagon Press, Oxford. pp 790-798. 
 
Garcia, M.L. (2001). Analysis and Evaluation. In The Design and Evaluation of Physical 
Protection Systems. (Ch.13, pp 241-250). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Giere, R.N. (1991). Knowledge, Values, and Technological Decisions: A Decision Theoretic 
Approach.  In D.G. Mayo & R.D. Hollander (Eds.) Acceptable Evidence Science and Values in 
Risk Management. New York. Oxford University Press, Inc. 
 
Green, P.E., Tull, D.S. and Albaum, G. (1988). Research for Marketing Decisions. Fifth 
Edition. Prentice-Hall, International, New Jersey. 
 
Heath, L. and Tindale, R.S. (1994). Heuristics and Biases in Applied Settings. In Heath, 
L.,Tindale, R.S., Edwards, J., Posavac, E.J., Bryant, F.B., Henderson-King, E., Suarez-Balcazar, 
Y. and Myers, J. (Eds). Applications of Heuristics and Biases to Social Issues. Plenum Press. 
New York. pp 1-11. 
 
Hill, P.W. (1982). Process hierarchy theory: A holistic approach to theory building in 
Education. PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, Western Australia. 
 
Houchin, R. (1999). Reflections on the incorporation of modern technology in the refurbishment 
of a Victorian prison. Proceedings of IEEE 33rd Annual 1999 International Carnahan 
Conference on Security Technology. Madrid, Spain. pp 412-422.  
 
Keats, J.A. (1997). Measurement in Educational Research. In Keeves, J.P. (Ed). Educational 
Research, Methodology, and Measurement: An International Handbook. Second Edition. 
Permagon Press, Oxford. pp 755-762. 
 
Keeves, J.P. (1997). Introduction: Advances in Measurement in Education. In Keeves, J.P. (Ed). 
Educational Research, Methodology, and Measurement: An International Handbook. Second 
Edition. Permagon Press, Oxford. pp 705-712. 
 
Lindfield, A.G. and Rodger, R.M. (1992). Fence Detection Systems-Achieving the Desired 
Performance.  Paper for ADPA 1992 Conference. Police Scientific Development Branch, Home 
Office, U.K. 
 
Lo, C.-C., Wang, P. and Chao, K.-M. (2005). Solving consensus measure of ambiguous MPDM 
problem vague sets – an application of risk assessment. Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design. 24-26 May 2005, Vol. 2 pp 
867-872. 
 
Miller, M.D. and Linn, R.L. (2000). Validation of Performance-Based Assessments. Applied 
Psychological Measurements, Vol. 24 No. 4, December 2000, pp 367-378. 
 
Moskowitz, H. (1975). Model Choice for Decision Making: Issues and Evidence Regarding the 
Use of Regression Models of Behaviour. In White, D.J. (Ed). Theories of Decision in Practice. 
Hodder and Stoughton, London. pp 328-340. 
 
Peck, L. (2002). Representation of weather and terrain effects on intrusion detection. In 
Proceedings of the 36
th
 Annual 2002 International Carnahan Conference on Security 
Technology, 20-24 October, Atlantic City, New Jersey, pp 179-190. 
   
 152 
 
Peck, L. and Trachier, G. (2004). Security Technology Decision Tree Tool. In Proceedings of 
the IEEE 38th Annual 2004 International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, pp 91-
98. 
 
Reisinger, Y. and Turner, L. (2000). Structural Equation Modelling with Lisrel: Application in 
Tourism. Working Paper 35/00, June 2000. Monash University, Faculty of Business & 
Economics. pp 1-29. 
 
Rodger, R.M., Leach, G. and Peaty, S.D. (1995). Alarm Verification Aids: Adding value to 
closed circuit television and detection systems. Proceedings of the 1994 International Carnahan 
Conference on Security Technology, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. pp 104-
107. 
 
Rowe, A.J. and Davis, S.A. (1996). Intelligent Information Systems: Meeting the challenge of 
the knowledge era. Quorum Books. USA. 
 
Sikder, I.U., Mal-Sarker, S. and Mal, T.K. (2006). Knowledge-Based Risk Assessment Under 
Uncertainty for Species Invasion. Risk Analysis. Oxford: Feb 2006. Vol. 26, Iss. 1, pp 239-252. 
  
Smart, B. (1976). Sociology, phenomenology and Marxian analysis. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London. 
 
Smith, C.L. (1984). Learning astronomy and the organisation of astronomy concepts in 
semantic memory. PhD. Murdoch University,  Western Australia. 
 
Smith, C.L. (2002). A Method for Understanding Students’ Perceptions of Concepts in the 
Defence in Depth Strategy. 3rd Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference. Perth, 
Western Australia, 28-29 November 2002. Edith Cowan University. pp 19-27. 
 
Smith, C.L. and Robinson, M. (1999). The understanding of security technology and its 
applications. Proceedings of IEEE 33rd Annual 1999 International Carnahan Conference on 
Security Technology, Keynote Address. Madrid, Spain. pp 26-37.  
 
Tarr, C.J. (1992). CLASP: A Computerised Aid to Cost-Effective Perimeter Security. 
Proceedings of the 1992 International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. pp 164-168. 
 
Tarr, C.J. (1994). Cost Effective Perimeter Security. Proceedings of the 1994 International 
Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 
pp 60-65. 
 
Tarr, C.J. and Peaty, S. (1995). Using CLASP to Assess Perimeter Security. Proceedings of the 
1995 International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers. pp 93. 
 
Uebersax, J.S. (1999). Probit Latent Class Analysis with Dichotomous or Ordered Category 
Measures: Conditional Independence/Dependence Models. Applied Psychological 
Measurement, Vol. 23 No. 4, December 1999, pp 283-297. 
 
Vallaster, C. and Koll, O. (2002). Participatory group observation – a tool to analyze strategic 
decision making. Qualitative Market Research, 2002, 5, 1, 40-57. 
 
van Voorthuijsen, G., van Hoof, H., Klima, M., Roubik, K., Bernas, M. and Pata, P. (2005). In 
Proceedings of the 39th Annual 2005 International Carnahan Conference on Security 
Technology, 11-14 October, pp 105-108. 
 
   
 153 
Ward, S.C. 1989. Arguments for Constructively Simple Models. Journal of the Operational 
Research Society. vol 40 pp 141-153. 
 
Wassell, I. (1997). Active Fence Structures And Toppings. Proceedings of the 1997 
International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers. pp 40-43. 
 
White, D.J. (1975). The Nature of Decision Theory. In White, D.J. (Ed). Theories of Decision in 
Practice. Hodder and Stoughton, London. pp 3-17. 
 
Wikepedia. (2006). Consensus. Available WWW March 2006 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consensus. 
 
Wikepedia. (2006). Orthogonal. Available WWW March 2006 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthogonal. 
 
Wikepedia. (2006). Orthogonal. Available WWW March 2006 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_in_depth. 
 
Ziglio, E. (1996). The Delphi Method and its Contribution to Decision-Making. In Adler, M. 
and Ziglio, E. (Eds). Gazing into the Oracle. Jessica Kingsley Publishers. London. pp 3-33. 
   
 154 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
• Answer guide 
• Research questionnaire 
Appendix B 
• Pilot study summary 
Appendix C 
• Respondent’s comments 
Appendix D 
• Respondent’s comments 
Appendix E 
• Raw data profiles 
Appendix F 
• Statistical summary for Sections A-H (n=26) 
Appendix G 
• Knowledge matrices for Sections A-H 
Appendix H 
• Group profile statistical summaries 
Appendix I 
• Tan curve examples 
Appendix J 
• Extended model test cases 
 
 
Appendix A 
Questionnaire ANSWER GUIDE 
RESEARCHER NAME: .........................................................................    DATE:   ………………………………  
EdithCowan University 
 
SecurityScience 
SchoolofEngineeringandMathematics 
JoondalupDveJOONDALUP 
  
COURSE NAME  
& STUDENT NUMBER:     .....................................................................  
 
COURSE SUPERVISOR:      .................................................................  
(If there are any queries or issues that cannot be addressed to the interviewer please forward them to the course supervisor). 
 
Mapping elements of physical security towards the creation of  
a holistic physical security model 
 
Aim: To assess terminology combination values relating to physical security systems - defined by time 
relationships.  To assess terminology of physical security systems using values within a defined 
spectrum so that a standard set of elements can be created. 
 
How long will it take?:  Approximately 50 minutes 
 
How difficult will it be?: All responses can be written on the questionnaire provided. 
    There are no wrong concepts – all opinions are valid and valuable. 
The format of the questions is repetitive, so once you have worked through the    
first few questions you will become familiar with the questionnaire. 
 
Why?:    Help me collect research data. 
 
Types of questions:  There are two types of questions:  
i) The first type is about defining physical security terminology. I would like 
you to define terminology sets of physical security by using the concept of 
time. For example, responses estimating time should be stated as either; 
• Years (Ye) 
• Months (Mo) 
• Weeks (We) 
• Days (Da) 
• Hours (Hrs) 
• Minutes (Min) 
• Seconds (Sec) 
ii) The second type of response will be a critical evaluation of the methods 
and measuring scales of this research. 
 
Goal of questions: To collect the “time” values of certain terminology combinations. 
 
Point of reference: The respondent should try to adopt the role of a person responsible for the assets 
of a facility when responding. (e.g. decision maker). Where possible the 
respondent should draw on their own experience or knowledge. 
 
Format:  
1. Name identification is optional but other information is required such as areas of expertise or potential 
biases. 
2. Identify terminology combinations for each concept and provide a time assessment for each as described 
above. 
3. List any underlying problems with the questionnaire or the method. If the respondent does not agree with 
questions in the questionnaire they should state their concerns on the relevant pages. 
4. All additional comments directed to the interviewer will be recorded. 
 Statement of Disclosure 
 
This document is for information to participants involved in the research entitled Mapping elements of physical security 
towards the creation of a holistic physical security decision model. The following is a brief description of the research. 
 
The development of a physical security model may be useful in making decisions about physical security and 
could provide the necessary supporting documentation for these decisions. This research presents an 
investigation into universal elements within a physical security environment and the inter-relationship of 
each of these elements as defined by expert opinion. The investigation of elemental spectrums relationships 
within physical security should assist in the creation of a conceptual mapping and may be able to determine 
the usefulness of physical security modelling. 
 
This is an anonymous questionnaire. Please ensure that you do not enter your name, or any other comments that will make 
you identifiable should you not wish to be. By completing the questionnaire you are consenting to take part in this 
research.  
 
Procedure 
Please follow the instructions on the questionnaire. If you are unsure about the interpretation of any questions or 
instructions, please enter your concerns about the question in the comment spaces provided. 
 
The questionnaire should take approximately 50 minutes to complete.  
 
The information that you enter into the questionnaire will be collected and stored in a database to create a conceptual 
mapping of the elements of physical security. You will be asked to enter choices for various elements of physical security 
and to evaluate the options available with respect to the relationships and importance of these elements. 
 
Risks and Benefits 
There are no anticipated physical or mental risks associated with being involved in this research. If at any point you decide 
to withdraw from participating in this research, please cease completion of the questionnaire. If you feel that the 
involvement in the research has potential risks not covered by this Statement of Disclosure, please feel free to contact the 
principle investigator or provide comments to this effect in the spaces provided by the questionnaire.  
 
The benefits in obtaining a conceptual mapping of the elements of physical security should be able to assist in categorising 
the complex environments of physical security and can be used as a guide to assist decision making. Anyone participating 
in the research is encouraged to make a copy of the questionnaire and further extend the usefulness of the concepts with 
their own input and imagination. It is anticipated that with continuing development in this Delphi-type process, continual 
review and amendments to the original concepts will ensure the usefulness of the research in the future. 
 
Refusal to participate in this questionnaire will not exclude anyone from the benefits of the research and non-participants 
are also encouraged to copy the questionnaire and review and suggest amendments to the process. 
 
Further information 
Any questions concerning the project entitled Mapping elements of physical security towards the creation of a holistic 
physical security model, can be directed to Mr Z J Alach of School of Engineering and Mathematics, Edith Cowan 
University on (08) 9400 5000 or (H) (08) 9387 2468. 
 
If you have any concerns about the project or would like to talk to an independent person, you may contact Associate 
Professor Clifton Smith (08) 9400 5000.  
 
 Definitions: 
 
Q1-6: 
break – [To compromise the strength integrity of a barrier] 
[Element 1] 
rock, hammer, axe, electric drill, oxy cutting, explosive - [standard type tools or items for breaking through structure] 
[Element 2] 
earth - [sandy surface or bare ground],  
glass, wood, brick, concrete – [to consider as wall barriers, windows, doors or other physical barriers],  
steel – [to consider as a metal fence barrier] 
 
Q7-12: 
climb – [To scale the outside of a barrier first up and then back to a ground situation on the other side] 
[Element 1] 
no aid – [no climbing aid, only human attributes available e.g. running, jumping] 
ladder, rope – [standard items for climbing, the length of the ladder or rope should be able to be readily constructed or purchased] 
climbing aids – [individual hand and foot items to enable better gripping on surfaces] 
projectiles & rope – [devices that use a propellant fuel to shoot a guide wire or rope high enough to assist climbing] 
flight assisted – [to consider as air craft/engine enabled assistance] 
[Element 2] 
5 human high smooth brick wall + razor wire – [approximately 9m in height, smooth surface and a fence topping to increase the 
difficulty for climbing] 
5 human high smooth brick wall – [approximately 9m in height, smooth surface to increase the difficulty for climbing] 
5 human high steel small mesh fence – [approximately 9m in height, semi-smooth surface where small steel mesh links increase the 
difficulty to obtain footholds] 
3 human high smooth brick wall – [approximately 6m in height, smooth surface to increase the difficulty for climbing] 
3 human high steel small mesh fence – [approximately 6m in height, semi-smooth surface where small steel mesh links increase the 
difficulty to obtain footholds] 
3 human high steel large mesh fence – [approximately 6m in height, rough surface where large steel mesh links allow footholds] 
  
Q13-18: 
avoids – [remaining outside the fields of detection of any security system through stealth] 
[Element 1] 
luck – [trusting to fortune to evade a detection system] 
colour camouflage – [using clothing items to evade detection] 
create false alarms – [causing false alarms in another area to distract detection from a detection system] 
smoke – [using smoke shields to evade detection] 
system knowledge – [using previously obtained knowledge about a detection system to avoid detection] 
knowledge & diversion – [using more that one method to evade detection such as false alarms and previously obtained knowledge, etc.] 
[Element 2] 
multiple systems – [more than one detection system in application within the same area] 
microwave – [detection system using radiofrequency radiation like radar] 
infrared – [movement detectors that work on infrared light or heat changes] 
closed circuit tv – [closed circuit TV cameras with staff monitoring display terminals] 
mobile human guard – [security staff driving or walking around a facility] 
chance detection – [visual detection by a neighbour or an employee or a member of the public] 
 
Q19-24: 
disables – [altering the fields of detection of any security system through violent method] 
[Element 1] 
accidental – [disabling detection systems by non-deliberate means] 
cut power – [disabling detection systems by stopping supply of mains voltage or other voltage] 
violent destruction - [disabling detection systems by physically breaking critical devices or links] 
physical intimidation – [disabling detection by threatening humans involved in the process] 
electrical interference – [disabling detection systems by creating an incorrect electronic signal or electric current] 
system knowledge – [using previously obtained knowledge about a detection system to disable detection] 
[Element 2] 
multiple systems – [more than one detection system in application within the same area] 
microwave – [detection system using radiofrequency radiation like radar] 
infrared – [movement detectors that work on infrared light or heat changes] 
closed circuit tv – [closed circuit TV cameras with staff monitoring display terminals] 
mobile human guard – [security staff driving or walking around a facility] 
chance detection – [visual detection by a neighbour or an employee or a member of the public] 
Definitions: 
 
Q25-30: 
responds – [the action taken towards restoring security after knowledge that a breach in defence has taken place] 
[Element 1] 
low value goods – [medium value items such as food, stationary or inexpensive electronic goods] 
small cash – [a small amount of money, slightly more than trivial] 
personal valuables – [personal valuables, e.g. jewellery, hi-fi items etc.] 
corporate data – [data from a business interest, human resources information, etc] 
large cash – [a large amount of money, a non-trivial amount] 
human life – [the value of safety of human life] 
[Element 2] 
high tech – [the response of a computer aided electric system, e.g. alarm bells, electronic noise, etc.] 
armed – [a military type response] 
insurance – [the response of an insurance company] 
security patrol – [an organised official type response with vehicle access and dedicated action parameters] 
police – [a law enforcement response] 
general public – [a response by ordinary people] 
 
Q31-36: 
consideration – [the human resources (in working hours) set aside to defensively counter a recognised threat prior to any action] 
[Element 1] 
low value goods – [medium value items such as food, stationary or inexpensive electronic goods] 
small cash – [a small amount of money, slightly more than trivial] 
personal valuables – [personal valuables, e.g. jewellery, etc.] 
corporate data – [data from a business interest, human resources information, etc] 
large cash – [a large amount of money, a non-trivial amount] 
human life – [the value of safety and security of human life] 
[Element 2] 
extreme motivation – [a person of fanatical requirements] 
high motivation – [a person of dedicated purpose to achieve their goals, a loyal follower] 
moderate motivation - [a person of intermediate specific need or requirement, someone that may be influenced by monetary rewards] 
low motivation – [a person of low need or requirement but potentially mischievous] 
very low motivation - [a person of very low requirements or most likely somebody without prior intention] 
accidental - [a person without any bad intention] 
 
Q37-42: 
pre-meditation – [the human resources (in total time) set aside to offensively counter an established defence] 
[Element 1] 
cut power – [disabling detection systems by stopping supply of mains voltage] 
technological attack – [disabling detection systems by creating an incorrect electronic signal or electric current] 
electric tools, explosive - [standard type tools for breaking through structure] 
violent destruction - [disabling physical defence systems by physically breaking critical devices or links] 
[Element 2] 
extreme motivation – [a person of fanatical requirements] 
high motivation – [a person of dedicated purpose to achieve their goals, a loyal follower] 
moderate motivation - [a person of intermediate specific need or requirement, someone that may be influenced by monetary rewards] 
low motivation – [a person of low need or requirement but potentially mischievous] 
very low motivation - [a person of very low requirements or most likely somebody without prior intention] 
accidental - [a person without any bad intention] 
 
Q43-48: 
consideration – [the human resources (in time and money) set aside to defensively counter a recognised threat prior to any action] 
[Element 1] 
low value goods – [medium value items such as food, stationary or inexpensive electronic goods] 
small cash – [a small amount of money, slightly more than trivial] 
personal valuables – [personal valuables, e.g. jewellery, etc.] 
corporate data – [data from a business interest, human resources information, etc] 
large cash – [a large amount of money, a non-trivial amount] 
human life – [the value of safety and security of human life] 
 [Element 2] 
cut power – [disabling detection systems by stopping supply of mains voltage] 
technological attack – [disabling detection systems by creating an incorrect electronic signal or electric current] 
electric tools, explosive - [standard type tools for breaking through structure] 
violent destruction - [disabling physical defence systems by physically breaking critical devices or links] 
 Section A : Consideration of Attack by measuring the term Breaking 
 
Two lists of elements are presented below.  Both comprise a series of terms, which for our purposes are called 
Data Sets 1-6.  Sets 1-6 are based on the terminology of the concept Attack and the verb Breaking. In particular 
they concentrate on the verb Breaking within the concept of Delay. For further explanation of the terminology in 
Sets 1-6 please refer to the Definitions in the Answer Guide. 
 
 
Q1: How long do you think it would take an attack of [Element 1] to break through an [Element 2] barrier? Please 
complete for Sets 1-6 in the table below, checking your answer in the appropriate column under “Estimated Time”. 
 
Note the following:  
- In this instance increased "time" represents better defence.   
- It is appreciated that a range of times values could be used as answers, in these cases please choose a value 
that would represent your initial thoughts of a typical scenario for each. 
- Please try to choose one of the listed "time" values (for further information please see the Answer Guide). 
 
As an example, the first set has been completed for your consideration. 
Element 1 
 
 
Element 2 
  
Estimated Time 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 1                  
rock breaks earth               √  
rock breaks glass               √  
rock breaks wood           √      
rock breaks brick         √        
rock breaks concrete     √            
rock breaks steel   √              
                   
Set 2                   
hammer breaks earth                 
hammer breaks glass                 
hammer breaks wood                 
hammer breaks brick                 
hammer breaks concrete                 
hammer breaks steel                 
                   
Set 3                   
axe breaks earth                 
axe breaks glass                 
axe breaks wood                 
axe breaks brick                 
axe breaks concrete                 
axe breaks steel                 
                   
Set 4                   
electric drill breaks earth                 
electric drill breaks glass                 
electric drill breaks wood                 
electric drill breaks brick                 
electric drill breaks concrete                 
electric drill breaks steel                 
 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 5                  
oxy cutting breaks earth                
oxy cutting breaks glass                
oxy cutting breaks wood                
oxy cutting breaks brick                
oxy cutting breaks concrete                
oxy cutting breaks steel                
                  
Set 6                  
explosive breaks earth                
explosive breaks glass                
explosive breaks wood                
explosive breaks brick                
explosive breaks concrete                
explosive breaks steel                
 
 
Q2a: For Element 1 (as listed above), the Data Sets 1-6 are listed in ascending order of force.  By order of force it is 
meant that explosives have a greater breaking ability than oxy cutting, which has a greater breaking ability than an 
electric drill, than and axe, than a hammer, and finally, than a rock. 
 
Do you agree with the order for Sets 1-6 for Element 1? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q2b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
Q3a: For Element 2 (as listed above), the Data Sets 1-6 are listed in ascending order of strength and ascending 
order of typical material cost.  By order of strength it is meant that steel is stronger than concrete, which is 
stronger than brick, than wood, than glass, than earth.  
 
Do you agree with the order for Sets 1-6 for Element 2? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q3b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
Q4: The Data Set 1-6 for Element 1 is intended to represent a spectrum of force.  The terms are presented here to 
each represent a group of relative force. Can you think of any other items or group terms that could be added to 
the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
You may be able to even think of a new, and better list! 
 
 For example, you may want to add “knife” to the Element 1 list, or replace axe with tin snips, or even provide a new 
list: 
  
 Add or Replace New list 
rock  Knife 
hammer  Chisel 
axe Tin snips Mallet 
electric drill  Tin snips 
oxy cutting  Jack hammer 
explosive  Bomb 
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 Add or Replace New list 
rock   
hammer   
axe   
electric drill   
oxy cutting   
explosive   
 
Q5: The Data Set 1-6 for Element 2 is intended to represent a spectrum of strength.  The terms are presented here to 
each represent a group of relative strength. Can you think of any other items or group terms that could be added 
to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
You may be able to even think of a new, and better list! 
 
 Add or Replace New list 
earth  no barrier 
glass  window 
wood plasterboard door 
brick  wall 
concrete  wall 
steel wire mesh wire mesh fence 
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 Add or Replace New list 
earth   
glass   
wood   
brick   
concrete   
steel   
 
Q6: Do you agree with the alternate terms given in the examples for Q4 and Q5?       Provide reasons: 
 
 
 
Knife 
 
Section B : Consideration of Attack by measuring the term Climbing 
 
New data sets 7-12 are listed below. These sets are based on the terminology of the concept Attack and the verb 
Climbing. In particular they concentrate on the verb Climbing within the concept of Delay. For further explanation of 
the terminology in Sets 7-12 please refer to the Definitions in the Answer Guide. 
 
 
 
Q7: How long do you think it would take [Element 1] to Climb an [Element 2] barrier to completion? Please complete 
for Sets 7-12 in the table below, checking your answer in the appropriate column under “Estimated Time”. 
 
Note the following:  
- In this instance increased "time" represents better defence.   
 
As an example, the first set has been completed for your consideration. 
Element 1 
 
 
Element 2 
  
Estimated Time 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 7                  
no aid climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall + razor wire   
√              
no aid climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall   
√              
no aid climbs 5 human high - steel small mesh fence   
        √      
no aid climbs 3 human high smooth brick wall   
        √      
no aid climbs 3 human high - steel small mesh fence   
        √      
no aid climbs 3 human high steel large mesh fence   
            √  
                   
Set 8                   
ladder climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall + razor wire   
              
ladder climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall   
              
ladder climbs 5 human high - steel small mesh fence   
              
ladder climbs 3 human high smooth brick wall   
              
ladder climbs 3 human high - steel small mesh fence   
              
ladder climbs 3 human high steel large mesh fence   
              
                   
Set 9                   
rope climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall + razor wire   
              
rope climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall   
              
rope climbs 5 human high - steel small mesh fence   
              
rope climbs 3 human high smooth brick wall   
              
rope climbs 3 human high - steel small mesh fence   
              
rope climbs 3 human high steel large mesh fence   
              
                   
 
                  
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 10                   
climbing aids climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall + razor wire   
              
climbing aids climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall   
              
climbing aids climbs 5 human high - steel small mesh fence   
              
climbing aids climbs 3 human high smooth brick wall   
              
climbing aids climbs 3 human high - steel small mesh fence   
              
climbing aids climbs 3 human high steel large mesh fence   
              
                  
Set 11                  
projectiles & 
wire 
climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall + razor wire  
              
projectiles & 
wire 
climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall  
              
projectiles & 
wire 
climbs 5 human high - steel small mesh fence  
              
projectiles & 
wire 
climbs 3 human high smooth brick wall  
              
projectiles & 
wire 
climbs 3 human high - steel small mesh fence  
              
projectiles & 
wire 
climbs 3 human high steel large mesh fence  
              
                  
Set 12                  
flight 
assisted 
climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall + razor wire  
              
flight 
assisted 
climbs 5 human high smooth brick wall  
              
flight 
assisted 
climbs 5 human high - steel small mesh fence  
              
flight 
assisted 
climbs 3 human high smooth brick wall  
              
flight 
assisted 
climbs 3 human high - steel small mesh fence  
              
flight 
assisted 
climbs 3 human high steel large mesh fence  
              
 
 
 
Q7a: For Element 1 (as listed above), the Data Sets 7-12 are listed in ascending order of climbing potential.   
 
Do you agree with the order for Sets 7-12 for Element 1? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q7b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q8a: For Element 2 (as listed above), the Data Sets 7-12 are listed in descending order of barrier potential and 
descending order of typical barrier cost.   
 
Do you agree with the order for Sets 7-12 for Element 2? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q8b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
  
 
Q9: The Data Set 7-12 for Element 1 is intended to represent a spectrum of climbing potential.  The terms are 
presented here to each represent a group of relative climbing potentials. Can you think of any other items or group 
terms that could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 
 
Add or 
Replace New list 
no aid   
ladder   
rope   
climbing aids   
projectiles & wire   
flight assisted   
 
Q10: The Data Set 7-12 for Element 2 is intended to represent a spectrum of height potential.  The terms are presented 
here to each represent a group of relative height potentials. Can you think of any other items or group terms that 
could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
You may be able to even think of a new, and better list! 
  e.g. considering smoothness, height and fence topping 
 
Add or 
Replace New list 
5 human high smooth 
brick wall + razor wire 
 8 human height steel mesh fence – 
small links + razor wire 
5 human high smooth 
brick wall 
 6 human height steel mesh fence – 
small links + razor wire 
5 human high - steel 
small mesh fence 
 4 human height steel mesh fence – 
small links + razor wire 
3 human high smooth 
brick wall 
 3 human height steel mesh fence – 
small links + razor wire 
3 human high - steel 
small mesh fence 
 3 human height steel mesh fence – 
large links + razor wire 
3 human high steel 
large mesh fence 
 2 human height steel mesh fence – 
large links 
 
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 
 
Add or 
Replace New list 
5 human high smooth 
brick wall + razor wire 
 
 
5 human high smooth 
brick wall 
 
 
5 human high - steel 
small mesh fence 
 
 
3 human high smooth 
brick wall 
 
 
3 human high - steel 
small mesh fence 
 
 
3 human high steel 
large mesh fence 
 
 
 
Q11: Do you agree with considering “smoothness, height and fence topping” as alternate terms given in the example for 
Q10?  Provide any reasons: 
 
 
 
 
 
Section C : Consideration of Attack by measuring the term Evading 
 
New data sets 13-18 are listed below. These sets are based on the terminology of the concept Attack and the verb 
Evading. In particular they concentrate on the verb Evading within the concept of Detection. For further explanation 
of the terminology in Sets 13-18 please refer to the Definitions in the Answer Guide. 
 
 
 
Q13: How long do you think it would be possible for an attack using [Element 1] to Evade an [Element 2] detection 
system? Please complete for Sets 13-18 in the table below, checking your answer in the appropriate column under 
“Estimated Time”. 
 
Note the following:  
- In this instance decreased "time" represents better defence.   
 
As an example, the first set has been completed for your consideration. 
Element 1 
 
 
Element 2 
  
Estimated Time 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 13                  
luck 
 
evades 
multiple 
systems   
            √  
luck 
 
evades microwave 
  
            √  
luck 
 
evades infrared 
  
            √  
luck 
 
evades 
closed circuit 
tv   
          √    
luck evades 
mobile 
human guard   
        √      
luck evades 
chance 
detection   
  √            
                   
Set 14                   
colour 
camouflage 
evades 
multiple 
systems   
              
colour 
camouflage 
evades microwave 
  
              
colour 
camouflage 
evades infrared 
  
              
colour 
camouflage 
evades 
closed circuit 
tv   
              
colour 
camouflage 
evades 
mobile 
human guard   
              
colour 
camouflage 
evades 
chance 
detection   
              
 
     Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 15                   
create false 
alarms 
evades 
multiple 
systems   
              
create false 
alarms 
evades microwave 
  
              
create false 
alarms 
evades infrared 
  
              
create false 
alarms 
evades 
closed circuit 
tv   
              
create false 
alarms 
evades 
mobile 
human guard   
              
create false 
alarms 
evades 
chance 
detection   
              
                   
Set 16                   
smoke 
 
evades 
multiple 
systems   
              
smoke 
 
evades microwave 
  
              
smoke 
 
evades infrared 
  
              
smoke 
 
evades 
closed circuit 
tv   
              
smoke evades 
mobile 
human guard   
              
smoke evades 
chance 
detection   
              
                  
Set 17                  
system 
knowledge 
evades 
multiple 
systems  
              
system 
knowledge 
evades microwave 
 
              
system 
knowledge 
evades infrared 
 
              
system 
knowledge 
evades 
closed circuit 
tv  
              
system 
knowledge 
evades 
mobile 
human guard  
              
system 
knowledge 
evades 
chance 
detection  
              
                  
Set 18                  
knowledge 
& diversion 
evades 
multiple 
systems  
              
knowledge 
& diversion 
evades microwave 
 
              
knowledge 
& diversion 
evades infrared 
 
              
knowledge 
& diversion 
evades 
closed circuit 
tv  
              
knowledge 
& diversion 
evades 
mobile 
human guard  
              
knowledge 
& diversion 
evades 
chance 
detection  
              
 
 
 
Q14a: For Element 1 (as listed above), the Data Sets 13-18 are listed in ascending order of evading potential.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 13-18 for Element 1? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q14b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
Q15a: For Element 2 (as listed above), the Data Sets 13-18 are listed in descending order of detecting potential and 
descending order of detecting cost.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 13-18 for Element 2? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q15b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
Q16: The Data Set 13-18 for Element 1 is intended to represent a spectrum of evading potential.  The terms are 
presented here to each represent a group of relative evading potentials. Can you think of any other items or group 
terms that could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
  
 Provide your answer here: 
 
 Add or Replace New list 
luck 
   
colour 
camouflage   
create false 
alarms    
smoke 
   
system 
knowledge   
knowledge & 
diversion   
 
 Q17: The Data Set 13-18 for Element 2 is intended to represent a spectrum of detection potential.  The terms are 
presented here to each represent a group of relative detection potentials. Can you think of any other items or 
group terms that could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
You may be able to think of new terminology. 
 
Example 
 Add or Replace New list 
multiple 
systems  
 
 
microwave 
 
 
 
infrared 
 
Motion sensors 
 
closed circuit 
tv 
 
 
mobile 
human guard 
Security dogs 
 
chance 
detection 
 
 
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 
 Add or Replace New list 
multiple 
systems  
 
 
microwave 
 
 
 
infrared 
 
 
 
closed circuit 
tv 
 
 
mobile 
human guard 
 
 
chance 
detection 
 
 
 
Q18: Do you agree with or have you previously heard of defence in depth in physical security?  i.e. deterrence, 
detection, delay and response?                      
Do you think the terms attack, attacker, and asset fit in with the above list?: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section D : Consideration of Attack by measuring the term Disabling 
 
New data sets 19-24 are listed below. These sets are based on the terminology of the concept Attack and the verb 
Disabling. In particular they concentrate on the verb Disabling within the concept of Detection. For further 
explanation of the terminology in Sets 19-24 please refer to the Definitions in the Answer Guide. 
 
 
Q19: How long do you think it would take an attack by [Element 1] to Disable an [Element 2] detection system? Please 
complete for Sets 19-24 in the table below, checking your answer in the appropriate column under “Estimated 
Time”. 
 
Note the following:  
- In this instance increased "time" represents better defence.   
 
As an example, the first set has been completed for your consideration. 
Element 1 
 
 
Element 2 
  
Estimated Time 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 19                  
accidental 
 
disables 
multiple 
systems   
√              
accidental 
 
disables microwave 
  
√              
accidental 
 
disables infrared 
  
√              
accidental 
 
disables 
closed circuit 
tv   
    √          
accidental disables 
mobile 
human guard   
      √        
accidental disables 
chance 
detection   
        √      
                   
Set 20                   
cut power 
 
disables 
multiple 
systems   
              
cut power 
 
disables microwave 
  
              
cut power 
 
disables infrared 
  
              
cut power 
 
disables 
closed circuit 
tv   
              
cut power disables 
mobile 
human guard   
              
cut power disables 
chance 
detection   
              
 
     Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 21                   
violent 
destruction 
disables 
multiple 
systems   
              
violent 
destruction 
disables microwave 
  
              
violent 
destruction 
disables infrared 
  
              
violent 
destruction 
disables 
closed circuit 
tv   
              
violent 
destruction 
disables 
mobile 
human guard   
              
violent 
destruction 
disables 
chance 
detection   
              
                  
Set 22                   
physical 
intimidation 
disables 
multiple 
systems   
              
physical 
intimidation 
disables microwave 
  
              
physical 
intimidation 
disables infrared 
  
              
physical 
intimidation 
disables 
closed circuit 
tv   
              
physical 
intimidation 
disables 
mobile 
human guard   
              
physical 
intimidation 
disables 
chance 
detection   
              
                  
Set 23                  
electrical 
interference 
disables 
multiple 
systems  
              
electrical 
interference 
disables microwave 
 
              
electrical 
interference 
disables infrared 
 
              
electrical 
interference 
disables 
closed circuit 
tv  
              
electrical 
interference 
disables 
mobile 
human guard  
              
electrical 
interference 
disables 
chance 
detection  
              
                  
Set 24                  
system 
knowledge 
disables 
multiple 
systems  
              
system 
knowledge 
disables microwave 
 
              
system 
knowledge 
disables infrared 
 
              
system 
knowledge 
disables 
closed circuit 
tv  
              
system 
knowledge 
disables 
mobile 
human guard  
              
system 
knowledge 
disables 
chance 
detection  
              
 
 
 
Q20a: For Element 1 (as listed above), the Data Sets 19-24 are listed in ascending order of disabling potential.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 19-24 for Element 1? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q20b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
Q21a: For Element 2 (as listed above), the Data Sets 19-24 are listed in descending order of detecting potential and 
descending order of detecting cost.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 19-24 for Element 2? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q21b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
Q22: The Data Set 19-24 for Element 1 is intended to represent a spectrum of disabling potential.  The terms are 
presented here to each represent a group of relative disabling potentials. Can you think of any other items or group 
terms that could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 
 Add or Replace New list 
accidental 
   
cut power 
   
violent 
destruction   
physical 
intimidation   
electrical 
interference   
system 
knowledge   
 
 Q23: The Data Set for Element 2 is intended to represent a spectrum of detection potential.  The terms are presented 
here to each represent a group of relative detection potentials. Can you think of any other items or group terms 
that could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 
 Add or Replace New list 
multiple 
systems 
 
 
microwave 
 
 
 
infrared 
 
 
 
closed circuit 
tv 
 
 
mobile 
human guard 
 
 
chance 
detection 
 
 
 
Q24: Do you so far agree with the way the questionnaire is evaluating physical security terminology by using “time” as a 
measure?                Provide any opinion: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section E : Consideration of Response by measuring the term Asset 
 
New data sets 25-30 are listed below. These sets are based on the terminology of the concept “Asset” and the 
verb “Respond” in particular considering the Asset type and the Response type. For an explanation of the 
terminology in Sets 25-30 refer to the Definitions in the Answer Guide. 
 
 
Q25: How long do you think it would take [Element 2] to respond to a direct attack on an [Element 1] asset? Please 
complete for Sets 25-30 in the table below, checking your answer in the appropriate column under “Estimated 
Time”. 
 
Note the following:  
- In this instance decreased "time" represents better defence.   
 
As an example, the first set has been completed for your consideration. 
Element 1 
 
 
Element 2 
  
Estimated Time 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 25                  
low value 
goods 
initial 
response by high tech   
√              
low value 
goods 
initial 
response by armed   
√              
low value 
goods 
initial 
response by insurance    
    √          
low value 
goods 
initial 
response by 
security 
patrol   
      √        
low value 
goods 
initial 
response by police   
    √          
low value 
goods 
initial 
response by 
general 
public   
          √    
                   
Set 26                   
small cash initial response by high tech   
              
small cash initial response by armed   
              
small cash initial response by insurance    
              
small cash initial response by 
security 
patrol   
              
small cash initial response by police   
              
small cash initial response by 
general 
public   
              
                   
Set 27                   
personal 
valuables 
initial 
response by high tech   
              
personal 
valuables 
initial 
response by armed   
              
personal 
valuables 
initial 
response by insurance    
              
personal 
valuables 
initial 
response by 
security 
patrol   
              
personal 
valuables 
initial 
response by police   
              
personal 
valuables 
initial 
response by 
general 
public   
              
                    
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 28                   
corporate 
data 
initial 
response by high tech   
              
corporate 
data 
initial 
response by armed   
              
corporate 
data 
initial 
response by insurance    
              
corporate 
data 
initial 
response by 
security 
patrol   
              
corporate 
data 
initial 
response by police   
              
corporate 
data 
initial 
response by 
general 
public   
              
                  
Set 29                  
large cash initial response by high tech  
              
large cash initial response by armed  
              
large cash initial response by insurance   
              
large cash initial response by 
security 
patrol  
              
large cash initial response by police  
              
large cash initial 
response by 
general 
public  
              
                  
Set 30                  
human life initial response by high tech  
              
human life initial response by armed  
              
human life initial 
response by 
insurance   
              
human life initial response by 
security 
patrol  
              
human life initial response by police  
              
human life initial response by 
general 
public  
              
 
 
 
Q26a: For Element 1 (as listed above), the Data Sets 25-30 are listed in ascending order of asset value.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 25-30 for Element 1? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q26b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
Q27a: For Element 2 (as listed above), the Data Sets 25-30 are listed in descending order of typical response cost.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 25-30 for Element 2? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q27b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
Q28: The Data Set for Element 1 is intended to represent a spectrum of asset potential.  The terms are presented here 
to each represent a group of relative asset potentials. Can you think of any other items or group terms that could 
be added to the data set?   
  
 Provide your answer here: 
 Add or Replace New list 
low value 
goods    
small cash 
   
personal 
valuables   
corporate 
data   
large cash 
   
human life 
   
 
Q29: The Data Set for Element 2 is intended to represent a spectrum of response potential.  The terms are presented 
here to each represent a group of relative response potentials. Can you think of any other items or group terms 
that could be added to the data set? 
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 Add or Replace New list 
high tech 
 
 
 
armed 
 
 
 
insurance 
 
 
 
security 
patrol 
 
 
police 
 
 
 
general 
public 
 
 
 
Q30: Do you have confidence in your opinions written in this questionnaire?         
 
 
 
Section F: Consideration of Attacker by measuring the term Asset 
 
New data sets 31-36 are listed below. These sets are based on the terminology of the concept Asset and the verb 
Attack in particular the consideration of the type of Attacker motivation. For an explanation of the terminology in 
Sets 31-36 please refer to the Definitions in the Answer Guide. 
 
 
Q31: How much defence consideration should be given (in total working hours/time) to try to counter an attacker of 
[Element 2] motivation relative to an [Element 1] asset? Please complete for Sets 31-36 in the table below, 
checking your answer in the appropriate column under “Estimated Time”. 
 
Note the following:  
- In this instance increased "time" represents better defence.   
 
As an example, the first set has been completed for your consideration. 
Element 1 
 
 
Element 2 
  
Estimated Time 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 31                  
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
extreme 
motivation   
      √        
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
high 
motivation   
      √        
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
moderate 
motivation   
        √      
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
low 
motivation   
        √      
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
very low 
motivation   
          √    
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration accidental   
            √  
                   
Set 32                   
small cash pre-attack consideration 
extreme 
motivation   
              
small cash pre-attack 
consideration 
high 
motivation   
              
small cash pre-attack 
consideration 
moderate 
motivation   
              
small cash pre-attack consideration 
low 
motivation   
              
small cash pre-attack consideration 
very low 
motivation   
              
small cash pre-attack consideration accidental   
              
                   
Set 33                   
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
extreme 
motivation   
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
high 
motivation   
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
moderate 
motivation   
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
low 
motivation   
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
very low 
motivation   
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration accidental   
              
                    
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 34                   
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
extreme 
motivation   
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
high 
motivation   
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
moderate 
motivation   
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
low 
motivation   
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
very low 
motivation   
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration accidental   
              
                  
Set 35                  
large cash pre-attack consideration 
extreme 
motivation  
              
large cash pre-attack consideration 
high 
motivation  
              
large cash pre-attack consideration 
moderate 
motivation  
              
large cash pre-attack consideration 
low 
motivation  
              
large cash pre-attack 
consideration 
very low 
motivation  
              
large cash pre-attack consideration accidental  
              
                  
Set 36                  
human life pre-attack 
consideration 
extreme 
motivation  
              
human life pre-attack consideration 
high 
motivation  
              
human life pre-attack consideration 
moderate 
motivation  
              
human life pre-attack consideration 
low 
motivation  
              
human life pre-attack consideration 
very low 
motivation  
              
human life pre-attack consideration accidental  
              
 
 
 
Q32a: For Element 1 (as listed above), the Data Sets 31-36 are listed in ascending order of asset value.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 31-36 for Element 1? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q32b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
Q33a: For Element 2 (as listed above), the Data Sets 31-36 are listed in descending order of attacker motivation.   
   
Do you agree with the order for Sets 31-36 for Element 2? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q33b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
Q34: The Data Set 31-36 for Element 1 is intended to represent a spectrum of asset potential.  The terms are presented 
here to each represent a group of relative asset potentials. Can you think of any other items that could be added 
to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?                                       
Provide your answer here: 
 Add or Replace New list 
low value 
goods   
small cash 
   
personal 
valuables   
corporate 
data   
large cash 
   
human life 
   
 
Q35: The Data Set 31-36 for Element 2 is intended to represent a spectrum of attacker motivation.  The terms are 
presented here to each represent a group of relative attacker motivations. Can you think of any other items that 
could be added to the data set? 
 Provide your answer here: 
 Add or Replace New list 
extreme 
motivation 
 
 
high 
motivation 
 
 
moderate 
motivation 
 
 
low 
motivation 
 
 
very low 
motivation 
 
 
accidental 
 
 
 
 
Q36: Do you have any comments on the terminology that has been used in this questionnaire?   
 
 
 
Section G: Consideration of Attacker by measuring the term Attack 
 
New data sets 37-42 are listed below. These sets are based on the terminology of the concept Attacker motivation 
and the verb Attack considering pre-meditation. For further explanation of the terminology in Sets 37-42 please 
refer to the Definitions in the Answer Guide. 
 
 
Q37: How long would you expect it to take (in total pre-meditated time) for an attacker of [Element 2] motivation to adapt 
to attack by the method of [Element 1]? Please complete for Sets 37-42 in the table below, checking your answer 
in the appropriate column under “Estimated Time”. 
 
Note the following:  
- In this instance increased "time" represents a stronger attack.   
 
As an example, the first set has been completed for your consideration. 
Element 1 
 
 Element 2 
  
Estimated Time 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 37                  
cut power attack pre-
meditation 
extreme 
motivation   
          √    
cut power attack pre-
meditation 
high 
motivation   
          √    
cut power attack pre-
meditation 
moderate 
motivation   
          √    
cut power attack pre-
meditation 
low 
motivation   
        √      
cut power attack pre-
meditation 
very low 
motivation   
        √      
cut power attack pre-
meditation accidental   
        √      
                   
Set 38                   
technological 
attack 
attack pre-
meditation 
extreme 
motivation   
              
technological 
attack 
attack pre-
meditation 
high 
motivation   
              
technological 
attack 
attack pre-
meditation 
moderate 
motivation   
              
technological 
attack 
attack pre-
meditation 
low 
motivation   
              
technological 
attack 
attack pre-
meditation 
very low 
motivation   
              
technological 
attack 
attack pre-
meditation accidental   
              
                   
Set 39                   
electric tools attack pre-
meditation 
extreme 
motivation   
              
electric tools attack pre-
meditation 
high 
motivation   
              
electric tools attack pre-
meditation 
moderate 
motivation   
              
electric tools attack pre-
meditation 
low 
motivation   
              
electric tools attack pre-
meditation 
very low 
motivation   
              
electric tools attack pre-
meditation accidental   
              
                    
     Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 40                  
physical 
intimidation 
attack pre-
meditation 
extreme 
motivation   
              
physical 
intimidation 
attack pre-
meditation 
high 
motivation   
              
physical 
intimidation 
attack pre-
meditation 
moderate 
motivation   
              
physical 
intimidation 
attack pre-
meditation 
low 
motivation   
              
physical 
intimidation 
attack pre-
meditation 
very low 
motivation   
              
physical 
intimidation 
attack pre-
meditation accidental   
              
                  
Set 41                  
violent 
destruction 
attack pre-
meditation 
extreme 
motivation  
              
violent 
destruction 
attack pre-
meditation 
high 
motivation  
              
violent 
destruction 
attack pre-
meditation 
moderate 
motivation  
              
violent 
destruction 
attack pre-
meditation 
low 
motivation  
              
violent 
destruction 
attack pre-
meditation 
very low 
motivation  
              
violent 
destruction 
attack pre-
meditation accidental  
              
                  
Set 42                  
explosive attack pre-
meditation 
extreme 
motivation  
              
explosive attack pre-
meditation 
high 
motivation  
              
explosive attack pre-
meditation 
moderate 
motivation  
              
explosive attack pre-
meditation 
low 
motivation  
              
explosive attack pre-
meditation 
very low 
motivation  
              
explosive attack pre-
meditation 
accidental  
              
 
 
 
Q38a: For Element 1 (as listed above), the Data Sets 37-42 are listed in ascending order of attack force.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 37-42 for Element 1? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q38b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
Q39a: For Element 2 (as listed above), the Data Sets 37-42 are listed in descending order of attacker motivation.   
   
Do you agree with the order for Sets 37-42 for Element 2? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q39b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
Q40: The Data Set 37-42 for Element 1 is intended to represent a spectrum of attacking force. The terms are presented 
here to each represent a group of relative attack potentials. Can you think of any other items or group terms that 
could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?                 
Provide your answer here: 
 Add or Replace New list 
cut power 
   
technological 
attack   
electric tools 
   
physical 
intimidation   
violent 
destruction   
explosive 
   
 
Q41: The Data Set 37-42 for Element 2 is intended to represent a spectrum of attacker motivation.  The terms are 
presented here to each represent a group of relative asset potentials. Can you think of any other items or group 
terms that could be added to the data set?  
Provide your answer here: 
 Add or Replace New list 
extreme 
motivation 
 
 
high 
motivation 
 
 
moderate 
motivation 
 
 
low 
motivation 
 
 
very low 
motivation 
 
 
accidental 
 
 
 
 
Q42: Do you have any comments on this questionnaire using “verbs” to help to measure “concepts” within the 
terminology presented?                            
 
 
 
Section H: Consideration of Attack by measuring the term Asset 
 
New data sets 43-48 are listed below. These sets are based on the terminology of the concept Asset and the verb 
Attack considered pre-attack. For further explanation of the terminology in Sets 43-48 please refer to the 
Definitions in the Answer Guide. 
 
 
Q43: How much defence consideration should be given (in total working hours/time) for an [Element 2] type attack 
relative to an [Element 1] asset? Please complete for Sets 43-48 in the table below, checking your answer in the 
appropriate column under “Estimated Time”. 
 
Note the following:  
- In this instance increased "time" represents a more likely attack.   
 
As an example, the first set has been completed for your consideration. 
Element 1 
 
 Element 2 
  
Estimated Time 
    Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 43                  
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
cut power 
  
    √          
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
technological 
attack   
            √  
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
electric tools 
  
    √          
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
physical 
intimidation   
        √      
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
violent 
destruction   
        √      
low value 
goods 
pre-attack 
consideration 
explosive 
  
            √  
                   
Set 44                   
small cash pre-attack 
consideration 
cut power 
  
              
small cash pre-attack 
consideration 
technological 
attack   
              
small cash pre-attack 
consideration 
electric tools 
  
              
small cash pre-attack 
consideration 
physical 
intimidation   
              
small cash pre-attack 
consideration 
violent 
destruction   
              
small cash pre-attack 
consideration 
explosive 
  
              
                   
Set 45                   
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
cut power 
  
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
technological 
attack   
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
electric drill 
  
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
physical 
intimidation   
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
violent 
destruction   
              
personal 
valuables 
pre-attack 
consideration 
explosive 
  
              
                   
     Ye  Mo  We  Da  Hrs  Min  Sec  
Set 46                   
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
cut power 
  
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
technological 
attack   
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
electric tools 
  
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
physical 
intimidation   
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
violent 
destruction   
              
corporate 
data 
pre-attack 
consideration 
explosive 
  
              
                  
Set 47                  
large cash pre-attack 
consideration 
cut power 
 
              
large cash pre-attack 
consideration 
technological 
attack  
              
large cash pre-attack 
consideration 
electric tools 
 
              
large cash pre-attack 
consideration 
physical 
intimidation  
              
large cash pre-attack 
consideration 
violent 
destruction  
              
large cash pre-attack 
consideration 
explosive 
 
              
                  
Set 48                  
human life pre-attack 
consideration 
cut power 
 
              
human life pre-attack 
consideration 
technological 
attack  
              
human life pre-attack 
consideration 
electric tools 
 
              
human life pre-attack 
consideration 
physical 
intimidation  
              
human life pre-attack 
consideration 
violent 
destruction  
              
human life pre-attack 
consideration 
explosive 
 
              
 
 
 
Q44a: For Element 1 (as listed above), the Data Sets 43-48 are listed in ascending order of asset value.   
  
Do you agree with the order for Sets 43-48 for Element 1? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q44b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
Q45a: For Element 2 (as listed above), the Data Sets 43-48 are listed in ascending order of attacking force.   
   
Do you agree with the order for Sets 43-48 for Element 2? Please circle your response below. 
 
Yes   No  
 
Q45b:  Please state your reasons for your answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
Q46: The Data Set 43-48 for Element 1 is intended to represent a spectrum of asset potential. The terms are presented 
here to each represent a group of relative asset potentials. Can you think of any other items or group terms that 
could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
  
 Provide your answer here: 
 
 Add or Replace New list 
low value 
goods   
small cash 
   
personal 
valuables   
corporate 
data   
large cash 
   
human life 
   
 
 
Q47: The Data Set 43-48 for Element 2 is intended to represent a spectrum of attacking force. The terms are presented 
here to each represent a group of relative attack potentials. Can you think of any other items or group terms that 
could be added to the data set, or could replace items already in the data set?   
 
 Provide your answer here: 
 
 Add or Replace New list 
cut power 
 
 
 
electrical 
interference 
 
 
electric drill  
 
 
 
physical 
intimidation 
 
 
violent 
destruction 
 
 
explosive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q48: Do you have any other comments on the overall method used in this questionnaire?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q49: Do you think that real-life facilities (buildings) – when considering the terminology of their physical structures, can 
be represented (with each part defined as a physical security component) by using at least one of the terminology 
categories presented in this questionnaire?  
  
i.e. Do you think that a small finite set of terms can adequately describe a real-life facility? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q50: Do you think the physical security of a real-life facility can be adequately represented by using terminology 
spectrums as presented in this questionnaire? 
 
 i.e. Do you think that a small finite set of terms can adequately describe the physical security of a real-life 
facility? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this Questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
 
 
Summary of the elements numbers identified from each interview of the Pilot Study.  
(Interviews 2, 3 and 4 include fixed boundary conditions)  
 Interview #1 
Elements 
Interview #2 
Elements 
Interview #3 
Elements 
Interview #4 
Elements 
Boundary condition /  
Concept topic 
    
Determining if and when an 
attack is taking place 
 22 12 18 
Physically slowing an attack 
using the structure 
surrounding an asset 
 45 11 21 
Responding to an attack in 
sufficient time 
 18 6 7 
Considering the value of an 
asset/quality and quantity of 
resources 
 9 21 9 
Target hardening 21    
Alarms 8    
Lighting 4    
Locks 4    
Fire safety 3    
CCTV 2    
     
Totals 42 94 50 55 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
C1: Section A 
The considerations from Section A provide some insight into the choices that have been recorded in the Question 1 value assessments 
of element pair combinations in the questionnaire. The conceptual ordering of the elements into lists presents a semantic challenge 
where as in contrast to numeric ordering, a standard conceptual order of terminology does not exist in our understanding of knowledge. 
Exceptions to rules will always be a contentious problem whenever an absolute statement on ranked order of latent variables is 
presented. Despite the potential for exceptions Table 1 and Table 2 both show high acceptance among respondents to the ordered lists 
presented with 71% agreement and 82% agreement respectively. Table 1 considered elements along the concept continuum used in a 
force attack (breaking) and Table 2 indicated elements over the concept continuum used for material strength. 
 
Comments received from respondents mainly indicated general agreement toward the ranked order of elements listed however as can 
be seen in Table 1 and Table 2 some respondents have indicated that the questionnaire did not supply enough specific information to 
suit their preference when making an assessment. The point being made by respondents, identified as a lack of specific information is 
understandable for this research. It forms the original basis of the problem of modelling as it would be unlikely that sufficient specific 
information for each value assessment could realistically be produced in a questionnaire format to suit all respondents. This leads to the 
necessity of respondents considering a “general” case when providing their element pair assessments. The “general” case requires that 
the many unspecified details relating to each judgement be subconsciously considered and moderated from respondent intuition, 
representing a best estimate for moderation in all cases. It is this “general” case that this study has considered to provide a means to 
reduce complexity through distillation of complicating factors through human judgement and yet still provide reasonably accurate 
indications. However it must be understood that these indications will each be subjective and therefore relative to a single knowledge 
structure. It is only by the consideration of many subjective and relative indications that value assessments can provide a more holistic 
map of understanding. Thus a consensus approach should be representative of commonly accepted knowledge within the field of 
physical security.  
 
The identification of a definitive order between the elements is not as important to this research as the understanding of a dimensional 
magnitude between them in a semantic and relational sense relative to the concept continuum that they each represent. The elements 
listed can be considered as universal elements when they are simple reference levels on the dimension of each concept continuum. 
Whether these elements are slightly out of order or absolutely correct in their rankings can only be determined with an exhaustive 
comparison approach considering paired elements rankings along each corresponding and “orthogonal” dimension of each boundary 
condition. The example for Table 2 exists where several respondents seemed unsure about the potential order was between an electric 
drill compared to a hammer and an axe. This is reasonable as there are complicating factors that are manifest in ranking these items. 
Electric drills ideally require mains power or otherwise a mobile power source, while axe and hammer are human powered. Similarly 
hammer and axe work best against material structures of lower strength while electric drills can work better against stronger based 
material structures but usually in a more localised area. Many other complicating factors exist and it is beyond the scope of this 
research to discuss them. 
 
A further example of an element that was particularly seen as a poor fit into a ranked order for several respondent’s general case 
scenarios in was the element of oxy cutting, where this element shows more affinity to metallic type substances rather than ceramic 
type substances for breaking purposes. This indication by a reasonable number of respondents points to a need to continue further value 
assessment for this element in additional orders of hierarchy. While it is beyond the scope of this research to provide these to 
eventually determine the hierarchical structure of complex elements in additional lower orders of hierarchy, further iterations of this 
study’s method should be able to provide results that can be unanimously accepted by respondents.  
 
It is however within the scope of this research to highlight from the comments of respondents any elements where this process may 
provide a better indication of consensus. It is hoped that with a large range of respondents’ opinions that cases such as this throughout 
the questionnaire would still provide a range of general case scenarios and that even considering contentious results should still be 
indicative to some degree of consensus. There is a similar parallel to Table 2 where several respondents indicated that different 
materials reacted differently to different tools.  
 
The results from Table 2 suggest that the strength and available quantity of a barrier is likely to be directly proportional to the cost of 
materials. The respondents in the study have generally agreed to the suggestion of the questionnaire that barrier strength is proportional 
to an estimate of cost for each material and this provides a useful concept continuum for the mapping in terms of selection of barrier 
relative to the asset.  The consideration of cost for a physical security scenario will in most cases be a simple quantitative calculation of 
each of the selected physical security elements over a defined region by a cost per unit area.  Other cost factors may affect this 
calculation such including potential future running and maintenance costs to physical security. 
 
Table 2 has also indicated from respondent suggestions that the density and thickness need to be established for more accurate 
assessments. The inclusion of an additional layer of hierarchy to consider the effect of various densities and thicknesses should provide 
more accurate assessments. The general case for these materials however should still provide some indication of the relative 
effectiveness and therefore some degree of consensus. 
 
The extended list of elements compiled from respondent’s suggestions was designed to indicate where potential new elements could be 
added to the universal elements listing in order to provide more reference points if required. An extended list is able in this manner to 
provide a dictionary of alternate reference levels and in this manner it may be possible to consider an exhaustive list of elements within 
a knowledge structure. For Table 1 and Table 2 it is evident that the list of extended elements provides a rich set of alternatives to the 
universal elements listed. As can be seen by the extended in Table 1 and Table 2 some of the extended elements presented are actually 
comments by respondents that begin with “what type of …”. These have been included in the extended list as they indicate that there 
may be multiple forms of each element type. Although this is ideally the case for all elements to a degree, it would seem valuable for a 
true and ideal extended list to recognise all variation and be able to rank them accordingly. The inclusion of several types of each 
element would easily have increased the length of the questionnaire and potentially reduced questionnaire return rates. Therefore the 
lists as they stand are not able to be better detailed in the scope of this research. 
 
In both Table 1 and Table 2 the extended list suggests elements in more than one ranked order position. This would most likely suggest 
that the elements operate at a range of effectiveness and this leads to a fuzzy ranking for each of these elements. In cases such as these 
more specific information is needed and a consideration of a lower order of hierarchy may be useful to provide this specific 
information. The best example of this from Table 1 are a jackhammer and diamond tipped electric cutter, while for Table 2 examples 
of this include the ranges that have been selected for concrete and brick walls. 
 
This study acknowledges that the lists of universal elements are not comprehensive lists of data representing the dimension of the 
concept continuum, however as reference levels along this dimension they have been relatively successful in generating agreement 
among respondents. The ranked order of the elements has been generally accepted by respondents and the extended lists of elements 
have suggested many potential additions to the universal element list in a useful order for extended referencing of the dimension. 
Table 1 Section A, Sets 1-6 Element 1 – considering the action “breaking through” 
Elements in 
rank order 
Question 4: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
rock knife, shovel, hand, fist, screwdriver, rock size, rock shape, hammer 
 crow bar, bar/rod, hand, metal pole, air pressure 
hammer chisel, bat, chisel, what type of hammer, size & weight will make a difference 
 power, sledge hammer, sledgehammer 
axe mallet, saw, bolt cutter, what size & type of axe, jackhammer 
 hydraulic, hack saw 
electric drill tin snips, ((electric drill)) chain saw, angle grinder, handgun, what type of drill e.g. size & speed & type of drill bit, 
oxy cutting 
 diamond tipped electric cutter, O2 gas, electric saw 
oxy cutting jack hammer, ((oxy cutting)) sledge hammer, ((oxy cutting)) jackhammer, laser, what type of oxy gas & tips used, 
car ram raid 
 diamond tipped electric cutter, motor car 
explosive bomb, what type of explosive 
  
Question 2a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
71% agreement for the presented ranked order from the least force to the greatest force downwards. 
 
Question 2b: Summary of comments received by frequency of comment 
10 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
6 respondents indicated that the application of oxy cutting was specific to metal and would not be applicable on the other type materials 
e.g. brick, earth. 
3 respondents indicated that all tools worked differently for different materials which made assessment difficult. 
3 respondent indicated concern that an electric drill my not have the force of a hammer or an axe. 
1 respondent indicated that the lack of specific information made this assessment difficult e.g. unknown thickness of materials, weight 
of attack item, force of blow, speed of drill, etc. 
1 respondent indicated that the chemical structure needed to be assessed during the interaction with the tools used. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 Table 2 Section A, Sets 1-6 Element 2 – considering the action “breaking through” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 5: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
earth no barrier, no barrier, paper, dirt, clay, glass sliding door, impaction of earth, no barrier 
 wood 
glass window, window, glass, glass (normal), Perspex, plastic, window, strength, window 
 safety glass, wire mesh, limestone 
wood door, plasterboard, door, ice, brick wall, tiles, tin roof, what type solid jarrah or plywood, door 
 bullet proof glass, colourbond fence, security mesh 
brick gyprock wall, wire fence, wood, concrete wall, brick and concrete are kind of similar, wall, what type solid brick or 
verticore, brick wall 
 composites 
concrete wall, brick wall, brick, steel, walls are generally more expensive than fences, plain concrete or reinforced, concrete 
wall 
 reinforced concretes 
steel wire mesh fence, ((steel)) reinforced concrete, concrete, reinforced concrete, thickness, steel plated wall 
  
Question 3a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
82% agreement for the presented ranked order from the least material strength to the greatest material strength downwards. 
 
Question 3b: Summary of comments received by frequency of comment 
5 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
3 respondents indicated that the thickness/density needed to be stated for different materials to make a better assessment of strength. 
3 respondents indicated that tools worked differently on different materials which made the assessment difficult. 
3 respondents indicated that they had doubts about the inclusion of earth in the list. 
3 respondent indicated that the lack of specific information made this assessment difficult e.g. type of glass, type of wood, solid jarrah 
or ply, etc. 
2 respondents indicated that the order between concrete and steel may be swapped. 
1 respondent indicated that the order would be close between wood and brick. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 C2: Section B 
The results from Section B consider Table 3 and Table 4 in Appendix C2 which present similar respondent sentiments to those for 
Section A. The main similarity in the comments from respondents relate to the lack of specific information available to make value 
assessments. The same rationale applies to Question 7 in the questionnaire where the necessity of respondents considering a “general” 
case in providing element pair assessments requires that the many unspecified details relating to each judgement be subconsciously 
considered and moderated from respondent intuition. In this “general” case complexity can be reduced through distillation of 
complicating factors by human judgement. Table 3 considered elements along the concept continuum used in a climbing attack and 
Table 4 indicated elements over the concept continuum used for barrier dimension and type. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 3 in Appendix C2 shows a general lack of agreement with the ranked ordering with only 41% agreement. 
This can mostly be described by the perception that most respondents saw the ordering of ladder and rope to be reversed, with a ladder 
considered to be more of a general threat to security. Some concern was also evident from comments received as to the inclusion of the 
term climbing aids. An additional problem that was brought up by two respondents was the issue of getting down from a steep barrier 
after using a particular climbing method. Although this presents an interesting issue, it is beyond the scope of the study to consider it 
further and it may be better considered by additional hierarchical investigation in any future work. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 4 in Appendix C2 was found to have 82% agreement with the ranked order. The series of universal elements 
in this part of the questionnaire were more specific than the corresponding element list representing Section A concept continuums. The 
concept continuum included barrier dimensions and type with three variation parts including height, barrier smoothness, and barrier 
topping. Due to this three part comparison the universal element list attempted to provide reference levels along the continuum for 
climbing with two various height levels, three different types of smooth/rough surface types and one addition of fence topping for 
comparison. A result of 82% percent agreement with the ranked order of this list is a good result in that it suggests that scale between 
the lowest and easiest barrier 3 human high - steel large mesh fence and the highest and hardest barrier 5 human high smooth brick wall 
+ razor wire is well represented with reference levels.  
 
Given that the universal element list in Table 4 of Appendix C was more specific than those of Section A, the extended elements 
suggested by respondents were more similar to those of the universal element list however it is noteworthy to identify the suggestions 
for the lowest and highest barriers were suggested such that the lowest barrier presented an easer climbing potential and the highest 
presented a more difficult design which effectively suggests that the scale could be broadened marginally. The extended list of Table 3 
in Appendix C provided a few additional interesting methods of climbing however most of these were located nearer to the lowest 
climbing potential methods listed no aid, ladder and rope.  
 Table 3 Section B, Sets 7-12 Element 1 – considering the action “climbing on” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 10: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
no aid human help, drive up car next to fence 
 small (define size) ladder, carpet, carpet 
ladder 
large (define size) ladder,  multiple people, ((ladder)) rope, ((ladder)) rope, ((ladder)) rope, type, height, size of 
ladder - no specifics as to tools used.,((ladder)) rope 
 
rope no grapple, rope, pole vault, makes it hard to answer Q7 even though definitions have been provided there are 
still other factors 
rope 
rope with grapple, ((rope)) ladder, ((rope)) climbing aids, attachments?, ((rope)) lift/hydrolics, ((rope)) ladder, 
people, ((rope)) climbing aids, other things may effect outcome, ((rope)) climbing aids 
  
climbing aids 
((climbing aids)) projectiles & wire, trampoline, human assistance, ((climbing aids)) ladder, ((climbing aids)) 
ladder 
 large cannon 
projectiles & 
wire ((projectiles & wire)) tall ladder, cherry picker, cherry picker, 
  
flight assisted helicopter, ((flight assisted)), ((flight assisted)) 
  
Question 8a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
41.2% agreement for the presented ranked order from the least climbing aid to the greatest climbing aid downwards. 
 
Question 8b: Summary of comments received by frequency of comment 
8 respondents indicated that the order between ladder and rope may be swapped. 
5 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
5 respondents indicated that the order between ladder and climbing aids or ladder and projectiles & wire may be swapped. 
2 respondents indicated that getting down from the barrier height may pose a problem. 
1 respondent indicated that the order between projectiles & wire and rope may be swapped. 
1 respondent indicated that they had doubts about the inclusion of flight assisted in the list. 
1 respondent indicated that they found climbing aids too general. 
1 respondent indicated that the order would depend strongly on the type of element e.g. a sophisticated ladder. 
1 respondent indicated they saw potential difficulty in carrying of a large ladder to a barrier. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 
 Table 4 Section B, Sets 7-12 Element 2 – considering the action “climbing on” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 11: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
5 human high 
smooth brick 
wall + razor wire 
8 human height steel mesh fence - small links + razor wire, Palisade fence, slip / barbed wire / topping, 3m high 
smooth concrete wall, 8 human height steel mesh fence - small links + razor wire, Palisade fence, & outriggers, 8 
human high smooth… + razor 
 3 strands barbed wire, slip & barbed wire, razor wire is expensive compared to no wire 
5 human high 
smooth brick 
wall 
6 human height steel mesh fence - small links + razor wire,  3m high smooth brick wall, 6 human height steel mesh 
fence - small links + razor wire, 6 human high smooth… + razor wire, barbed wire 
 barbed wire 
5 human high - 
steel small mesh 
fence 
4 human height steel mesh fence - small links + razor wire, 3m high 358 weld mesh fence, ((5 human high - steel 
small mesh fence)) 3 human high smooth brick wall, 4 human height steel mesh fence - small links + razor wire, 5 
human high smooth… + razor wire 
 slippery flat surface 
3 human high 
smooth brick 
wall 
3 human height steel mesh fence - small links + razor wire, 3m high expamet fence, ((3 human high smooth brick 
wall)) 5 human high - steel small mesh fence, 3 human height steel mesh fence - small links + razor wire 
 flat 
3 human high - 
steel small mesh 
fence 
3 human height steel mesh fence - large links + razor wire, 3m high chain link fence, 3 human height steel mesh 
fence - large links + razor wire 
 uneven surface 
3 human high - 
steel large mesh 
fence 
2 human height steel mesh fence - large links, 3m high ring lock fence, 2 human height steel mesh fence - large 
links 
  
Question 9a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
82.4% agreement for the presented ranked order from the greatest climbing obstacle to the least climbing obstacle downwards. 
 
Question 9b: Summary of comments received by frequency of comment 
6 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
3 respondents indicated that brick walls would be more expensive and metal fences would be cheaper. 
2 respondents indicated that it would be more difficult to climb a smaller brick wall than a larger steel fence in some circumstances. 
1 respondent indicated uncertainty between the order of difficulty for a small mesh fence and a large mesh fence. 
1 respondent indicated that any fence with razor wire would make it easier to hook a grappling device onto it. 
1 respondent indicated that they considered razor wire expensive. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 
C3: Section C 
The results from Section C consider Table 5 and Table 6 in Appendix C3 which present similar respondent sentiments to those for 
Section A with the main similarity again relating to the lack of specific information available to make value assessments. The “general” 
case in providing element pair assessments is again required to be exercised for each judgement. Table 5 considered elements along the 
concept continuum used in a stealth attack and Table 6 indicated elements over the concept continuum used for detection system. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 5 in Appendix C3 shows a strong agreement with the ranked ordering of 88% agreement. The only 
comment that seemed to counter the ranked order of the universal elements listed was a comment that the list of potential attacking 
mechanisms was endless. Suggestions of uncertainty over the use of luck and smoke for evasion techniques were noted. The extended 
element list for Table 5 contained several indications for the use of stealth however the ranked order of stealth was difficult to ascertain 
as it varied in its suggested position with the few respondent’s indications. Insider assistance also varied across the scale. With such 
variation these extended elements may provide more useful reference levels with an additional consideration of hierarchical levels and 
investigation into the component elements of both stealth and insider assistance. The strong agreement for this concept continuum 
indicates a good chance to achieve consensus. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 6 in Appendix C3 was found to have 71% agreement with the ranked order. Some consideration of the 
broadness in scope of mobile human guard was suggested as the greatest unknown entity. Several respondents considered human 
guards to be the most cost effective while others considered electronic devices to be cheaper in the long run. One opinion considered 
visual detection systems to be less effective while several opinions considered multiple systems to be the most effective. One 
respondent indicated that the techniques listed were too different to compare. The figure of 71% agreement however indicates that a 
majority of respondents did not consider the list to pose too many contentious issues and the lowest considered and the highest 
considered detection systems of chance detection and multiple detection systems respectively provide a suitable scale for reference 
levels to be provided for the other systems listed. 
 
The extended elements suggested by respondents for Table 6 in Appendix C3 suggested most of the additional detection systems 
located nearer to the highest detection potentials listed of multiple systems, microwave and infrared. The extended elements suggested 
provides a rich series of alternate reference level items however as these all seem to be within the same region of effectiveness, it 
would seem that it does not make a large difference which electronic detection system is in place with respect to the concept continuum 
order of magnitude.  
 
Comments obtained from research questionnaire have suggested that detection potential is a balance in cost between long term and 
short term objectives. The results from the Table 6 in Appendix C3 suggest that the sensitivity and effectiveness of a detection system 
may be directly proportional to the cost of technology and the cost of human expertise. This additional consideration provides another 
potentially useful concept continuum for a knowledge mapping of this area in terms of selection of human or non-human measures for 
detection expenditure.  The consideration in a security scenario will in most cases be a simple quantitative calculation of the physical 
security elements cost per unit over a defined region and perimeter length.  Other cost factors will affect this calculation such as 
running and maintenance costs. 
 Table 5 Section C, Sets 13-18 Element 1 – considering the action “evading detection” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 16: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
luck the potentials are endless, no it's a good list. 
 heat 
colour 
camouflage heat or cooling camouflage 
 wood shield 
create false 
alarms disguise, animals 
 stealth 
smoke stealth, multiple people, inside helper, deception 
  
system 
knowledge using guard 
 stealth 
knowledge & 
diversion insider info 
  
Question 14a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
88.2% agreement for the presented ranked order from the least stealth-like activity to the greatest stealth-like activity downwards. 
 
Question 14b: Summary of comments received by frequency of comment 
8 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
2 respondents indicated that using luck as an evasion technique would seem very careless. 
1 respondent indicated that large amounts of smoke would cause suspicions. 
1 respondent indicated that any comparison would depend on the competence and training for mobile guards. 
1 respondent indicated that the techniques being compared were too different to compare. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 Table 6 Section C, Sets 13-18 Element 2 – considering the action “evading detection” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 17: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
  
multiple systems 
multiple system placement, In the long run, multiple systems, infrared, microwave, are going to be a cheaper 
alternative than mobile human guards. -> initial cost expensive but cheap to maintain., sterile zone, pretty much 
covers it 
 Dual tech - microwave & PIR, buried cable perimeter detection, acoustic detectors 
microwave 
Reed switches, fence mounted perimeter detection, In the long run, multiple systems, infrared & microwave, are 
going to be a cheaper alternative than mobile human guards. ->initial cost expensive but cheap to maintain., 
microphone sensors, motion sensors 
 vibration sensor, microwave outdoor detection 
infrared 
motion sensors, acoustic sensor, electric field detection, In the long run - multiple systems, infrared, microwave, 
are going to be a cheaper alternative than mobile human guards. -> initial cost expensive but cheap to maintain., 
motion sensors, trip 
 security dogs, outdoor PIR detection 
closed circuit tv ((closed circuit tv)) mobile human guard, cameras, monitored cctv 
 glass breaks, security dogs 
mobile human 
guard 
security dogs, ((mobile human guard)) closed circuit tv, guards are expensive, unpredictable, more expensive in the 
long run, security guard 
  
chance detection  
  
Question 15a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
70.6% agreement for the presented ranked order from the greatest detection system to the least detection system downwards. 
 
Question 15b: Summary of comments received by frequency of comment 
5 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
3 respondents indicated that electronic detection devices would be a cheaper expense in the long run. 
2 respondents indicated that the number of detection systems in place would be more effective against an attack. 
2 respondents indicated that they considered mobile human guards to be the most cost effective. 
1 respondent indicated uncertainty in the order of effectiveness and cost between a mobile guard and cctv. 
1 respondent indicated that any visual detection system would be less effective. 
1 respondent indicated that humans were the greatest unknown entity in the list. 
1 respondent indicated that multiple systems would cost a lot more than a single system. 
1 respondent indicated that the techniques being compared were too different to compare. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 
 
C4: Section D 
The results from Section D consider Table 7 and Table 8 in Appendix C4 which present similar respondent sentiments to those for 
Section C with the extract similarity being the detection systems used. Table 7 considered elements along the concept continuum used 
in a force attack (disabling) and Table 8 indicated elements over the concept continuum used for detection system. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 7 in Appendix C4 shows a weak agreement with the ranked ordering of 47% agreement. The ranked order 
considered universal elements listed for disabling detection systems including violent destruction and physical intimidation. These two 
universal elements in particular were considered to be in reversed order with violent destruction generally considered to be a more 
effective means of disabling. A general sentiment for physical intimidation was that it should be represented lower in the ranked order 
than its original listing. Of worthy note was some indication that cut power was very dependent on the existence of a uninterruptible 
power source (UPS). The lowest and the highest disabling techniques of accidental and system knowledge respectively were not 
disputed. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 8 in Appendix C4 was found to have 65% agreement with the ranked order. This result was 6% lower for 
the same concept continuum as Section C (Table 6 Appendix C3). It is difficult to explain the slight drop in agreement however this 
does include a slight reduction in response rate over the questions of the questionnaire. The level of agreement of 65% nevertheless still 
indicates a high probability of achieving consensus. 
 
The extended elements suggested by respondents for Table 7 in Appendix C4 suggested some additional disabling techniques however 
most were similar to the listed universal elements. 
 Table 7 Section D, Sets 19-24 Element 1 – considering the action “disabling detection” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 22: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
accidental Act of God, trip or power surge, bypass, accidental 
 disable phone line, physical intimidation 
cut power 
((cut power)), ((cut power)) tampering, with UPS or not?, pliers, depends if back up power is available or not (UPS 
system), no maintenance on devices 
  
violent 
destruction 
((violent destruction)), ((violent destruction)) physical intimidation, explosion, the potentials are endless, system 
knowledge 
  
physical 
intimidation 
((intimidation)), ((physical intimidation)), ((physical intimidation)) violent destruction, use of violence, army, 
manipulation of operators 
 violent destruction, cut power, bribe, blackmail, intimidation 
electrical 
interference generator, violent destruction 
 cut power, insider help, insider 
system 
knowledge placement knowledge, disgruntled employee, disgruntled employee, cut power and backup power 
  
Question 20a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
47.1% agreement for the presented ranked order from the greatest detection system to the least detection system downwards. 
 
Question 20b: Summary of comments received by frequency of comment 
4 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
4 respondents indicated that physical intimidation would be better represented down the list as a lower force attack on detection 
systems. 
3 respondents indicated that physical intimidation could be swapped with violent destruction in the order. 
3 respondents indicated that violent destruction should be represented higher in the order. 
3 respondents indicated that to successfully cut power would depend on the presence of an uninterruptible power supply (UPS). 
2 respondents indicated that physical intimidation could be swapped with cut power in the order. 
1 respondent indicated that the techniques being compared were too different to compare. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
  
Table 8 Section D, Sets 19-24 Element 2 – considering the action “disabling detection” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 23: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
multiple systems defence in depth 
 Dual tech - microwave & PIR, pretty much covers them 
microwave Reed switches 
 vibration sensor 
infrared acoustic sensor 
  
closed circuit tv ((closed circuit tv)) mobile human guard 
 glass breaks 
mobile human 
guard ((mobile human guard)) closed circuit tv, guards are expensive 
  
chance detection accidental 
  
Question 21a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
64.7% agreement for the presented ranked order from the greatest detection system to the least detection system downwards. 
 
Question 21b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
8 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
1 respondent indicated that electronic detection devices would be a cheaper expense in the long run although initially more expensive. 
1 respondent indicated that they considered mobile human guards more effective. 
1 respondent indicated that they considered mobile human guards to be expensive. 
1 respondent indicated that mobile guard and cctv should be swapped. 
1 respondent indicated that humans were the greatest unknown entity and that electronic devices were more reliable. 
1 respondent indicated that the techniques being compared were too different to compare. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 
 
C5: Section E 
The results from Section E consider Table 9 and Table 10 in Appendix C5. Table 9 considered elements along the concept continuum 
for assets and Table 10 indicated elements over the concept continuum of response type. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 9 in Appendix C5 shows a strong agreement with the ranked ordering of 76% agreement. The only 
comment that seemed to counter the ranked order of the universal elements listed were those that considered the assets of corporate 
data and large cash to be similar and potentially to be swapped in order. The other noteworthy comment was one respondent 
commented that human life was not able to be measured. This has been noted as human life is representative of the highest reference 
level of the concept continuum for asset. The extended elements suggested by respondents for Table 9 in Appendix C5 suggested some 
additional assets however most were similar to the listed universal elements. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 10 in Appendix C5 was also found to have 76% agreement with the ranked order. The main noteworthy 
comment from several respondents was that the general public, represented as the lowest considered type of response with respect to 
time was not able to be relied upon during an attack and if they did it may not be constructive. A high tech response was noted as not so 
applicable to human life and insurance as a response was thought by one respondent to be inappropriate for the list. The general 
agreement for this list suggests reasonable likelihood of consensus. The extended elements suggested by respondents for Table 9 in 
Appendix C5 suggested some additional response types with one in particular very important as it alters the broadness of the universal 
element list. This is the addition of a full time security manager to the list which would ideally fit in as the highest considered type of 
response type. This is conceptualised as a designated person that is able to coordinate a variable response within a very brief time 
period after detection has occurred.  
 
 Table 9 Section E, Sets 25-30 Element 1 – considering the action “responding for” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 28: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
low value goods stationary 
 minor assets 
small cash cash register 
 major assets 
personal 
valuables high value goods, jewellery 
 furniture/fittings, plant and equipment may be applied somewhere 
corporate data 
((corporate data)) large cash, ((corporate data)) large cash, ((corporate data)) large cash, large number of high value 
goods, client info, company asset, ((corporate data)) 
 high tech equipment 
large cash ((large cash)) corporate data, ((large cash)) corporate data, ((large cash)) corporate data, safes 
  
human life casualties 
  
Question 26a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
76.5% agreement for the presented ranked order 
 
Question 26b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
7 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
3 respondents indicated that corporate data and large cash could be swapped in the order. 
1 respondent indicated that corporate data was a very subjective concept. 
1 respondent indicated that human life was not able to be measured. 
1 respondent indicated that low value goods may be important although not necessarily valuable. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 
 Table 10 Section E, Sets 25-30 Element 2 – considering the action “responding for” 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 29: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
high tech 
((high tech)) multiple systems, high tech may not detect human life so well, full time security manager, motion 
sensor, maybe each category could have been broken down to be more specific 
 armed, face recognition 
armed ((armed)) high tech, pill boxes 
  
insurance ((insurance)), ((insurance)), property insurance, ((insurance)) police 
  
security patrol guards and dogs, size and skill of security patrol. 
 insurance 
police ((police)) insurance 
 insurance 
general public neighbours, ((general public)) 
  
Question 27a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
76.5% agreement for the presented ranked order 
 
Question 27b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
4 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
4 respondents indicated that the general public may not respond to a situation and if they did it may not be a constructive response. 
2 respondents indicated that high tech response didn’t apply well to human life. 
2 respondents indicated that they would swap insurance with police response. 
1 respondent indicated that they would swap high tech with armed response. 
1 respondent indicated that they considered electronic/high tech responses more reliable. 
1 respondent indicated that insurance was not a valid response but instead a transfer of risk. 
1 respondent indicated that armed/military type response is almost never called for. 
1 respondent indicated that they considered a large security patrol more expensive than a high tech response. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 
 
C6: Section F 
The results from Section F consider Table 11 and Table 12 in Appendix C6. Table 11 considered elements along the concept 
continuum for assets and Table 12 indicated elements over the concept continuum of motivation. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 11 in Appendix C6 shows a strong agreement with the ranked ordering of 82% agreement. This agreement 
level is 6% higher than for the same concept continuum in Section E (Table 9 in Appendix C5). This represents a potential high level 
for consensus of ranked order. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 12 in Appendix C6 was also found to have 100% agreement with the ranked order. This is to be expected as 
the universal elements listed for this dimension are incremental. 
 
Table 11 Section F, Sets 31-36 Element 1 – considering motivation by asset 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 34: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
low value goods relate to dollar value?, office equipment, maybe the current categories could be more specific or further expanded. 
  
small cash relate to dollar value?, wallets 
  
personal 
valuables relate to dollar value?, clothing 
 computers 
corporate data corporate data is very subjective, relate to dollar value?, addresses 
  
large cash relate to dollar value?, thousands of dollars or millions of dollars?, vaults 
  
human life relate to dollar value?, armed robbery 
  
Question 32a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
82.4% agreement for the presented ranked order 
 
Question 32b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
5 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
3 respondents indicated that corporate data and large cash could be swapped in the order. 
2 respondents indicated that corporate data was a very subjective concept. 
2 respondents indicated that the categories could be more specific. 
1 respondent indicated that human life was not able to be measured. 
1 respondent indicated that minor/major assets could be considered e.g. computers. 
1 respondent indicated that the assets being presented were too different to compare. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 Table 12 Section F, Sets 31-36 Element 2 – considering motivation by asset 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 35: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
extreme 
motivation fanatical, jealousy, covers most of them 
  
high motivation revenge 
  
moderate 
motivation anger 
  
low motivation annoyance 
  
very low 
motivation principle 
  
accidental ((accidental)) no intent, by mistake 
  
Question 33a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
100% agreement for the presented ranked order 
 
Question 33b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
11 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
C7: Section G 
The results from Section G consider Table 13 and Table 14 in Appendix C7. Table 13 considered elements along the concept 
continuum for attack types and Table 14 indicated elements over the concept continuum of motivation. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 13 in Appendix C7 shows a strong agreement with the ranked ordering of 82% agreement. There was some 
suggestion that the universal elements in this list were too different to compare. The level of agreement of 82% represents a potential 
high level for consensus of ranked order. The ordered scale of Table 14 in Appendix C7 was also found to have 100% agreement with 
the ranked order.  
 
Table 13 Section G, Sets 37-42 Element 1 – considering attack types by motivation 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 40: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
cut power hand tools, axe 
 stealth, smashing tools, etc, physical intimidation 
technological 
attack ((technological attack)) break through windows or doors, computer virus 
  
electric tools drills, jigsaw 
  
physical 
intimidation ((physical intimidation)), threats 
  
violent 
destruction bombs 
 armed destruction 
explosive LEDs 
  
Question 38a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
82.4% agreement for the presented ranked order 
 
Question 38b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
6 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
2 respondents indicated that the definitions provided were too general or different to compare. 
1 respondent indicated that physical intimidation should be represented lower in the list. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 Table 14 Section G, Sets 37-42 Element 2 – considering attack types by motivation 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 41: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
extreme 
motivation  
  
high motivation  
  
moderate 
motivation  
  
low motivation  
  
very low 
motivation  
  
accidental  
  
Question 39a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
100% agreement for the presented ranked order 
 
Question 39b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
11 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
1 respondent indicated that accidental might be replaced with no intent. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 C8: Section H 
The results from Section H consider Table 15 and Table 16 in Appendix C8. Table 15 considered elements along the concept 
continuum for assets and Table 16 indicated elements over the concept continuum of attack type. The ordered scale of Table 15 in 
Appendix C8 shows a strong agreement with the ranked ordering of 65% agreement. This agreement level is 11% lower than Section E 
(Table 9 in Appendix C5). And 17% lower than Section F (Table 11 in Appendix C6). Suggestion with the questionnaire indicated that 
this reduced figure would appear to be a result of the repeated question format. This still represents a high level for consensus of ranked 
order. 
 
The ordered scale of Table 16 in Appendix C8 shows a strong agreement with the ranked ordering of 76% agreement. This represents a 
reduction of 6% from the indication from Section G (Table 14 in Appendix C7). The level of agreement of 76% represents a high level 
for consensus of ranked order. 
 
Table 15 Section H, Sets 43-48 Element 1 – considering attack types by asset 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 46: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
low value goods  
  
small cash  
  
personal 
valuables  
 business interruption 
corporate data ((corporate data)) restricted corporate data 
 corporate systems 
large cash expand e.g. more then 1 million? 
 critical corporate data 
human life  
  
Question 44a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
64.7% agreement for the presented ranked order 
 
Question 44b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
6 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
3 respondents indicated that corporate data and large cash could be swapped in the order. 
1 respondent indicated that human life was not able to be measured. 
1 respondent indicated that the assets being presented were too different to compare. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
 Table 16 Section H, Sets 43-48 Element 2 – considering attack types by asset 
Listed Elements 
in rank order 
Question 47: Respondent’s extended and amended element members in rank order 
cut power possibilities are endless 
  
technological 
attack  
  
electric tools  
  
physical 
intimidation  
  
violent 
destruction  
  
explosive  
  
Question 45a: Consensus of agreement from “security experts” and “security students” groups 
76.5% agreement for the presented ranked order 
 
Question 45b: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
7 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
2 respondents indicated that the definitions provided were too general or different to compare. 
1 respondent indicated that physical intimidation should be represented lower in the list. 
1 respondent indicated that physical intimidation was not appropriate for the list. 
*((elements)) in double brackets signify suggested removal from that position in the list order. 
Appendix D 
 
D1: Section A 
Table 17 considers a question posed by the questionnaire to gauge agreement from respondents in accepting an alternative list of 
elements as potential universal elements. This presentation of an alternative list provides the basis for the extension of the universal 
lists and also provides the basis for conceptualising the universal elements as simple reference levels on a dimension representing the 
concept continuums. Table 17 shows that general agreement was identified from respondents to the concept of replacing the list. 
Several respondents indicated the alternate list was more appropriate to real-world examples, however in attempting to create simple 
reference levels any list of universal elements would seem to be appropriate.  
 
The suggestion of one respondent that AS3555 should be considered instead of the list is interesting as this indicates that a standard 
that is already in acceptance should replace the listed universal elements. A closer inspection of the list in comparison with AS3555 
shows that the universal elements presented are able to be recognised within the categories of AS3555. This generally supports the 
universal element list however the research has considered six reference levels for element pair comparisons while AS3555 only 
incorporates 4 categories. It would be of potential interest to substitute the universal elements listed in the questionnaire with others 
from the categories of AS3555 to test whether similar results from the element pair assessments would result. The rate of disagreement 
and uncertainty to Question 6 was very low. 
 
Table 17 Section A: Respondent commentary on extending the lists for both Element 1 and Element 2 by associating new/additional 
terms while continuing the same visual ranking method  
Question 6: Summary of comments received by frequency of topic 
8 respondents indicated general agreement in their comments. 
3 respondents indicated that the alternative list suggested was more appropriate to real-world examples. 
1 respondent indicated some agreement with the alternate list. 
1 respondent indicated that they were uncertain. 
1 respondent indicated disagreement with the alternate terms as no actual specifics for those terms were provided. 
1 respondent indicated that the question did not consider groupings of the Australian Standard AS3555: with 4 classes of tools – Hand, 
Power, Hydraulic, O2/gas. 
 
 
 
D2: Section B 
Question 12 asked respondents whether considered the universal elements as representative of the alternate terms smoothness, height, 
and fence topping. This question was designed to alert the respondents to the type of items that the climbing potential of a barrier was 
rated. More than half of respondents agreed with the proposed alternate terms while an additional number suggested additional specific 
terms to represent the list. Only one respondent disagreed which indicated that this list was most likely to be adequate for achieving a 
high degree of consensus. 
 
 
 D3: Section C 
Question 18 was presented to measure support for the inclusion of the concept continuums in each of Sections F, G and H in the 
questionnaire. Investigation by the pilot study highlighted that the acknowledged functions of defence in depth in isolation were 
potentially insufficient to determine likelihood of attack and therefore attack methods for modelling purposes should be supplemented 
with consideration of motivation and asset in relation to attack types. Therefore the questionnaire presented 3 sections that were used to 
assess the interaction between attack, attacker, and asset. Question 18 has achieved greater agreement than disagreement that the 
Sections F,G, and H of the questionnaire may be seen as valid to compliment Sections A-E which deal with delay, detection and 
response. Additionally one respondent indicated that the terms: capability, opportunity, and motivation were more appropriate. While 
this suggestion is of importance to future considerations to the knowledge structure although to a large extent the Sections F, G, and H 
do indirectly consider capability, opportunity, and motivation. 
 
 
 
D4: Section D 
Question 24 collected the respondents’ opinion about the use of time as a measuring tool. More respondents indicated agreement with 
the time based approach than disagreement. Several respondents indicated the measure using time was sometimes hard to judge while 
one respondent indicated that they preferred the Sandia model using delay time with probability of detection and response time. The 
limitations of the Sandia model (Garcia, 2001) are addressed in Chapter 5 in the theoretical considerations of the relationships with 
detection and delay. It is the proposal of this research that time is used to gauge the order of magnitude in the relationships between 
universal elements and not in its normal use as a quantitative temporal measure with a start and finish value. One respondent indicated 
the following statement that has been included as follows: 
 
No, it just appears too general. There are so many factors that should be considered when determining measurements of time 
(even though the definitions have been provided). When an attacker decides to implement an attack on an asset, they will 
generally have done the necessary research and acquired the exact tools necessary to defeat the physical security measure. 
The questionnaire may provide some measure of time however I am not confident that it will be a precise enough measure. 
For example as a security manager of a prison you may be allocated millions of dollars to implement security measures. In 
order to justify the decisions made you need more solid and specific data. 
 
This statement while not in agreement with the technique of the questionnaire is actually a reinforcement for the method in the study. 
Due to the fact that the statement consider the attacker to have the exact tools necessary to defeat the physical security measure then 
“precise” time measurements of physical security would seem to be redundant in assessing physical security. In this regard only 
consideration by experts can seek to counter such a resourced attack. The respondent also considers so many factors should be 
considered and in this manner supports the direction of this research where it attempts to use respondent’s ability to consider a 
“general” case in providing their element pair assessments. Where the many unspecified (so many factors to be considered) details can 
be subconsciously considered from intuition to represent a best estimate for moderation in all cases. Further to this statement more 
solid and specific data may be attempted with additional iterations of the element hierarchy in future work in this area. 
 
 
 
 
D5: Section E 
Question 30 was presented to measure the level of respondent confidence in answering the questionnaire. A large number of 
respondents indicated unspecified confidence and several more indicated slightly reduced confidence in answering the questions of the 
questionnaire and providing the value assessments. Several respondents indicated confidence with additional statements that 
assumptions or grey areas existed in the way they were required to completed the questionnaire. Only one respondent indicated a lack 
of confidence in completing the questionnaire requirements.   
 
 
D6: Section F 
Question 36 was left open for respondents to comment freely on any terminology that they thought was ambiguous or inappropriate. As 
more respondents indicated general understanding with the concepts being investigated than indicated confusion, it would appear that 
the choice of terminology in the questionnaire was not a comprehension issue. The main comment of note is that one respondent 
suggested that the questionnaire should provide more detail in order to assist the value assessments and reduce the need for assumption. 
 
 
D7: Section G 
Question 42 considered the use of “verbs” to help measure the time relationships used in the questionnaire. Most respondents had no 
comment on this question although several indication understanding with the specific use of verbs to measure relative time 
assessments. One respondent indicated that they felt that the method seemed more complex than it needed to be. 
 
 
D8: Section H 
Question 48 asked for comments on the overall method used in the questionnaire and has been included in the text for information 
purposes. The main indication here is that some confusion is evident about whether time represents an actual measure of time or 
alternatively a likelihood of an event happening. As both provide a relative indication this issue is not seen as a major concern to the 
research. 
 
 
D9: Question 49 
Question 49 included comments from respondents on their thoughts about whether a small set of elements (such as those in the 
questionnaire) can adequately describe a real-life facility. There is general agreement to this proposition although concern has been 
raised about the ability for the universal elements to be a large enough set to be representative. The main area of concern for several 
respondents was that facility specific information was not available for the questionnaire. This study acknowledges that facility specific 
information was not available and assumes that a “general” case is appropriate within the research boundary conditions. 
 
 
D10: Question 50 
Question 50 included comments from respondents on their thoughts about whether a small set of elements (such as those in the 
questionnaire) can adequately describe the physical security of a real-life facility. There is general agreement to this proposition 
although concern has been raised about the ability for the universal elements to be a large enough set to be representative. 
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 Appendix F 
 
 
F1: Table showing Questions 1, 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 37 and 43: Statistical summary of respondents’ value assessment (n=26) of the time relationship 
between Element 1 and Element 2 by conceptual scenario (Section A-H). 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN MEDIAN MODE ST DEV 
Section A – considering the action “break through”     
explosive glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
explosive wood 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
explosive brick 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.81 
explosive earth 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.81 
explosive concrete 0.39 0.07 0.07 1.12 
explosive steel 1.04 0.07 0.07 1.76 
electric drill earth 0.55 0.07 0.07 1.34 
electric drill glass 0.71 0.07 0.07 1.51 
electric drill wood 1.53 0.07 0.07 2.59 
electric drill brick 4.04 4.10 4.10 3.63 
electric drill concrete 5.39 4.10 4.10 3.79 
electric drill steel 6.63 4.10 4.10 4.09 
oxy cutting glass 1.68 0.07 0.07 2.02 
oxy cutting wood 3.15 4.10 0.07 3.16 
oxy cutting steel 3.71 4.10 4.10 2.99 
oxy cutting earth 4.15 0.07 0.07 5.54 
oxy cutting brick 8.51 8.20 8.20 5.04 
oxy cutting concrete 9.59 8.20 8.20 5.31 
axe glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
axe earth 1.08 0.07 0.07 2.87 
axe brick 5.09 4.10 4.10 2.70 
axe wood 5.93 4.10 0.07 5.64 
axe concrete 8.07 8.20 8.20 3.42 
axe steel 12.22 13.30 14.70 3.57 
hammer glass 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.84 
hammer earth 0.95 0.07 0.07 2.10 
hammer wood 4.82 4.10 4.10 2.01 
hammer brick 5.14 4.10 4.10 2.71 
hammer concrete 8.59 8.20 8.20 3.13 
hammer steel 13.53 14.70 17.30 3.70 
rock glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
rock earth 0.76 0.07 0.07 2.73 
rock wood 7.71 8.20 8.20 1.36 
rock brick 10.85 11.40 11.40 1.66 
rock concrete 14.51 14.70 14.70 0.71 
rock steel 17.30 17.30 17.30 0.00 
 
F2: 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN MEDIAN MODE ST DEV 
Section B – considering the action “climbing over”     
flight assisted 3 human high smooth brick wall 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.84 
flight assisted 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.84 
flight assisted 3 human high steel small mesh fence 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.84 
flight assisted 5 human high smooth brick wall 0.59 0.07 0.07 1.39 
flight assisted 5 human high steel mesh fence 0.59 0.07 0.07 1.39 
flight assisted 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 0.77 0.07 0.07 1.56 
projectiles and wire 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.74 0.07 0.07 1.53 
projectiles and wire 3 human high steel small mesh fence 1.16 0.07 0.07 1.78 
projectiles and wire 3 human high smooth brick wall 1.75 0.07 0.07 2.65 
projectiles and wire 5 human high steel mesh fence 2.93 4.10 4.10 2.80 
projectiles and wire 5 human high smooth brick wall 3.44 4.10 4.10 3.09 
projectiles and wire 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 4.55 4.10 4.10 3.07 
climbing aids 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.82 0.07 0.07 1.55 
climbing aids 3 human high steel small mesh fence 1.24 0.07 0.07 1.87 
climbing aids 3 human high smooth brick wall 3.48 4.10 4.10 3.22 
climbing aids 5 human high steel mesh fence 4.48 4.10 4.10 3.06 
climbing aids 5 human high smooth brick wall 5.19 4.10 4.10 4.20 
climbing aids 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 6.00 4.10 4.10 3.91 
ladder 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.99 0.07 0.07 1.68 
ladder 3 human high steel small mesh fence 2.22 0.07 0.07 3.04 
ladder 3 human high smooth brick wall 3.11 2.08 0.07 3.86 
ladder 5 human high steel mesh fence 4.89 4.10 4.10 4.10 
ladder 5 human high smooth brick wall 6.21 4.10 4.10 4.79 
ladder 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 7.81 8.20 4.10 4.94 
rope 3 human high steel large mesh fence 1.53 0.07 0.07 1.98 
rope 3 human high steel small mesh fence 2.64 2.08 0.07 2.95 
rope 3 human high smooth brick wall 3.75 4.10 4.10 3.30 
rope 5 human high steel mesh fence 5.15 4.10 4.10 3.20 
rope 5 human high smooth brick wall 7.24 4.10 4.10 4.94 
rope 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 7.30 6.15 4.10 3.92 
no aid 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.39 0.07 0.07 1.12 
no aid 3 human high steel small mesh fence 8.08 8.20 8.20 1.96 
no aid 5 human high steel mesh fence 8.30 8.20 8.20 1.57 
no aid 3 human high smooth brick wall 8.97 8.20 8.20 2.24 
no aid 5 human high smooth brick wall 17.20 17.30 17.30 0.52 
no aid 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 17.30 17.30 17.30 0.00 
F3: 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN MEDIAN MODE ST DEV 
Section C – considering the action “evading”     
luck infrared 0.68 0.07 0.07 2.37 
luck microwave 0.68 0.07 0.07 2.37 
luck multiple systems 0.92 0.07 0.07 3.51 
luck closed circuit tv 4.63 4.10 4.10 2.64 
luck human guard 8.17 8.20 8.20 1.07 
luck chance detection 14.18 14.70 14.70 1.54 
create false alarms multiple systems 3.23 4.10 0.07 3.61 
create false alarms infrared 4.15 4.10 4.10 4.08 
create false alarms microwave 4.13 4.10 4.10 3.82 
create false alarms closed circuit tv 6.72 8.20 4.10 4.34 
create false alarms human guard 8.42 8.20 8.20 4.97 
create false alarms chance detection 10.05 11.40 14.70 5.19 
smoke multiple systems 2.73 0.07 0.07 4.06 
smoke microwave 2.85 0.07 0.07 4.28 
smoke infrared 3.65 4.10 0.07 4.59 
smoke closed circuit tv 8.57 8.20 8.20 4.68 
smoke human guard 9.15 8.20 8.20 4.48 
smoke chance detection 10.64 11.40 14.70 5.15 
colour camouflage microwave 2.10 0.07 0.07 4.96 
colour camouflage infrared 2.58 0.07 0.07 4.93 
colour camouflage multiple systems 4.99 0.07 0.07 5.69 
colour camouflage closed circuit tv 7.13 8.20 4.10 3.53 
colour camouflage human guard 9.08 8.20 8.20 2.82 
colour camouflage chance detection 12.28 13.30 14.70 3.55 
system knowledge multiple systems 7.56 8.20 8.20 4.62 
system knowledge microwave 8.08 8.20 8.20 5.28 
system knowledge infrared 8.50 8.20 0.07 5.94 
system knowledge human guard 9.94 8.20 8.20 5.54 
system knowledge closed circuit tv 9.90 11.40 8.20 5.83 
system knowledge chance detection 11.30 13.30 17.30 5.82 
knowledge and 
diversion multiple systems 7.77 8.20 8.20 5.71 
knowledge and 
diversion infrared 9.18 11.40 11.40 6.02 
knowledge and 
diversion microwave 9.14 11.40 11.40 5.76 
knowledge and 
diversion closed circuit tv 10.97 11.40 17.30 6.00 
knowledge and 
diversion human guard 11.37 11.40 17.30 5.30 
knowledge and 
diversion chance detection 11.56 13.30 17.30 5.94 
F4: 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN MEDIAN MODE ST DEV 
Section D – considering the action “disabling”     
violent destruction closed circuit tv 4.93 4.10 0.07 4.73 
violent destruction microwave 5.48 4.10 0.07 6.04 
violent destruction infrared 5.49 4.10 0.07 5.68 
violent destruction human guard 6.26 8.20 8.20 4.99 
violent destruction multiple systems 7.32 8.20 0.07 6.18 
violent destruction chance detection 7.77 8.20 0.07 6.29 
system knowledge closed circuit tv 5.42 4.10 4.10 5.11 
system knowledge infrared 5.61 4.10 4.10 5.14 
system knowledge microwave 6.01 4.10 4.10 5.13 
system knowledge multiple systems 7.04 8.20 8.20 5.54 
system knowledge human guard 7.57 8.20 4.10 5.71 
system knowledge chance detection 8.39 8.20 0.07 6.71 
cut power closed circuit tv 4.50 4.10 8.20 3.82 
cut power infrared 5.69 4.10 0.07 5.30 
cut power microwave 5.77 4.10 0.07 5.40 
cut power multiple systems 7.03 8.20 0.07 6.19 
cut power chance detection 10.58 8.20 8.20 6.26 
cut power human guard 10.85 8.20 17.30 5.83 
electrical interference closed circuit tv 4.57 4.10 0.07 3.81 
electrical interference infrared 6.40 8.20 8.20 5.14 
electrical interference microwave 5.95 4.10 4.10 4.92 
electrical interference multiple systems 7.49 8.20 8.20 5.07 
electrical interference human guard 11.56 14.70 17.30 6.93 
electrical interference chance detection 11.57 13.30 17.30 6.20 
physical intimidation human guard 5.99 4.10 4.10 4.39 
physical intimidation chance detection 7.41 4.10 4.10 6.19 
physical intimidation closed circuit tv 11.40 13.30 17.30 6.40 
physical intimidation infrared 12.70 17.30 17.30 6.68 
physical intimidation microwave 12.79 17.30 17.30 6.68 
physical intimidation multiple systems 12.87 17.30 17.30 6.36 
accidental chance detection 8.16 8.20 8.20 1.06 
accidental human guard 10.98 11.40 11.40 1.57 
accidental closed circuit tv 12.82 13.30 13.30 1.44 
accidental multiple systems 14.28 17.30 17.30 3.78 
accidental infrared 17.06 17.30 17.30 1.18 
accidental microwave 17.06 17.30 17.30 1.18 
F5: 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN MEDIAN MODE ST DEV 
Section E – considering the action “response for”     
human life general public 4.16 4.10 4.10 3.84 
human life police 4.60 4.10 4.10 3.46 
human life security patrol 5.78 4.10 4.10 4.40 
human life armed 6.35 4.10 4.10 4.81 
human life high tech 7.60 4.10 4.10 6.09 
human life insurance 11.75 13.30 13.30 3.71 
large cash security patrol 5.97 4.10 4.10 3.09 
large cash high tech 6.66 4.10 4.10 5.93 
large cash police 6.75 8.20 4.10 2.97 
large cash armed 6.92 4.10 4.10 5.38 
large cash general public 7.26 6.15 4.10 4.97 
large cash insurance 10.31 11.40 8.20 2.95 
corporate data high tech 7.01 6.15 0.07 6.58 
corporate data police 9.33 8.20 8.20 2.90 
corporate data security patrol 10.03 10.60 11.40 3.83 
corporate data general public 10.27 12.35 13.30 5.94 
corporate data insurance 12.23 13.30 13.30 2.70 
corporate data armed 12.80 14.70 17.30 5.21 
small cash general public 7.01 4.10 4.10 4.32 
small cash security patrol 8.31 8.20 11.40 3.26 
small cash police 10.78 11.40 11.40 2.97 
small cash high tech 11.81 14.70 17.30 6.96 
small cash insurance 12.74 13.30 13.30 2.90 
small cash armed 13.93 17.30 17.30 4.89 
personal valuables general public 7.07 4.10 4.10 4.70 
personal valuables security patrol 8.78 8.20 11.40 3.70 
personal valuables police 9.68 8.20 8.20 2.98 
personal valuables high tech 11.77 14.70 17.30 6.65 
personal valuables insurance 12.50 13.30 13.30 1.83 
personal valuables armed 14.47 17.30 17.30 4.21 
low value goods general public 4.43 4.10 4.10 1.14 
low value goods security patrol 10.98 11.40 11.40 1.57 
low value goods police 13.02 13.30 13.30 1.07 
low value goods insurance 13.22 13.30 13.30 0.38 
low value goods high tech 16.41 17.30 17.30 3.14 
low value goods armed 16.94 17.30 17.30 1.82 
F6: 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN MEDIAN MODE ST DEV 
Section F – considering the concept “attack motivation”     
small cash accidental 2.30 0.07 0.07 3.23 
small cash very low motivation 4.21 4.10 4.10 3.46 
small cash low motivation 5.54 4.10 4.10 3.76 
small cash moderate motivation 6.96 8.20 8.20 3.69 
small cash high motivation 8.17 8.20 11.40 4.34 
small cash extreme motivation 8.81 11.40 11.40 4.47 
low value goods accidental 0.72 0.07 0.07 1.92 
low value goods very low motivation 4.26 4.10 4.10 0.82 
low value goods low motivation 7.87 8.20 8.20 1.14 
low value goods moderate motivation 8.16 8.20 8.20 1.06 
low value goods extreme motivation 10.98 11.40 11.40 1.57 
low value goods high motivation 10.98 11.40 11.40 1.57 
personal valuables accidental 3.47 4.10 4.10 3.03 
personal valuables very low motivation 5.58 4.10 4.10 3.91 
personal valuables low motivation 7.08 8.20 4.10 3.42 
personal valuables moderate motivation 8.27 8.20 8.20 3.76 
personal valuables high motivation 9.70 11.40 11.40 4.33 
personal valuables extreme motivation 9.94 11.40 11.40 4.54 
corporate data accidental 7.95 8.20 8.20 4.04 
corporate data low motivation 10.50 11.40 13.30 3.37 
corporate data very low motivation 10.61 11.40 11.40 3.62 
corporate data moderate motivation 12.30 13.30 11.40 2.36 
corporate data high motivation 13.10 13.30 14.70 2.30 
corporate data extreme motivation 14.01 14.70 14.70 2.10 
large cash accidental 9.09 11.40 8.20 4.36 
large cash very low motivation 9.94 11.40 13.30 4.18 
large cash low motivation 11.11 11.40 13.30 3.13 
large cash moderate motivation 12.49 13.30 13.30 2.69 
large cash high motivation 13.33 14.70 14.70 3.54 
large cash extreme motivation 14.11 14.70 17.30 3.82 
human life very low motivation 10.87 11.40 11.40 5.32 
human life accidental 10.56 11.40 11.40 5.21 
human life low motivation 11.97 13.30 14.70 4.77 
human life moderate motivation 13.29 14.70 14.70 4.45 
human life high motivation 13.98 14.70 17.30 5.14 
human life extreme motivation 14.16 17.30 17.30 5.57 
F7: 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN MEDIAN MODE ST DEV 
Section G – considering the concept “attack capability”     
cut power extreme motivation 4.43 4.10 4.10 1.14 
cut power high motivation 4.43 4.10 4.10 1.14 
cut power moderate motivation 4.56 4.10 4.10 1.64 
cut power very low motivation 6.85 8.20 8.20 2.20 
cut power low motivation 8.16 8.20 8.20 1.06 
cut power accidental 8.24 8.20 8.20 1.34 
physical 
intimidation extreme motivation 4.59 4.10 0.07 4.54 
physical 
intimidation high motivation 5.35 4.10 4.10 4.06 
physical 
intimidation moderate motivation 6.10 4.10 4.10 4.22 
physical 
intimidation low motivation 7.59 8.20 4.10 4.89 
physical 
intimidation very low motivation 8.42 8.20 8.20 5.56 
physical 
intimidation accidental 10.03 11.40 13.30 5.63 
electric tools extreme motivation 4.90 4.10 4.10 4.37 
electric tools high motivation 5.23 4.10 4.10 3.85 
electric tools moderate motivation 6.49 8.20 8.20 3.45 
electric tools low motivation 8.01 8.20 8.20 3.50 
electric tools very low motivation 8.34 8.20 8.20 4.02 
electric tools accidental 9.97 11.40 11.40 4.86 
violent destruction extreme motivation 6.75 4.10 4.10 5.36 
violent destruction high motivation 7.20 8.20 4.10 4.63 
violent destruction moderate motivation 7.50 8.20 8.20 4.83 
violent destruction low motivation 8.24 8.20 8.20 4.98 
violent destruction very low motivation 8.96 11.40 11.40 5.68 
violent destruction accidental 9.57 11.40 0.07 6.56 
explosive extreme motivation 6.69 4.10 0.07 5.89 
explosive high motivation 7.16 8.20 13.30 5.60 
explosive moderate motivation 8.97 8.20 4.10 5.06 
explosive low motivation 9.12 11.40 14.70 5.64 
explosive very low motivation 10.39 11.40 17.30 6.26 
explosive accidental 10.48 11.40 17.30 6.55 
technological attack extreme motivation 8.30 8.20 4.10 4.75 
technological attack high motivation 8.57 8.20 4.10 4.03 
technological attack moderate motivation 9.55 11.40 11.40 3.22 
technological attack very low motivation 9.89 11.40 8.20 4.07 
technological attack low motivation 10.37 11.40 8.20 2.82 
technological attack accidental 11.10 11.40 17.30 5.55 
F8: 
Element 1 Element 2 MEAN MEDIAN MODE ST DEV 
Section H – considering the concept “attack 
consideration (likelihood)”     
low value goods explosive 0.52 0.07 0.07 2.27 
low value goods technological attack 0.52 0.07 0.07 2.27 
low value goods physical intimidation 8.00 8.20 8.20 1.77 
low value goods violent destruction 8.00 8.20 8.20 1.77 
low value goods cut power 12.57 13.30 13.30 2.80 
low value goods electric tools 12.57 13.30 13.30 2.80 
small cash explosive 4.18 0.07 0.07 5.52 
small cash technological attack 5.78 4.10 0.07 5.28 
small cash violent destruction 6.86 8.20 4.10 4.72 
small cash physical intimidation 8.35 8.20 8.20 4.11 
small cash electric tools 9.00 9.80 11.40 4.23 
small cash cut power 9.68 11.40 13.30 4.53 
personal valuables explosive 4.66 4.10 0.07 5.48 
personal valuables technological attack 7.12 8.20 8.20 4.96 
personal valuables violent destruction 7.90 8.20 8.20 4.44 
personal valuables electric tools 8.74 8.20 8.20 3.67 
personal valuables physical intimidation 9.23 8.20 8.20 3.86 
personal valuables cut power 9.95 11.40 13.30 3.55 
corporate data explosive 9.18 11.40 13.30 5.79 
corporate data physical intimidation 10.09 11.40 13.30 4.30 
corporate data electric tools 11.00 12.35 13.30 3.28 
corporate data violent destruction 11.01 12.35 14.70 4.35 
corporate data cut power 11.35 13.30 14.70 4.57 
corporate data technological attack 13.00 13.30 14.70 2.89 
large cash explosive 10.76 13.30 14.70 5.61 
large cash violent destruction 10.95 12.35 14.70 4.65 
large cash physical intimidation 11.15 11.40 8.20 3.70 
large cash electric tools 11.24 13.30 14.70 4.27 
large cash cut power 11.96 13.30 14.70 3.49 
large cash technological attack 12.17 13.30 14.70 3.77 
human life technological attack 9.24 11.40 0.07 6.66 
human life cut power 10.10 12.35 13.30 6.05 
human life electric tools 11.16 12.35 8.20 4.71 
human life physical intimidation 12.57 14.00 14.70 4.03 
human life explosive 13.30 14.70 17.30 5.11 
human life violent destruction 14.02 14.70 17.30 4.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix G 
 
G1 Section A: A Relative relationship map (in ranked order) indicating the concept continuums of force measured against 
strength  
 force attack rock hammer axe oxy cutting electric drill explosive 
material 
strength 
Average of 
means over 6 
elements 
(range) 
8.54 
(0.07 -17.30) 
5.49 
(0.24 – 13.47) 
5.33 
(0.07 – 12.27) 
4.98 
(1.62 – 9.03) 
3.13 
(0.53 – 6.69) 
0.33 
(0.07 -1.00) 
steel 9.05 
(1.00 – 17.30) 
17.30 13.47 12.27 3.57 6.69 1.00 
concrete 7.65 
(0.38 – 14.52) 
14.52 8.58 8.07 9.03 5.34 0.38 
brick 5.63 
(0.22 – 10.87) 
10.87 5.09 5.05 8.50 4.04 0.22 
wood 3.75 
(0.07 – 7.73) 
7.73 4.62 5.45 3.18 1.47 0.07 
earth 1.24 
(0.22 – 3.99) 
0.73 0.91 1.04 3.99 0.53 0.22 
glass 0.46 
(0.07 – 1.62) 
0.07 0.24 0.07 1.62 0.69 0.07 
 
 G2 Section B: Relative relationships (rankings) for climbing attack measured against barrier delay 
 Climbing 
Attack 
no aid rope ladder climbing 
aids 
projectiles & 
wire 
flight 
assisted 
Height, 
material, 
topping 
Average of 
means over 6 
elements 
(range) 
10.03 
(0.38 – 17.30) 
4.52 
(1.47 – 7.16) 
4.15 
(0.96 – 7.66) 
3.48 
(0.79 – 5.92) 
2.34 
(0.71 – 4.53) 
0.45 
(0.24 – 0.74) 
5 human 
high smooth 
brick wall + 
razor wire 
7.22 
(0.74 – 17.30) 
17.30 7.16 7.66 5.92 4.53 0.74 
5 human 
high smooth 
brick wall 
6.58 
(0.57 – 17.20) 
17.20 7.10 6.13 5.31 3.14 0.57 
5 human 
high - steel 
small mesh 
fence 
4.32 
(0.57 – 8.29) 
8.29 5.10 4.85 4.30 2.82 0.57 
3 human 
high smooth 
brick wall 
3.52 
(0.24 – 8.94) 
8.94 3.77 3.15 3.34 1.69 0.24 
3 human 
high - steel 
small mesh 
fence 
2.55 
(0.24 – 8.08) 
8.08 2.53 2.14 1.20 1.12 0.24 
3 human 
high - steel 
large mesh 
fence 
0.76 
(0.24 – 1.47) 
0.38 1.47 0.96 0.79 0.71 0.24 
 
G3 Section C: Relative relationships (rankings) for stealth attack measured against detection system 
 Stealth 
Attack 
luck create false 
alarms 
smoke colour 
camouflage 
system 
knowledge 
knowledge 
& diversion 
Detection 
System 
Average of 
means over 6 
elements 
(range) 
4.86 
(0.66 – 14.20) 
6.14 
(3.27 – 9.92) 
6.28 
(2.75 – 10.74) 
6.31 
(2.02 – 12.32) 
9.49 
(8.02 – 11.53) 
10.18 
(7.98 – 11.59) 
microwave 4.53 
(0.66 – 9.35) 
0.66 4.13 2.75 2.02 8.28 9.35 
multiple 
systems 
4.62 
(0.89 – 7.98) 
0.89 3.27 2.62 4.96 8.02 7.98 
infrared 4.84 
(0.66 – 9.39) 
0.66 4.15 3.67 2.48 8.68 9.39 
closed 
circuit tv 
8.09 
(4.61 – 11.22) 
4.61 6.98 8.55 7.02 10.18 11.22 
mobile 
human 
guard 
9.47 
(8.17 – 11.59) 
8.17 8.41 9.36 9.05 10.22 11.59 
chance 
detection 
11.71 
(9.92 – 14.20) 
14.20 9.92 10.74 12.32 11.53 11.53 
 
 G4 Section D: Relative relationships (rankings) for force attack measured against detection system 
 Force 
attack 
accidental physical 
intimidation  
electrical 
interference 
cut 
power  
system 
knowledge  
violent 
destruction 
Detection 
System 
Average 
of 
means 
over 6 
elements 
(range) 
13.42 
(8.17 – 
17.07) 
10.41 
(6.08 – 12.81) 
8.05 
(4.71 – 11.69) 
7.41 
(4.48 – 
10.83) 
6.57 
(5.37 – 8.07) 
6.18 
(4.90 – 7.48) 
multiple 
systems  
9.35 
(7.07 – 
14.40) 
14.40 12.68 7.52 7.07 7.08 7.36 
chance 
detection 
8.95 
(7.48 – 
11.69) 
8.17 7.44 11.69 10.83 8.07 7.48 
mobile 
human 
guard 
8.88 
(6.08 – 
11.68) 
11.00 6.08 11.68 10.75 7.44 6.33 
microwave 8.86 
(5.43 – 
17.07) 
17.07 12.81 6.23 5.70 5.94 5.43 
infrared 8.78 
(5.55 – 
17.07) 
17.07 12.34 6.47 5.63 5.55 5.60 
closed 
circuit tv  
7.23 
(4.48 – 
12.83) 
12.83 11.09 4.71 4.48 5.37 4.90 
 
 G5 Section E: Relative relationships for asset measured against response 
 Asset human life  large cash  corporate 
data  
personal 
valuables 
small 
cash 
low value 
goods 
Response Average of 
means over 6 
elements 
(range) 
6.78 
(4.32 – 
11.73) 
7.34 
(6.05 – 
10.35) 
10.36 
(7.31 – 
12.87) 
10.71 
(7.80 – 
14.58) 
10.79 
(6.90 – 
13.96) 
12.51 
(4.42 – 
16.95) 
general 
public 
6.60 
(4.32 – 10.18) 
4.32 6.97 10.18 7.80 6.90 4.42 
security 
patrol 
8.36 
(5.88 – 11.00) 
5.88 6.05 10.16 8.76 8.30 11.00 
police 9.04 
(4.58 – 13.03) 
4.58 6.80 9.41 9.62 10.81 13.03 
high tech 10.41 
(6.93 – 16.44) 
7.76 6.93 7.31 11.99 12.02 16.44 
armed 11.96 
(6.42 – 16.95) 
6.42 6.96 12.87 14.58 13.96 16.95 
insurance 12.13 
(10.35 – 13.23) 
11.73 10.35 12.20 12.53 12.76 13.23 
 
G6 Section F: Relative relationships (rankings) for asset measured against motivation 
 Asset human life  large cash  corporate 
data  
personal 
valuables 
low value 
goods 
small 
cash 
Motivation Average of 
means over 6 
elements 
(range) 
12.47 
(10.56 – 
14.16) 
11.68 
(9.09 – 
14.12) 
11.41 
(7.95 – 
14.01) 
7.34 
(3.47 – 
9.94) 
7.16 
(0.72 – 
10.98) 
6.00 
(2.30 – 
8.81) 
extreme 
motivation  
12.00 
(8.81 – 
14.16) 
14.16 14.11 14.01 9.94 10.98 8.81 
high 
motivation 
11.54 
(8.17 – 
13.98) 
13.98 13.33 13.10 9.70 10.98 8.17 
moderate 
motivation 
10.25 
(6.96 – 
13.29) 
13.29 12.49 12.30 8.27 8.16 6.96 
low 
motivation  
9.01 
(5.54 – 
11.97) 
11.97 11.11 10.50 7.08 7.87 5.54 
very low 
motivation  
7.58 
(4.21 – 
10.87) 
10.87 9.94 10.61 5.58 4.26 4.21 
accidental 5.68 
(0.72 – 
10.56) 
10.56 9.09 7.95 3.47 0.72 2.30 
 
 G7 Section G: Relative relationships (rankings) for attack type against motivation 
 Attack technological 
attack 
explosive  violent 
destruction 
electrical 
tools 
physical 
intimidation 
cut power 
Motivation Average of 
means over 
6 elements 
(range) 
9.63 
(8.30 – 11.10) 
8.80 
(6.69 – 
10.48) 
8.04 
(6.75 – 
9.58) 
7.16 
(4.90 – 
9.97) 
7.01 
(4.59 – 10.03) 
6.11 
(4.43 – 
8.24) 
accidental 9.90 
(8.24 – 
11.10) 
11.10 10.48 9.57 9.97 10.03 8.24 
very low 
motivation  
8.81 
(6.85 – 
10.39) 
9.89 10.39 8.96 8.34 8.42 6.85 
low 
motivation  
8.58 
(7.59 – 
10.37) 
10.37 9.12 8.24 8.01 7.59 8.16 
moderate 
motivation  
7.19 
(4.56 – 
9.55) 
9.55 8.97 7.50 6.49 6.10 4.56 
high 
motivation 
6.32 
(4.43 – 
8.57) 
8.57 7.16 7.20 5.23 5.35 4.43 
extreme 
motivation 
5.94 
(4.43 – 
8.30) 
8.30 6.69 6.75 4.90 4.59 4.43 
 
 
 G8 Section H: Relative relationships (rankings) for asset measured against attack type 
 Asset human life  large cash  corporate 
data  
personal  
valuables 
small 
cash 
low value 
goods 
Attack Average of 
means over 
6 elements 
(range) 
11.73 
(9.24 – 
14.02) 
11.37 
(10.76 – 
12.17) 
10.94 
(9.18 – 
13.00) 
7.93 
(4.66 – 
9.96) 
7.31 
(4.18 – 
9.68) 
7.031 
(0.52 – 
12.57) 
cut power 10.94 
(9.68 – 
12.57) 
10.10 11.96 11.35 9.95 9.68 12.57 
electrical 
tools 
10.62 
(8.74 – 
12.57) 
11.16 11.24 11.00 8.74 9.00 12.57 
physical 
intimidation 
9.89 
(8.00 – 
12.57) 
12.57 11.15 10.09 9.23 8.35 8.00 
violent 
destruction 
9.79 
(6.86 – 
14.02) 
14.02 10.95 11.01 7.90 6.86 8.00 
technological 
attack  
7.97 
(0.52 – 
13.00) 
9.24 12.17 13.00 7.12 5.78 0.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix H 
Group profiles using element relationships from the following 
element combinations 
Group 
Standard 
Profile  
Group 
Standard 
Profile  
Group 
Standard 
Profile  
Group 
Standard 
Profile  
Element 1 Element 2 Composite 
Group  
(mean) n=26 
Group SE  
 
(mean) n=5 
Group SS  
 
(mean) n=15 
Group SU  
 
(mean) n=6 
explosive glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
explosive wood 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
explosive brick 0.23 1.08 0.07 0.07 
explosive earth 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.64 
explosive concrete 0.39 1.08 0.36 0.07 
explosive steel 1.04 2.08 0.64 1.22 
electric drill earth 0.55 1.08 0.07 1.22 
electric drill glass 0.71 1.08 0.64 0.64 
electric drill wood 1.53 2.08 0.94 2.38 
electric drill brick 4.04 5.13 3.61 4.26 
electric drill concrete 5.39 5.13 5.15 6.00 
electric drill steel 6.63 6.95 6.55 6.58 
oxy cutting glass 1.68 1.08 1.80 1.80 
oxy cutting wood 3.15 3.09 2.68 4.12 
oxy cutting steel 3.71 7.18 2.67 3.82 
oxy cutting earth 4.15 1.08 4.92 4.35 
oxy cutting brick 8.51 9.45 8.10 8.80 
oxy cutting concrete 9.59 12.08 9.04 9.25 
axe glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
axe earth 1.08 0.07 0.64 2.54 
axe brick 5.09 5.13 4.70 5.86 
axe wood 5.93 8.43 4.77 6.82 
axe concrete 8.07 8.78 7.79 8.21 
axe steel 12.22 13.38 12.39 11.24 
hammer glass 0.24 1.08 0.07 0.07 
hammer earth 0.95 0.07 0.93 1.70 
hammer wood 4.82 5.13 4.69 4.92 
hammer brick 5.14 7.18 4.63 4.92 
hammer concrete 8.59 10.28 8.61 7.20 
hammer steel 13.53 14.83 13.84 11.62 
rock glass 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
rock earth 0.76 0.07 0.07 2.54 
rock wood 7.71 8.20 8.20 6.44 
rock brick 10.85 11.40 11.40 9.44 
rock concrete 14.51 14.70 14.70 14.03 
rock steel 17.30 17.30 17.30 17.30 
flight assisted 3 human high smooth brick wall 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.74 
flight assisted 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.74 
flight assisted 3 human high steel small mesh fence 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.74 
flight assisted 5 human high smooth brick wall 0.59 0.07 0.69 0.74 
flight assisted 5 human high steel mesh fence 0.59 0.07 0.69 0.74 
flight assisted 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 0.77 0.07 1.00 0.74 
projectiles and wire 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.74 0.07 0.93 0.74 
projectiles and wire 3 human high steel small mesh fence 1.16 0.57 1.51 0.74 
projectiles and wire 3 human high smooth brick wall 1.75 1.08 2.38 0.74 
projectiles and wire 5 human high steel mesh fence 2.93 2.08 3.25 2.77 
projectiles and wire 5 human high smooth brick wall 3.44 3.09 3.83 2.77 
projectiles and wire 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 4.55 4.10 5.15 3.44 
climbing aids 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.82 0.57 0.64 1.41 
climbing aids 3 human high steel small mesh fence 1.24 1.08 1.22 1.41 
climbing aids 3 human high smooth brick wall 3.48 3.09 2.95 4.97 
climbing aids 5 human high steel mesh fence 4.48 4.61 3.18 7.22 
climbing aids 5 human high smooth brick wall 5.19 4.61 4.64 6.84 
climbing aids 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 6.00 4.61 5.74 7.52 
ladder 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.99 0.57 0.93 1.41 
ladder 3 human high steel small mesh fence 2.22 4.10 1.22 3.31 
ladder 3 human high smooth brick wall 3.11 5.13 2.09 4.16 
ladder 5 human high steel mesh fence 4.89 7.19 4.19 4.97 
ladder 5 human high smooth brick wall 6.21 9.01 5.00 7.16 
ladder 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 7.81 10.45 7.05 7.83 
rope 3 human high steel large mesh fence 1.53 1.08 1.80 1.08 
rope 3 human high steel small mesh fence 2.64 2.08 3.25 1.08 
rope 3 human high smooth brick wall 3.75 4.12 4.41 1.08 
rope 5 human high steel mesh fence 5.15 5.13 5.45 4.10 
rope 5 human high smooth brick wall 7.24 8.43 7.80 4.10 
rope 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 7.30 6.15 8.54 4.10 
no aid 3 human high steel large mesh fence 0.39 0.07 0.07 1.22 
no aid 3 human high steel small mesh fence 8.08 8.20 8.20 7.77 
no aid 5 human high steel mesh fence 8.30 8.20 8.20 8.54 
no aid 3 human high smooth brick wall 8.97 8.20 8.20 10.96 
no aid 5 human high smooth brick wall 17.20 17.30 17.30 16.93 
no aid 5 human high smooth brick wall and razor wire 17.30 17.30 17.30 17.30 
luck infrared 0.68 0.07 0.07 2.26 
luck microwave 0.68 0.07 0.07 2.26 
luck multiple systems 0.92 0.07 0.07 3.11 
luck closed circuit tv 4.63 4.10 4.10 5.99 
luck human guard 8.17 8.20 8.20 8.08 
luck chance detection 14.18 14.70 14.70 12.83 
create false alarms multiple systems 3.23 1.08 3.47 4.12 
create false alarms infrared 4.15 4.12 3.70 5.21 
create false alarms microwave 4.13 4.12 3.77 4.97 
create false alarms closed circuit tv 6.72 10.60 4.87 8.45 
create false alarms human guard 8.42 11.88 7.65 7.93 
create false alarms chance detection 10.05 13.18 9.60 9.00 
smoke multiple systems 2.73 3.11 2.32 3.31 
smoke microwave 2.85 2.08 3.13 2.74 
smoke infrared 3.65 1.08 3.98 4.47 
smoke closed circuit tv 8.57 11.68 7.75 8.41 
smoke human guard 9.15 12.95 8.14 9.00 
smoke chance detection 10.64 13.78 10.10 9.93 
colour camouflage microwave 2.10 0.07 2.17 3.11 
colour camouflage infrared 2.58 1.08 2.74 3.11 
colour camouflage multiple systems 4.99 7.79 4.61 4.15 
colour camouflage closed circuit tv 7.13 5.13 7.30 7.94 
colour camouflage human guard 9.08 9.00 9.15 8.99 
colour camouflage chance detection 12.28 11.43 13.04 11.24 
system knowledge multiple systems 7.56 8.78 6.82 8.33 
system knowledge microwave 8.08 11.75 7.25 7.62 
system knowledge infrared 8.50 11.28 8.14 7.62 
system knowledge human guard 9.94 12.35 10.11 8.21 
system knowledge closed circuit tv 9.90 13.94 9.35 8.68 
system knowledge chance detection 11.30 14.53 10.05 11.97 
knowledge and diversion multiple systems 7.77 9.80 6.97 8.21 
knowledge and diversion infrared 9.18 13.35 8.24 8.67 
knowledge and diversion microwave 9.14 12.88 8.30 8.67 
knowledge and diversion closed circuit tv 10.97 15.30 10.24 9.97 
knowledge and diversion human guard 11.37 14.53 11.45 9.40 
knowledge and diversion chance detection 11.56 15.18 10.39 11.85 
violent destruction closed circuit tv 4.93 3.51 4.85 5.90 
violent destruction microwave 5.48 2.08 5.12 8.13 
violent destruction infrared 5.49 2.08 5.37 7.67 
violent destruction human guard 6.26 7.37 5.39 7.37 
violent destruction multiple systems 7.32 4.92 7.29 8.77 
violent destruction chance detection 7.77 4.38 8.16 8.94 
system knowledge closed circuit tv 5.42 3.91 5.28 6.58 
system knowledge infrared 5.61 3.11 5.18 7.90 
system knowledge microwave 6.01 4.12 5.61 7.90 
system knowledge multiple systems 7.04 5.14 6.52 9.14 
system knowledge human guard 7.57 12.53 5.22 9.46 
system knowledge chance detection 8.39 9.69 6.87 10.67 
cut power closed circuit tv 4.50 4.63 4.42 4.59 
cut power infrared 5.69 3.62 5.95 6.36 
cut power microwave 5.77 3.62 6.08 6.36 
cut power multiple systems 7.03 3.91 6.84 9.19 
cut power chance detection 10.58 8.68 11.29 10.23 
cut power human guard 10.85 11.73 10.22 11.60 
electrical interference closed circuit tv 4.57 4.63 4.20 5.29 
electrical interference infrared 6.40 7.42 5.07 8.48 
electrical interference microwave 5.95 4.12 4.88 9.14 
electrical interference multiple systems 7.49 6.74 6.46 9.99 
electrical interference human guard 11.56 17.30 9.66 12.07 
electrical interference chance detection 11.57 17.30 10.53 10.37 
physical intimidation human guard 5.99 6.42 5.85 6.01 
physical intimidation chance detection 7.41 9.69 5.71 9.57 
physical intimidation closed circuit tv 11.40 15.83 8.87 13.93 
physical intimidation infrared 12.70 17.30 9.57 16.43 
physical intimidation microwave 12.79 17.30 9.71 16.43 
physical intimidation multiple systems 12.87 17.30 10.54 15.35 
accidental chance detection 8.16 8.20 8.20 8.07 
accidental human guard 10.98 11.40 11.40 9.90 
accidental closed circuit tv 12.82 13.30 13.30 11.57 
accidental multiple systems 14.28 12.88 15.19 13.27 
accidental infrared 17.06 17.30 17.30 16.46 
accidental microwave 17.06 17.30 17.30 16.46 
human life general public 4.16 5.39 4.13 3.53 
human life police 4.60 7.40 3.82 4.57 
human life security patrol 5.78 7.40 5.22 6.00 
human life armed 6.35 7.91 6.43 5.28 
human life high tech 7.60 6.39 7.40 8.88 
human life insurance 11.75 11.53 11.31 12.76 
large cash security patrol 5.97 7.78 6.38 4.11 
large cash high tech 6.66 6.41 7.01 6.00 
large cash police 6.75 6.75 6.44 7.36 
large cash armed 6.92 6.39 7.05 6.94 
large cash general public 7.26 8.43 6.90 7.25 
large cash insurance 10.31 10.08 10.67 9.71 
corporate data high tech 7.01 8.22 7.43 5.20 
corporate data police 9.33 8.85 8.76 10.97 
corporate data security patrol 10.03 11.03 9.19 11.01 
corporate data general public 10.27 8.69 10.15 11.59 
corporate data insurance 12.23 11.55 11.53 14.32 
corporate data armed 12.80 14.83 10.44 16.36 
small cash general public 7.01 7.98 6.62 7.24 
small cash security patrol 8.31 10.28 7.99 7.81 
small cash police 10.78 11.90 10.05 11.50 
small cash high tech 11.81 11.69 12.11 11.28 
small cash insurance 12.74 9.52 13.23 13.60 
small cash armed 13.93 16.00 12.50 15.61 
personal valuables general public 7.07 5.13 7.24 7.83 
personal valuables security patrol 8.78 9.48 9.06 7.83 
personal valuables police 9.68 7.18 9.49 11.50 
personal valuables high tech 11.77 8.04 12.12 13.45 
personal valuables insurance 12.50 10.75 12.96 12.57 
personal valuables armed 14.47 15.65 13.32 16.09 
low value goods general public 4.43 4.10 4.10 5.27 
low value goods security patrol 10.98 11.40 11.40 9.90 
low value goods police 13.02 13.30 13.30 12.30 
low value goods insurance 13.22 13.30 13.30 13.03 
low value goods high tech 16.41 17.30 17.30 14.11 
low value goods armed 16.94 17.30 17.30 16.00 
small cash accidental 2.30 2.10 1.74 3.53 
small cash very low motivation 4.21 2.10 4.57 4.70 
small cash low motivation 5.54 5.93 5.62 5.16 
small cash moderate motivation 6.96 5.93 7.63 6.21 
small cash high motivation 8.17 10.28 8.41 6.48 
small cash extreme motivation 8.81 11.08 9.33 6.48 
low value goods accidental 0.72 0.07 0.07 2.38 
low value goods very low motivation 4.26 4.10 4.10 4.69 
low value goods low motivation 7.87 8.20 8.20 7.03 
low value goods moderate motivation 8.16 8.20 8.20 8.07 
low value goods extreme motivation 10.98 11.40 11.40 9.90 
low value goods high motivation 10.98 11.40 11.40 9.90 
personal valuables accidental 3.47 2.10 2.67 5.86 
personal valuables very low motivation 5.58 4.92 5.16 6.77 
personal valuables low motivation 7.08 5.93 7.43 7.04 
personal valuables moderate motivation 8.27 9.25 8.60 7.05 
personal valuables high motivation 9.70 10.75 10.54 7.41 
personal valuables extreme motivation 9.94 10.75 10.88 7.61 
corporate data accidental 7.95 6.97 7.12 10.17 
corporate data low motivation 10.50 9.48 10.45 11.17 
corporate data very low motivation 10.61 11.23 10.05 11.37 
corporate data moderate motivation 12.30 12.23 12.26 12.43 
corporate data high motivation 13.10 13.18 13.19 12.90 
corporate data extreme motivation 14.01 13.65 14.30 13.64 
large cash accidental 9.09 7.44 8.37 11.49 
large cash very low motivation 9.94 9.83 9.06 11.76 
large cash low motivation 11.11 10.63 11.08 11.44 
large cash moderate motivation 12.49 12.08 12.79 12.11 
large cash high motivation 13.33 13.70 14.02 11.74 
large cash extreme motivation 14.11 14.18 14.91 12.48 
human life very low motivation 10.87 12.70 10.29 11.00 
human life accidental 10.56 9.04 10.57 11.43 
human life low motivation 11.97 13.35 11.82 11.47 
human life moderate motivation 13.29 14.65 13.30 12.48 
human life high motivation 13.98 15.35 14.23 12.68 
human life extreme motivation 14.16 16.00 14.18 13.05 
cut power extreme motivation 4.43 4.10 4.10 5.27 
cut power high motivation 4.43 4.10 4.10 5.27 
cut power moderate motivation 4.56 4.10 4.10 5.73 
cut power very low motivation 6.85 5.47 7.03 7.49 
cut power low motivation 8.16 8.20 8.20 8.07 
cut power accidental 8.24 8.20 8.20 8.34 
physical intimidation extreme motivation 4.59 7.90 4.72 2.63 
physical intimidation high motivation 5.35 8.97 5.45 3.30 
physical intimidation moderate motivation 6.10 10.97 6.25 3.30 
physical intimidation low motivation 7.59 11.60 7.93 4.79 
physical intimidation very low motivation 8.42 13.60 7.99 6.84 
physical intimidation accidental 10.03 15.10 9.48 8.76 
electric tools extreme motivation 4.90 9.60 4.23 4.12 
electric tools high motivation 5.23 9.60 4.48 4.79 
electric tools moderate motivation 6.49 10.33 6.10 5.48 
electric tools low motivation 8.01 10.97 7.65 7.38 
electric tools very low motivation 8.34 10.97 8.19 7.38 
electric tools accidental 9.97 12.67 9.92 8.76 
violent destruction extreme motivation 6.75 7.90 6.46 6.86 
violent destruction high motivation 7.20 8.97 6.86 7.09 
violent destruction moderate motivation 7.50 10.97 6.67 7.71 
violent destruction low motivation 8.24 11.43 8.07 7.04 
violent destruction very low motivation 8.96 14.00 8.54 7.42 
violent destruction accidental 9.57 12.67 9.61 7.94 
explosive extreme motivation 6.69 8.26 5.78 8.03 
explosive high motivation 7.16 8.26 6.26 8.71 
explosive moderate motivation 8.97 10.70 8.32 9.62 
explosive low motivation 9.12 11.17 8.56 9.39 
explosive very low motivation 10.39 14.27 9.37 10.83 
explosive accidental 10.48 14.00 9.47 11.06 
technological attack extreme motivation 8.30 11.60 6.74 10.28 
technological attack high motivation 8.57 11.60 7.36 9.85 
technological attack moderate motivation 9.55 12.03 8.40 10.98 
technological attack very low motivation 9.89 12.53 9.28 9.98 
technological attack low motivation 10.37 11.60 9.88 10.90 
technological attack accidental 11.10 14.27 10.82 10.16 
low value goods explosive 0.52 0.07 0.07 1.69 
low value goods technological attack 0.52 0.07 0.07 1.69 
low value goods physical intimidation 8.00 8.20 8.20 7.50 
low value goods violent destruction 8.00 8.20 8.20 7.50 
low value goods cut power 12.57 13.30 13.30 10.68 
low value goods electric tools 12.57 13.30 13.30 10.68 
small cash explosive 4.18 6.29 4.09 3.31 
small cash technological attack 5.78 9.27 5.55 4.52 
small cash violent destruction 6.86 10.07 6.43 6.19 
small cash physical intimidation 8.35 9.60 9.20 5.87 
small cash electric tools 9.00 8.97 9.98 6.87 
small cash cut power 9.68 9.27 10.67 7.72 
personal valuables explosive 4.66 7.16 3.46 6.01 
personal valuables technological attack 7.12 8.53 6.28 8.22 
personal valuables violent destruction 7.90 9.00 7.64 7.90 
personal valuables electric tools 8.74 8.53 8.71 8.90 
personal valuables physical intimidation 9.23 9.00 9.74 8.22 
personal valuables cut power 9.95 9.27 9.96 10.28 
corporate data explosive 9.18 8.52 9.30 9.24 
corporate data physical intimidation 10.09 12.50 10.48 8.03 
corporate data electric tools 11.00 10.97 11.45 10.07 
corporate data violent destruction 11.01 12.73 10.20 11.30 
corporate data cut power 11.35 5.19 13.12 10.60 
corporate data technological attack 13.00 13.77 13.06 12.48 
large cash explosive 10.76 13.40 10.01 11.07 
large cash violent destruction 10.95 12.03 10.64 11.07 
large cash physical intimidation 11.15 13.40 10.81 10.75 
large cash electric tools 11.24 12.03 11.28 10.77 
large cash cut power 11.96 12.67 11.79 11.98 
large cash technological attack 12.17 14.00 11.84 11.98 
human life technological attack 9.24 9.60 9.64 8.19 
human life cut power 10.10 13.30 10.25 8.19 
human life electric tools 11.16 13.13 11.00 10.53 
human life physical intimidation 12.57 14.23 12.56 11.75 
human life explosive 13.30 14.47 12.59 14.25 
human life violent destruction 14.02 15.33 13.81 13.82 
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Appendix J 
J1: Test Case 10 
Identifying a case with similarity to Test Case 9 however considering a different stronger delay for physical security 
effectiveness from the knowledge matrices (considering all values over all listed attack-type elements in the orthogonal 
continuum) of defensive-type universal elements we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high strength value is 6.69 (e.g. high percentage of steel structure considering an attack by 
electric drill). 
2. Section B, where a high material dimensions value is 7.66 (e.g. 5 human high steel small mesh with razor wire 
considering an attack by a ladder).  
3. Section C, where a low detection value is 4.15 (e.g. infrared detection considering an attack creating false alarms). 
4. Section D, where a high detection value is 5.55 (e.g. infrared detection considering an attack using system 
knowledge). 
5. Section E, where a medium response value is 8.76 (e.g. security patrol response considering personal valuables as 
an asset). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 5.17. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 14.35 
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -51.25 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -15.90 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -76.66 
For Response Probability: 
m value  = - (Section A) * (Section B)  * ((17.3 / (Section E)) - 1) = -49.96 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -76.66 
 
Figure 20 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 10 as tangent curves for the model showing that the delay probability 
- detection probability intersection crosses at -40°. Figure 20 also presents the delay probability - response probability 
intersection crosses as -21°. 
Figure 20
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By the consideration of a stronger barrier material and barrier topping parameter inputs into the model, the resultant 
intersection points of the curves have changed to significantly increase the effectiveness of the physical security 
arrangement. The delay probability - detection probability intersection of approximately -40° can be compared to -64° for 
Test Case 9 for the consideration of the same attacking-type parameters. Although the response input parameter is 
unchanged from Test Case 9, the delay probability - response probability intersection is -21° compared to -58° for Test 
Case 9. The significant increase that can be seen in both intersection points of Figure 20 is attributed to the increase in 
barrier arrangement relative to Test Case 9. It follows from logical interpretation that where a stronger consideration for 
delay probability is introduced to a physical security arrangement, the more likely that the response probability will 
improve its suitability. This improvement in response probability occurs without any actual change to the response 
parameter between these test cases.  
 
In this example the model presents an interesting aspect to this research where it proposes that the curve for response 
probability is directly related to the parameter input for delay probability. This interrelationship provides for a 
demonstrated interpretation of the results of this study through use of the values out of the knowledge matrices and the 
consideration of effectiveness between dissimilar conceptual entities. 
  
Test Case 11 provides a similar consideration to Test Case 10 but in the new example the relationship between detection 
probability and response probability is demonstrated. This example is presented as a direct comparison to Test Case 9 
where the only altered input parameters are for a stronger detection system. 
 
 J2: Test Case 11 
Identifying a case with similarity to Test Case 9 however considering a stronger detection system for physical security 
effectiveness from the knowledge matrices (considering all values over all listed attack-type elements in the orthogonal 
continuum) of defensive-type universal elements we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high strength value is 4.04 (e.g. high percentage of brick structure considering an attack by 
electric drill). 
2. Section B, where a high material dimensions value is 6.13 (e.g. 5 human high smooth brick wall considering an 
attack by a ladder).  
3. Section C, where a low detection value is 3.27 (e.g. multiple detection systems considering an attack creating false 
alarms). 
4. Section D, where a high detection value is 7.36 (e.g. multiple detection systems considering an attack using violent 
destruction). 
5. Section E, where a medium response value is 8.76 (e.g. security patrol response considering personal valuables as 
an asset). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 5.17. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 10.17 
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -24.77 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -13.21 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -46.38 
For Response Probability: 
m value  = - (Section A) * (Section B)  * ((17.3 / (Section E)) - 1) = -24.14 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -46.38 
 
Figure 21 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 11 as tangent curves for the model showing that the delay probability 
- detection probability intersection crosses at -41°. Figure 21 also presents the delay probability - response probability 
intersection crosses as -32°. 
Figure 21
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The inclusion of a stronger detection system as the only altered input parameter inputs into the model, demonstrate that the 
resultant intersection points of the curves have again changed to significantly from Test Case 9. The increase the 
effectiveness of the delay probability - detection probability intersection of approximately -41° can be compared to -64° 
for Test Case 9 for the consideration of the same attacking-type parameters. The delay probability - response probability 
intersection crosses as -32° compared to -58° for Test Case 9. It can be seen that by increasing the detection system of a 
physical security arrangement the model has proposed that the effectiveness for response probability also increases.  
 
The results from Test Case 10 and Test Case 11 are similar in effect where significant increase in the intersection point for 
the response probability and delay probability curves can be attributed to the increase in either delay parameter input or 
detection parameter input. The model proposes that with a relative increase in the delay probability or alternatively a 
relative increase in the detection probability, a relative increase in the response probability will result.  
 
Test Case 12 provides another example of an increase to the delay probability curve response probability curve 
intersection point where the only altered input parameter is for a stronger response system. 
 
 J3: Test Case 12: 
Identifying a case with similarity to Test Case 8 however considering a different slightly weaker response for physical 
security effectiveness from the knowledge matrices (considering all values over all listed attack-type elements in the 
orthogonal continuum) of defensive-type universal elements we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high strength value is 4.04 (e.g. high percentage of brick structure considering an attack by 
electric drill). 
2. Section B, where a high material dimensions value is 6.13 (e.g. 5 human high smooth brick wall considering an 
attack by a ladder).  
3. Section C, where a low detection value is 4.15 (e.g. infrared detection considering an attack creating false alarms). 
4. Section D, where a high detection value is 5.55 (e.g. infrared detection considering an attack using system 
knowledge). 
5. Section E, where a medium response value is 6.05 (e.g. security patrol response considering large cash as an asset). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 5.17. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 10.17  
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -24.77 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -15.90 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -76.66 
For Response Probability: 
m value  = - (Section A) * (Section B)  * ((17.3 / (Section E)) - 1) = -46.05 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -76.66 
 
Figure 22 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 12 as tangent curves for the model showing that the delay probability 
- detection probability intersection crosses at -64°. Figure 22 also presents the delay probability - response probability 
intersection crosses as -43°. 
Figure 22
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The inclusion of a better response into the model, demonstrate that the resultant intersection points of the curves have 
changed marginally from Test Case 9. The delay probability - response probability intersection crosses at -43° compared 
to -58° for Test Case 9 and -50° for Test Case 8.  
 
The results from Test Case 12 suggest that the model considers input toward stronger delay probability or stronger 
detection probability to be more significant to the overall response probability than by increasing the model’s input 
parameters for response. Thus the concept for response is treated more holistically by full consideration of the inter-
relationship of response probability to both delay probability and detection probability.  
  
Test Case 13 has been included for demonstration purposes where the strongest case for response consideration is useful to 
be able to consider the magnitude of the changes relating to the intersection point of the delay probability – response 
probability curves in the previous examples. 
  
 
 
 J4: Test Case 13: 
Identifying a case with the strongest physical security effectiveness for delay detection and response arrangements for all 
Test Cases 8-12 for physical security from the knowledge matrices (considering all values over all listed attack-type 
elements in the orthogonal continuum) of defensive-type universal elements we can assign values for: 
1. Section A, where a high strength value is 6.69 (e.g. high percentage of steel structure considering an attack by 
electric drill). 
2. Section B, where a high material dimensions value is 7.66 (e.g. 5 human high steel small mesh with razor wire 
considering an attack by a ladder).  
3. Section C, where a low detection value is 3.27 (e.g. multiple detection systems considering an attack creating false 
alarms). 
4. Section D, where a high detection value is 7.36 (e.g. multiple detection systems considering an attack using violent 
destruction). 
5. Section E, where a medium response value is 6.05 (e.g. security patrol response considering large cash as an asset). 
 
These values can be considered for the model in Figure 5.17. 
For Delay Probability:  
m value  = (Section A) + (Section B) = 14.35 
b value = - (Section A) * (Section B) =  -51.25 
For Detection Probability: 
m value  = - 34.6 + (17.3 - (Section C)) + (Section D) = -13.21 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -46.38 
For Response Probability: 
m value  = - (Section A) * (Section B)  * ((17.3 / (Section E)) - 1) = -95.29 
b value = (17.3 - (Section C)) * (Section D) – (299.29 / 2) = -46.38 
 
Figure 23 provides the conceptual map for Test Case 13 as tangent curves for the model showing that the delay probability 
- detection probability intersection crosses at 10°. Figure 23 also presents the delay probability - response probability 
intersection crosses as 3°. 
Figure 23
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The results for Test Case 13 indicate the strongest case for the delay probability - response probability intersection is likely 
to be in the vicinity of -10° to 10°. This is noted for reference purposes for the model and can be seen to be significantly 
lower than the corresponding strongest case for the delay probability - detection probability intersection point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
